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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the foundations of risk assessment.
By exploring the polysemantics of basic concepts and their influence on the pro-
cess and results of risk assessment, the thesis endeavors to clarify the words of risk
assessment and promote reflection among practitioners and scholars. The findings
are derived from integration and critique of pioneering and state of the art literature.
Risk is a characteristic of the future concerning the uncertain consequences of
decisions and contingencies. Understanding risk urges contemplation on funda-
mental issues of ontology (is risk a real-world property?) and epistemology (what
can we know about risk?). The many-faceted concept has been differently inter-
preted across time, cultures and disciplines. Numerous definitions coexist in dis-
sonance and concordance, caricaturing risk singly or as a combination of events,
consequences, probability or uncertainty. The quantitative definition of Kaplan and
Garrick (1981) embeds all elements, defining risk as the answer to three questions:
1) What can happen? 2) How likely is it? 3) If it does happen, what are the conse-
quences? In comparison with contending definitions, this triplet definition gains
in comprehensibility and relevancy to risk assessment. The defining questions are,
however, very capacious and render significant interpretative freedom. Focal to this
study is the first question, whose associated terminology is particularly vague and
on which focused discussions remain most disturbingly few.
An alternative means for grasping the concept of risk is to examine its related
counterconcepts. Uncertainty not only makes a central component of risk, it also
has a complementary meaning as lack of confidence in the results of risk analysis.
Safety is often conceived as freedom from unacceptable risk or the antonym of risk.
The conceptually sensitive coupling between risk and safety reveals that the right-
ness of this claim depends on whether uncertainty is considered part of the second
question of Kaplan and Garrick (1981). Security is the equivalent of safety in situa-
tions of intentional harm. The moral and analytical complexities of security outdo
those of safety since the first question becomes how someone canmake something
happen. Vulnerability is the lacking ability of a system to resist the impact of an un-
wanted event and to restore to its original function. The relation between risk and
vulnerability is not commutative. A counterconcept to vulnerability is resilience,
meaning a system’s ability to bounce back to a reference state after a disturbance.
Complementing the negatively connoted concept of riskwith resilience offers a pos-
itive perspective for mastering the dynamics of future uncertainties.
Risk analysis is the process of answering the triplet definition of risk, whereas
risk assessment refers to the wider process of risk analysis and risk evaluation. Nei-
ther the analytical process nor its results should be considered in isolation from the
purpose of risk assessment, which is to inform decision making about risk. Deci-
sions shall be risk-informed, not risk-based, meaning that risk assessment is never
the sole input to decisions. The plurality of stakeholders and the prevalence of un-
certainties represent twomajor challenges to risk-informed decisionmaking. Fram-
ing analysis by deliberation and informing deliberation by analysis presupposes that
decision makers understand the words and results of risk assessment.
Hazard is a source of potential harm. Whereas risk pivots on the future realiza-
tion of this potential, hazard exists presently and solely at the source. Closely related
is the concept of threat, which is conceptually reserved to sources of intentional
damage. There is a plethora of terms marking the intersection between prevention
and mitigation in the realization of a hazardous potential. Hazardous event is pro-
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moted as the least ambiguous denotation, defined as an event confined to the first
significant release of a hazards that will result in harmful exposure if not controlled.
Triggering event and safety issues are promising concepts for bridging hazards and
hazardous events. Triggering events are the most immediate causes of hazardous
events, while safety issues are one or more hazards in combination with local trig-
gering events. Both concepts reflect the calculability and controllability of risk and
should thus be used with caution.
Accident scenario is promoted as the answer to the question of what can go
wrong. It is a uniquely defined path in an event tree, confined by an initiating event
and a corresponding end state. Unfortunately, both the concept itself and the terms
that confine are circularly defined. Initiating event is a vague descriptor that in prin-
ciple can be placed anywhere in the bowtie-diagram. End states are pragmatically
conditioned on the purpose of analysis; implicitly through the selection of conse-
quences and explicitly in the relevancy of pivotal events. A principal advice is that
any accident scenario shall be terminated in the absence of discrete ramifications.
Contrasting the scenario approach to risk assessment with the conventional ap-
proach in Norway shows that accident scenario is not imperative to the triplet def-
inition of risk. A revised definition of accident scenario is suggested in initiative to
further discussion: An accident scenario is a sequence of events from the hazardous
event to a uniquely determined end state of relevance.
The study has demonstrated the importance of striving for a clear and consis-
tent terminology. Researchers, practitioners and regulators use the words of risk
assessment differently and inconsistently. Not only does this preclude communica-
tion internally and across analysis teams, it also leads to erroneous applications of
methods and inexpedient use of results. This urges terminological vigilance of ev-
ery practitioner, as well as further academic and standardization efforts towards a
unifying nomenclature. A key challenge is to reconcile the analyst’s need for prag-
matic procedures with the decision maker’s call for consistent and communicable
results. Ultimately, this is a matter of finding the optimal fit between analysis and
deliberation in risk-informed decision making.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Risk is an intuitive concept that complicates and spices up our daily lives. Perhaps
now more than ever, the headlines of the recent spring have demonstrated the om-
nipresence of risk in modern society. The risk of encountering volcano ash clouds
has pushed airline systems on the edge of bankruptcy and stranded state and indus-
trial affairs. Whereas these are consequences of excessive caution, the blowout of an
oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010 has alerted the world to the costs of reck-
lessness. This and similar catastrophes of the past exert considerable influence on
how we think about forthcoming decision problems. A topical example is the issue
of future oil and gas production at the newly drawn dividing line in the Barents Sea.
The alchemy of risk assessment is to transform experience into foresight, in order to
ensure that such decisions are informed by the best available technical knowledge.
Risk assessment is a many splintered thing. It is a discipline of numerous meth-
ods, scholars and fields of application. This diversity has led the words of risk as-
sessment into a bewildering land of ambiguity and confusion. Notably contentious
is the fundamental concept of risk, over which theorists have fought to define since
the rise of the scientific risk literature in the late 1960s. Commonly accepted is the
quantitative definition of Kaplan and Garrick (1981), defining risk as the answer to
three questions:
1. What can happen?
2. How likely is it?
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences?
In a talk given to a plenary session at the Society for Risk Analysis, Kaplan (1997)
notes that the scientific community is still discussing how we should interpret this
triplet definition of risk. This attention has by and large been directed at the second
question. Representative is Aven’s (2003) preoccupation with the interpretation of
probability and uncertainty in quantitative risk assessment. Few have yet sought to
clarify the first of these questions or contemplate the variety of terms sustaining our
conception of risk. An attempt of the latter is made by Christensen et al. (2003), who
compare a selection of definitions on the central terms of risk assessment. Albeit
elucidating, this contribution is more collocating than reflective, hence failing to
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provide rudimentary insights. The nomenclature of risk assessment is still ambigu-
ous after more than forty years of application. Since this leads to communication
problems, erroneous applications of methods and so on, there is a call for enhanced
understanding and shared awareness of the foundational concepts of risk assess-
ment.
1.2 Objectives
The purpose of this study is to shed light on the foundations of risk assessment, dis-
cuss the basic concepts and how their interpretation influences the analysis process
and the understanding of results from risk assessment. From this overall goal, five
lower level objectives are deduced:
1. Perform a literature survey and discuss the main definitions (or interpreta-
tions) of the term risk- and also discuss how the term risk is related to concepts
like safety, security, vulnerability and so on.
2. Discuss the concept of accident scenario. Suggest a “suitable” definition and
especially discuss the extent of a scenario. What is the initiating event of the
scenario and where should the development of the scenario be terminated?
3. Discuss the concepts of hazard and threat- and triggering events. Do we need
to distinguish between these concepts? The aviation organization ICAO has
suggested to focus on so-called safety issues. What are the benefits and limita-
tions of this approach?
4. How can we measure and compare consequences to various types of assets?
-and how can we obtain a single measure for different degrees of harm to one
type of assets (e.g., fatalities, injuries, permanent vs. non-permanent disabili-
ties)?
5. Discuss risk assessment as basis for decision-making. What are the pros and
cons related to risk-based decision making and risk-informed decision mak-
ing?
Following agreement with the supervisor, task 4 will not be covered in this study.
1.3 Limitations
The thematic coverage is confined to four out of five tasks in approaching the over-
all objective. Omitting the fourth issue of consequent measurement is not con-
sidered depriving to the remainder. It does, however, remain a cardinal aspect in
risk-informed decisionmaking that requires examination in its own right. The same
holds for the concept of probability, whose interpretation affects both the derivation
and understanding of the results of risk assessment.
The study is limited to considerations of accident risk. It does not cover con-
tinuous, gradual or long-term development, as is typical for analysis of health and
environmental risk. Nor is vulnerability analysis considered, albeit the concept of
vulnerability is thoroughly discussed as a counterconcept to risk. The reader should
beware that all findings are not directly transferable beyond applications of accident
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risk. Accident scenario, for instance, is ameaningless descriptor of risk from contin-
uous emissions. The first half of the report is by and large concerned with generic
insights relevant to all domains of (bodily) risk.
A second limitation concerns the study’s adherence to the traditional way of
thinking about risk analysis. Novel perspectives and methods, like resilience en-
gineering and dynamic modeling approaches, are left out of consideration. This is
because the overall objective calls for elaboration of basic concepts rather than pre-
sentation of advanced models or contending paradigms. The reader is not required
any previous knowledge on the subject, although advised to consult additional ref-
erences on scarcely covered topics.
The findings are derived from integration and critique of pioneering and state
of the art literature. The study is hence purely theoretical. During the literature se-
lection process, emphasis has been placed on conceptual contributions, but also on
mapping the variety of terms and definitions across applications and guidelines. A
challenge that follows is the difficulty of reconciling pragmatic concernswith a quest
for generic insights. Some terms are amenable to general definition, while others are
necessarily pragmatically conditioned. In the latter case, the most valuable findings
are the nuances and contrasts of the various conceptions, calling for terminological
vigilance of practitioners and scholars of risk assessment.
1.4 Structure
Chapter 2 explores the many facets of risk. Broad characteristics of the concept are
presented, followed by a philosophical briefing on contentious ontological and epis-
temological interpretations. Abstraction is finally sought by discussing a handful of
definitions with emphasis on conceptual content and clarity. The quantitative def-
inition of Kaplan and Garrick (1981) is adopted for the study, while stressing the
importance of clarifying foundational ambiguities in the respective questions.
The following chapter seeks to clarify what risk is not by relating it to central
counterconcepts. First, uncertainty is examined as a constituent yet complemen-
tary concept to risk. A discussion on the antonymous concept of safety follows
thereafter, along with the related, but more complex concept of security. The feasi-
bility of extending and complementing risk analysis is lastly discussed by contrast-
ing risk with the concepts of vulnerability and resilience.
Chapter 4 examines the contents and role of risk assessment in mastering tech-
nological risk. Risk assessment is briefly described with the visual aid of the bowtie-
diagram and an introduction to logic modeling. Contemplation follows on the pur-
pose of risk assessment, leading to a discussion on its prevalent strengths and limi-
tations. Most attention is devoted to the use of risk assessment in decision making,
particularly aided by the decision making framework of Aven (2003).
Subsequently, chapter 5 seeks to tidy up the toolbox of concepts for answering
the first question of Kaplan and Garrick (1981). The concepts of hazard and threat
make the starting point of inquiry, while a philosophical discussion on event and
causation lays the foundation for entering the jungle of terms relating a hazard to
events of cause and realization. Central are the concepts of hazardous event and
triggering event as conceived in the framework of Reason (1990b). ICAO’s concept of
safety issues is eventually considered in light of the remaining terminological knobs.
Chapter 6 examinesKaplan andGarrick’s (1981) conceptionof accident scenario.
The extent of a scenario is problematized by exploring the terms of initiating event
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and end state. A final discussion pulls the threads together by questioning the con-
ceptual soundness of accident scenario and contrasting the scenario approach to
risk assessment with the approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001). The chapter is closed
by suggesting a refined definition of accident scenario in initiative to further reflec-
tion.
Commentary conclusions and recommendations for further work are given in
the epilogue of chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Understanding risk
2.1 Introduction
If you ask ten persons what they mean by the word risk you will, most likely, get
ten different answers. Not only are the conceptions of lay people and professionals
prone to differ, disparities are striking also within those communities. The polyse-
mantics of risk are aptly captured by Garland (2003, p.49):
Today’s accounts of risk are remarkable for their multiplicity and for the
variety of senses they give to the term. Risk is a calculation. Risk is a
commodity. Risk is a capital. Risk is a technique of government. Risk
is objective and scientifically knowable. Risk is subjective and socially
constructed. Risk is a problem, a threat, a source of insecurity. Risk is
a pleasure, a thrill, a source for profit and freedom. Risk is the means
whereby we colonize and control the future. ‘Risk society’ is our late
modern world spinning out of control.
Against this backdrop of ambiguity, risk has become the buzzword of today. It is the
subject of debate and analysis, anxiety and speculation. Christensen et al. (2003) as-
sert that its manifold interpretations lead one not only to doubt if discourses struc-
ture around the same thing, but also whether individual sciences have a clear con-
ception of what they are investigating. Whether equipped with the techno-scientific
objective of estimation, or the socio-culturalists’ aimof contextual explanation (Lup-
ton, 1999), misconceptions are likely to propagate if the basic object of analysis is
encapsulated with confusion. When analyzing and debating risk, it is rudimentary
to clarify what we actually mean by risk.
This chapter explores the many facets of risk. First, broad characteristics of the
concept are presented, followed by a philosophical briefing on the ontology and
epistemology of risk. Abstraction is subsequently sought in the representation of
a handful of risk definitions. The definitions are discussed with respect to concep-
tual content and clarity, before finally emphasizing the importance of elucidating
foundational issues in risk assessment.
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2.2 Characterizing risk
2.2.1 The remarkable history of risk
Equipped with the title Against the Gods, Bernstein (1996) entertainingly maps the
remarkable history of risk. The word risk, he introduces, stems from the Italian risi-
care, meaning “to dare”. At the very heart of the risk concept is the ability to define
what may happen in the future and to choose among alternatives. Central to Bern-
stein’s story telling is how quantitative breakthroughs over the past 450 years have
shaped the trajectory of progress into a modern society uniquely characterized by
its mastery of risk. Anthropologist Lupton (1999) tells the story from a different per-
spective, mapping the changing conceptions of risk through time. The premise of
Lupton is that our understanding of risk takes place in a specific socio-cultural and
historical context. Risk in its early, 16th century use denoted unfortunate events be-
yond the scope of human intervention. The emergence of modernity andwith it the
disciplines of probability and statistics, readjusted the notion to what could bemea-
sured, calculated and prevented. In the everyday parlance of contemporary western
societies, the term is loosened. Today, risk seemingly characterizes any hazardous,
misfortunate, or simply annoying event. We speak of nuclear accidents, terrorism
attacks and delayed departure of trains using the same notion of risk.
An extensive expert apparatus proliferated in the 20th century with the aim of
understanding, measuring and controlling risk. A band of scientists have of this rea-
son caricatured our postmodern society as preoccupied with risk. Among the most
influential is the dystopian Beck (1992), postulating that we currently live in a risk
society that is undermining its own preconditions. In remarkable contrast is Bern-
stein (1996), who positively portrays a society that has broken down the barriers for
mastering risk. Modern conceptions of risk, he concludes, goes hand in hand with
opportunity for gain and historical progress. Either one sides with Beck (1992) or
Bernstein (1996), it can be concluded that risk is a defining characteristic of con-
temporary society. According to Lupton (1999), there are at least six pressing risk
domains in the present socio-cultural, political and economic context of western
societies:
• Environmental risk related to global warming, pollution, radiation, chemicals
and floods.
• Lifestyle risk in consumption of food and drugs, sexual activities, driving prac-
tices, stress and leisure.
• Medical risk of drug therapy, surgery, childbirth and diagnostic tests.
• Interpersonal risk from engaging in intimate relationships, social interactions,
love, sexuality and parenting.
• Economic risk of under- or unemployment, loan, investment and bankruptcy.
• Criminal risk of participating in or being the victim of illegal activities.
A seventh group of technological risk may be added, capturing the accidental side
effects of technological innovations that preoccupy technical risk assessors and the-
orists like Perrow (1984) and Beck (1992).
The preponderant domains in which risk now applies are very diverse. What are
common to these situations, rendering them explainable by one single word? Broad
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qualitative features of the risk concept are presented in the following. These can be
summarized as:
Risk is a characteristic of the future concerning the uncertain conse-
quences of decisions and contingencies.
2.2.2 Uncertainty about future consequences
Intuitive to the notion of risk is that something is at stake. It might be the loss of
life or limb, freedom, enterprise or biodiversity. According to Fischhoff et al. (1984),
the most defining aspect of risk is the attribution of consequences to future events.
Lupton (1999) observes that contemporary conceptions of risk almost exclusively
relate to undesirable consequences. An important exception is the parlance of eco-
nomic speculation, where one speaks of “good” and “bad” risk as the anatomy of
making money. Attempting to generalize this view, economist Holton (2004) pro-
motes a sole requirement in that someone must care about, that is, be exposed to
the consequences. Luhmann (1991) elaborates that one can speak of risk only if
able to draw certain distinctions; between good and bad outcomes, advantages and
disadvantages and the probability and improbability of occurrence.
The latter division brings us to the secondmajor characteristic of risk; the conse-
quences are probable to a varying degree, but never certain. If an outcome is certain
to happen, one does not face a risk (Adams, 1995). This is because risk is exclusively
concerned with consequences of a future that is draped in uncertainty. Although
omitting the word risk, Lindley (2006) preaches that the future is inherently inca-
pable of following logic’s rules of falsity and truth. When contemplating the future,
one must thus always prescribe probabilities that are neither 0 nor 1. The theory of
probability is of this reason at themathematical heart of the risk concept (Bernstein,
1996).
Accepting this tenet is conceptually quite challenging. Does it mean that an un-
protected person who jumps out of an airplane at 10 000 feet above ground does
not face a risk, since he is almost certain to die? Or if he does, is he facing high or
low risk? Most people would presumably agree that few activities involve greater
risk than this hypothetical extreme. The principal issue is that a probability close to,
but not equal to one, implies a high risk (Campbell, 2005). Whether we are certain
that this probability is correct is, however, a different but significant issue which will
reappear in Section 3.2.
While future consequences and their uncertain realization are central to both
lay people and experts’ conceptions of risk, they are also a primary source of dis-
cord. Philosopher Adler (2003) explains this by reference to probabilistic and non
probabilistic conceptions of risk, characterizing the weight people place on prob-
ability and consequence severity when contemplating risk. There is an extensive
body of literature on the subject that lies beyond the scope of this study. The inter-
ested reader may consult for instance Ball and Floyd (1998) or Tversky and Kahne-
man (1974). For now, wewill continue our exploration of the risk concept by abstract
attribution.
2.2.3 Fighting contingency
Luhmann (1991) conceives risk by causal attribution to decisions. Decisions, he
claims, are what binds time, making us turn the page from past to future by project-
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Figure 2.1: Demarcating risk (adopted from Rosa, 1998).
ing essential aspects of a described future onto the present. Accepting thepremise of
Luhmann, we speak of risk only if we can identify a decision without which the con-
sequences could not have occurred. The consequences are hence avoidable, that is,
within the influential scope of one or several decisionmakers. Rosa (1998) promotes
a similar position when demarcating risk from fate as depicted in Figure 2.1. While
this implies the exclusion of some situations from the risk concept (like meteorite
destruction of earth), the exceptions are fascinatingly few in number. In contem-
porary society, nearly all events are within the influence of humans. Instead of pas-
sively accepting the future, we actively engage in it in pursuit of control. The paradox
is that we can never fully manage the future, not even the one we generate bymeans
of our own decisions. In the context of risk, one is never emancipated from the gap
between possible and chosen action; reality and possibility. Renn (2008) explains
this as contingency; the future is neither predetermined, nor independent of today’s
activities. Embracing the disturbing conclusions of Perrow (1984), Luhmann main-
tains that the more we seek to control, the more contingencies are introduced and
risk proliferates. The gap between the past and future grows, and with it society’s
dependency on decision making.
The argumentation of Luhmann is deeply philosophical, and serves to support
a conclusion explaining societal processes in terms of risk rather than vice versa.
Nonetheless, it points to a crucial characteristic which simple conceptualizations
of risk as consequence and uncertainty seem to miss. When striving to understand
risk, wemust also understand the decisions that make up our very conception of it.
2.2.4 Past futures
Accepting that risk is related to future contingencies begs the question if one can
speak of past risk. Is it sound to claim that the risk of swine flu was high in 2009?
And if so, what considerations underly this statement; that over 900 000 Norwegians
caught the flu during 2009 (FHI, 2010) or the uncertain predictions at its very onset?
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Figure 2.2: Assessing risk retrospectively.
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) publishes an annual report ti-
tled Trends in risk levels (RNNP). RNNP endeavors tomeasure risk levels by collocat-
ing a range of relevant indicators, like reported accidents during the year of interest
(PSA, 2010). A conclusion is drawn regarding the risk level as observed. Is this a
proper use of the term risk? Rhetorically, one can ask what to conclude if there were
zero reported accidents during the period. Does that mean that the risk was zero?
Consulting the risk literature, the advice is an unanimous no. Risk can never be zero,
unless we stop performing the activity in question (Adams, 1995). More importantly,
looking back at the past, one is able to say with certainty that an accident has or has
not happened. Since certainty has got nothing to do with the concept of risk, it is
the opinion of this author that PSA should consider rephrasing their publication to,
for example, Trends in safety performance levels.
Monitoring trends in risk levels is not an unreasonable objective. The crucial
point is that in order to speak of past risk, onemust recapture the future as conceived
in the past and not the past outcomes as such. Figure 2.2 illustrates that considera-
tions made today, t1, of risk for a previous interval T , must be made by moving the
point of observation to a time t0. If no assessments at t0 are documented, the prob-
lembecomes one of separating reasonable foresight fromhindsight. TheNorwegian
research institute SINTEF is currently struggling with this problem, retrospectively
mapping so-called risk influencing factors (RIF) in a research project on trends in
helicopter safety (see, Kråkenes et al., 2009).
Closing with the words of Luhmann (1991, p.42), one can state that a main diffi-
culty of risk is that the way it is evaluated varies in time:
With hindsight, we evaluate risk in terms of whether a loss has occurred
or not. When we look back, we no longer understand why in a present
now belonging to the past we had been so cautious or, as the case may
be, why we had made such a risky decision. And from out of the fu-
ture another present stares us in the face, in which we will in retrospect
certainly come to a different appraisal of the risk situation we are expe-
riencing in this present. But how we will see it remains uncertain.
2.3 Theorizing risk
Risk is an intuitively appealing concept. Perhaps paradoxically, it is also a concept
that is difficult to contemplate. Consulting the risk literature, one is bewildered by
diametrically diverging opinions on what risk really is. In her quest for rational-
ity, Shrader-Frechette (1991) critically reviews theoretical extremities on the subject.
Focal in the conflict among risk philosophers is the very existence of risk and what
methodological norms, if any, guarantee the rationality of evaluation. The positions
are arrayed on a spectrum from cultural theory tonaive positivism. Exponents of the
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former stance are Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), while the latter has traditionally
been occupied by risk analysts like Starr (1969). The positions are briefly presented
in the following, adopting the advice of Rosa (1998) of separating issues of ontology
from those of epistemology:
• Ontology asks “What is out there?”. It deals with what exists, the nature of
existence and states of the world.
• Epistemology inquires “How do we know what’s out there?” It refers to the
acquisition of knowledge, the thoroughness of that knowledge and its justifi-
cation.
2.3.1 Ontology
Ontological realism makes the bedrock of naive positivism. Risk is considered an
objective state of the world that exists independently of human observation (Rosa,
1998). A risk is a risk, regardless if anyone has recognized it as such. In contrast
is ontological relativism, which is fundamental to the cultural theory of Douglas
and Wildavsky (1983). Risk is interpreted as a cultural, rather than physical phe-
nomenon; nothing is a risk in itself. While the realist position holds a promise of an
actual risk of a certain state or quantity, relativism denies that risk is anywhere but
in our minds. Perceived risk is a meaningful complement in the former case and an
unnecessary given in the latter (Adams, 1995).
While otherwise concordant in their critique of naive positivism and cultural
theory, Shrader-Frechette (1991) and Rosa (1998) disagree over the issue of ontol-
ogy. Rosa alleges that there are certain states of the world that can be objectively de-
fined as risk. Some risks are undeniably real, regardless of our perception of them.
Shrader-Frechette (1991, p.84) on the other hand, asserts that “(..) there are no risks
except perceived risk”. Many risks are real as they bring real consequences, but until
their manifestation, risk is purely perceived. Although appealing to the recognition
that risk is a property of a never observable future, this exposition invites unanswer-
able philosophical questions. Does it imply that dangers we do not know about are
not representing a risk? And may two people experiencing a similar situation have
different risk? According to Kaplan and Garrick (1981), the answer to the latter ques-
tion is yes. Risk depends on what you do and what you know and is thus relative to
the observer. But this is a matter of epistemology.
2.3.2 Epistemology
Epistemology is closely related, but conceptually far from ontology. According to
Rosa (1998), there need not be an isomorphic relationship between the world and
our understanding of it. Both naive positivism and cultural theory fuse the ontology
and epistemology of risk into a reductionist philosophical purée. This diverts our
attention from asking the most important question of what our knowledge of risk is,
with theoretical obsession of what risk is.
Naive positivists believe that risk may be objectively identified and estimated,
devoid of bias and sociological shaping. In the seat of honor are technical risk as-
sessors, whose claims are considered completely objective, neutral and value free.
True knowledge is provided of a risk that is real, hence guaranteeing rational risk
management (Shrader-Frechette, 1991). An early advocate is Starr (1969, p.1237),
announcing that:
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The principal point is that the issue of public safety can be focused on a
tangible, quantitative, engineering design objective.
At the other end of the epistemological spectrum are Douglas and Wildavsky (1983,
p.80), asserting that all knowledge is a social construct. And because nothing is a
risk in itself, any claim about risk is as imperfect as the other:
Everyone, expert and layman alike, is biased. No one has a social theory
above the battle. Knowledge of danger is necessarily impartial and lim-
ited: judgments of risk and safety must be selected asmuch on the basis
of what is valued as on the basis of what is known.
Due to our limited perceptual and cognitive capabilities, Rosa (1998) agrees that
knowledge claims are always subjective. That we can never generate perfect knowl-
edge about the world does not, however, mean that all claims are equally fallible. Al-
though never absolutely true, knowledge claims admit to varying degrees of approx-
imation. Shrader-Frechette (1991) clings to this argument when launching scientific
proceduralism as an epistemological middle position. Some claims, like those of
technical risk assessors, are recognized as more explanatory than others. But above
that, thinking rationally about risk presumes intelligible and democratic debate in
a balanced consideration of facts and values. Such a middle position is in line with
most contemporary approaches to risk management (see, e.g. Renn, 2008) and will
serve as the underlying epistemology of this thesis. Whether risk exists outside our
perception is considered minor to the question of how we best can produce knowl-
edge to reduce our uncertainty about the future.
2.4 Defining risk
Risk assessment guru Kaplan (1997) opens his speech to the Society for Risk Anal-
ysis by reminiscing how an expert committee gave up after four years struggling to
define risk. Maybe it is better not to define risk, the final report concluded, and
let each author define it in his own way. And so he did. In a recent paper, Aven
(2010b) navigates through a vast number of risk definitions. Some are diametrically
distinct, while others wordily nuanced. Little consensus is ostensibly achieved since
Fischhoff et al. (1984) early recognized that defining risk is a manifold and inher-
ently controversial task. According to this trio, the choice of definition affects the
outcomes of decision problems and is thus an exercise in power. As put by Slovic
(1999, p.699);
(..) whoever controls the definition of risk controls the rational solution
to the problem at hand.
Both contributors search a flexible definition, contending that no definition is suit-
able for all problems. Notwithstanding that definitions are never entirely true or
false, they provide useful tools for abstraction and clarification of focal points (Rosa,
1998). A selection of common risk definitions are discussed in the following with
emphasis on conceptual content and clarity. The review of Aven (2010b) serves as
explanatory inspiration, characterizing definitional elements in the form:
Risk= (A,C ,P,U ) (2.1)
A represents events, C denotes consequences and P and U designate probability
and uncertainty.
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2.4.1 The traditional engineering approach
A conventional definition in engineering contexts is fronted by Wilson and Crouch
(1982, p.9):
Risk= Probability⊗Severity (2.2)
This definitionmay be conceptualized as R=(C,P). It is rooted in the ontology of real-
ism, assuming that risk is an objective state of the world as future events with asso-
ciated consequences and probabilities of occurrence. For decision making, Wilson
and Crouch admit that the terms represent perceptions only. The definition is ap-
praised as superior in applications of risk/benefit analysis. It provides a compound
measure that is unambiguous, easy to handle and enables ranking of alternatives.
When multiple events are considered, the measure is commonly referred to as ex-
pected loss or expected value.
Aven (2010b) is clear when dispelling this type of definition. The pressing prob-
lem is that improbable events of potentially large consequences are equated with
frequently occurring events of minor consequences. Haimes (2009) elaborates that
the relative importance of both probability and consequence is distorted, hence
masking the criticality of extreme events like dam failure or airplane crashes. Since
such situations require different management strategies than, for example, car acci-
dents, the definition of Wilson and Crouch (1982) is likely to preclude effective risk
management.
2.4.2 The international standard
The most recent international standard on risk management, ISO31000 (2009, p.1),
defines risk as:
Risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives.
Risk is in this definition conceived as R=(U). With reference to Section 2.2, this in-
sufficiently captures that risk is concerned not only with uncertainty, but also con-
sequences. Regardless of the potential consequences, all objectives seemingly rep-
resent a risk. This is because their fulfillment is a property of the future and is thus
uncertain. Does the uncertainty tied to the objective of reducing national sickness
absence qualify it as a risk? And if so; is it the attainability objectives that repre-
sents a risk or the uncertainty itself? Recalling the words of Luhmann (1991), it may
be argued that objectives implies consequences of some sort, since it allows one to
draw distinction between realizing the objective or not. Yet, the locus of attention is
not the goodness of the objectives as such, but how they are affected by uncertainty.
How is one then to prioritize between different objectives that are equally affected
by uncertainty?
Themost evidentweakness of the ISO31000 (2009)-definition is simply its vague-
ness. What is an effect and how is it measured? Is it something that is in my head
or is it a state of the world? What is an objective and what separates it from other
concepts and eventualities? ISO31000 (2009, p.1) attempts to clarify some of these
issues via five notes:
NOTE 1: An effect is a deviation from the expected-positive and/or neg-
ative.
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NOTE 2: Objectives can have different aspects (such as financial, health
and safety, and environmental goals) and can apply at different levels
(such as strategic, organization-wide, project, product and process).
NOTE 3: Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events and
consequences, or a combination of these.
NOTE 4: Risk is often expressed in terms of a combination of the conse-
quences of an event (including changes in circumstances) and the like-
lihood of occurrence.
NOTE 5: Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of infor-
mation related to, understanding or knowledge of an event, its conse-
quence, or likelihood.
On the positive side, the notes convey that risk is a many-faceted concept. It is rec-
ognized that outcomes canbebothpositive andnegative, reflecting that anoutcome
can be positive for some stakeholders while negative for others (Aven and Renn,
2009). On the negative side, the risk concept is not only expanded into definitional
inertia, embedded are also contending definitions like that of Wilson and Crouch
(1982). In the pursuit of abstraction and clarification, we are therefore better served
continuing our definitional search elsewhere.
2.4.3 Consequence-orientation according to Klinke and Renn
Klinke and Renn (2002, p.1071) defines risk as:
The possibility that human actions or events lead to consequences that
harm aspects of things that human beings value.
In contrast to the ISO31000 (2009)-definition, Klinke and Renn emphasize conse-
quences rather than uncertainty. Their definition may thus be caricatured as R=(C).
By choosing the loose term possibility1 instead of probability , focus is seemingly on
the consequences that might occur rather than our uncertainty of this happening.
Klinke and Renn are specific, yet general, in defining the consequences of inter-
est. Unless something human beings value might be harmed, we do not speak of
risk. An epistemological middle position is indicated in which risk is a real world,
but value-dependent concept of selection. The definition captures the necessity of
exposure to potential outcomes as postulated byHolton (2004). However, combined
with its peripheral account of uncertainty, it may erroneously lead you to think in
certainties when contemplating risk. Given that a consequence occurs, do you care?
Owing to this, risk considerations may be biased towards catastrophic, but unreal-
istic outcomes. The result may be excessive precaution, along with neglect of less
severe, but more probable consequences. What is more, decision making is likely
precluded as one cannot conclude whether a risk is high or low or compare differ-
ent outcomes. According to Aven (2010b) and as demonstrated in the previous sec-
tions, this holds for all definitions conceiving risk in terms of R = (C ), R = (UorP ) or
R = (A).
1The reader should note that possibility has a distinct meaning within possibility theory, which deals
with certain types of uncertainty as an alternative to probability theory (Lindley, 2006). This specific
meaning is, however, hardly the intention of Klinke and Renn (2002).
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Figure 2.3: Risk according to (a) Rosa (1998) and (b)Aven and Renn (2009) (adopted
from Aven and Renn, 2009).
2.4.4 Event-orientation: Rosa vs. Aven and Renn
An example of the latter category is Rosa (1998, p.28):
Risk is a situation or event where something of human value (includ-
ing human themselves) has been put at stake and where the outcome is
uncertain.
Three elements found in nearly all conceptions of risk are, according to Rosa, cap-
tured in this definition; a state of reality of human interest, a possible outcome (pos-
itive or negative) and the notion of uncertainty. Unfortunately, Rosa refrains from
concretizing what lies at the very heart of his definition. What is an event? His only
specification is the plausible, but in the context of risk assessment too general, de-
marcation scheme of Figure 2.1. Consider the case of car driving ending in a fatal
accident. Is the event of interest the choice of not using seat belt, being distracted
by a fly, entering the opposite lane or crashing into another car?
In a thorough critique of the Rosa (1998)-definition, Aven and Renn (2009) agree
that it offers a sound foundation for risk management as it diverts attention to un-
certainty instead of probability, and outcome stakes instead of specific consequences.
This is in linewithAven’s contributions on the insufficiency of probability calculus in
expressing uncertainty (see, e.g. Aven, 2003). Probability-centered risk definitions,
he asserts, are too narrow. Aven believes that probability assignments mask crit-
ical assumptions and suppositions made in the assessment, truncating important
aspects of uncertainty. This is, however, not a generally accepted convention. Con-
sulting leading statisticians like Lindley (2006) and risk assessors like Garrick (2008),
probability is our only and perfect tool for quantitatively expressing uncertainty.
The main flaw of Rosa’s definition is according to Aven and Renn the granting
of ontological realism to risk as an event. Uncertainty is not real, they claim, but
a construct of human imagination to cope with future outcomes that can become
real. Without incorporating the epistemological component of uncertainty in the
risk concept, conceptual difficulties are allegedly induced as one is unable to ap-
praise a risk as high or low. Owing to this, they suggest a slightly refined definition
that is conceptualized in Figure 2.3. Risk is no longer described as R = (A), but as
R = (A,C ,U ) (Aven and Renn, 2009, p. 6):
Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity of the events and conse-
quences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to something that hu-
mans value.
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Table 2.1: The risk table (adopted from Kaplan and Garrick, 1981).
Scenario Likelihood Consequence
s1 p1 x1
s2 p2 x2
. . .
. . .
sn pn xn
The argumentation of Aven (2009) is not only intricate, but does also seem to twist
the very point of Rosa (1998). Believing that certain states of the world are pos-
sible, that is, objectively real, does not exclude epistemic considerations of uncer-
tainty from the risk concept. If our ability to understand risk is very uncertain, risk
appears less like an objective state and more like a mental construction. Notwith-
standing that, the conclusion of Aven (2009) remains plausible when discarding the
Rosa-definition as incompatible with practical risk assessment. It is of this reason
considered unsuitable for our purpose. Also the uncertainty-centered conception
of Aven and Renn (2009) and Aven (2010b) is forsaken, if only on the grounds of con-
ceptual complexity.
2.4.5 The quantitative definition of Kaplan and Garrick
Consulting the reference tracker SCOPUS, one of the most cited definitions of risk
is the quantitative-, or triplet definition of Kaplan and Garrick (1981, p. 13). Risk is
defined as the answer to three questions:
1. What can happen? (i.e. what can go wrong?)
2. How likely is it that it will happen?
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences?
To answer these questions, Kaplan and Garrick suggest the making of a list as in
Table 2.1. Each line, i , is a triplet of a scenario description, si , the probability, pi , and
consequence measure, xi , of that scenario. Including all imaginable scenarios, the
table is the answer to the questions and therefore the risk. Formally, risk is defined
as a set of triplets:
R =
{〈
si ,pi ,xi
〉}
(2.3)
Acknowledging uncertainty in consequence and probability estimations, the defini-
tion may be further refined into:
R =
{〈
si ,pi (φi ,xi )
〉}
(2.4)
pi (φi ) and pi (xi ) are the probability density functions for the frequency and con-
sequence of the i th scenario. In our simplified framework, Equation 2.3 and Equa-
tion 2.4 corresponds to R = (A,P,C ) and R = (A,P,C ,U ). Arranging the scenarios
in order of increasing severity and damage, Equation 2.3 and Equation 2.4 can be
plotted as a single or a family of curves as shown in Figure 2.4. In contrast to the
definition of Wilson and Crouch (1982), Kaplan and Garrick stress that it is not the
mean of the curve, but the curve(s) itself that is the risk. Since risk by definition
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Figure 2.4: (a)A single and (b)family of risk curves (adopted from Kaplan and Gar-
rick, 1981).
is given by the totality of curves over the entire consequence spectrum, it is in the
opinion of this author that referring to risk in plural is somewhat superfluous. At the
risk of insulting the great many scholars who frequently speak of risks, it appears a
modest correction that this is rarely imperative.
Comprehensibility and content
The definition of Kaplan andGarrick (1981) has gained wide acceptance bothwithin
the scientific community and among practical risk assessors (Haimes, 2009). A rea-
sonable explanation is its direct relevance to risk assessment. Not only do the three
questions offer simple clarification of what the risk concept is, provided is also pro-
cedural guidance for risk assessment. Moreover, unlike some of the above defini-
tions, all elements of A, P , C and U are included and apparently given equal con-
siderations. The following recommendations are thus not biased towards extreme
events as in the definition of Klinke and Renn (2002), nor is the relative importance
of consequence and probability distorted like in the case of Wilson and Crouch
(1982). Compared to the entangling definitions of ISO31000 (2009) and Aven and
Renn (2009), the triplet definition gains in comprehensibility.
Constraints and ambiguities
Paradoxically, the plainness of Kaplan and Garrick’s definition may also be claimed
its weakness. As a foundation for risk assessment, it opens up for many interpreta-
tions. In fact, the scientific community is still discussing how the individual ques-
tions shall be interpreted. Aven (2010b) is harsh in his critique, claiming that Kaplan
and Garrick’s focus on probability as an expression of uncertainty is too narrow. By
jumping directly into probabilities, potential surprises could be left unconsidered
since one cannot accurately express what is extremely uncertain. This is a typical
misinterpretation according to Garrick (2008), replying that the commonly added
question ofwhat are the uncertainties? is already embedded in the second question.
Haimes (2009) sees the necessity of adding a different question, which is over what
time frame? Garrick’s response to this suggestion would probably be that the ques-
tion of time is already embedded as a significant constraint in all three questions.
What is interesting is that all contenders are right in their ownmeans. While the def-
inition may embed all contents of the risk concept, this ultimately depends on the
interpreter. Since the understanding influences the choice of analytical methods,
16
the following results and their use in the decisionmaking process, there is a need for
making clear the foundations of risk assessment in terms of these three questions.
The definition of Kaplan and Garrick (1981) is adopted for this study, premising
clarification of the following conceptual ambiguities:
1. What can happen? To foresee a future of endless possibilities, we must struc-
ture our imagination. What dowe refer to when contemplating what can hap-
pen? Is it an accident scenario, an event or a set of consequences? Precisely
what is an accident accident scenario and what distinguishes it from notions
of initiating event, hazardous event and accidental event? Do thenotions yield
different analytical logics and results? When does a scenario start and when
is it terminated? What is a hazard and what triggers it into a scenario? How
can we assess scenarios of malicious acts? And what about the scenarios we
cannot foresee?
2. How likely is it? According to Garrick (2008), the choice of the word likely is
a well-considered one. Likelihood, he claims, is a general, intuitive expres-
sion that may be further specified as either frequency, probability, credibility
and probability of frequency. This is problematic, since likelihood is a unique
term in its own right, expressing a certain kind of statistical function that is
not synonymous with any of the abovementioned terms (Lindley, 2006). More
importantly, probability is far from a simple concept per se. Is it an objective
property or does it only exists in our heads? Will two people, given the same
background knowledge, assign the same probability? To what help is the past?
Do we need to express our confidence in the assigned probabilities, that is,
our uncertainty about the uncertainty?
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences? Imagine that we are to perform
a risk assessment before the start-up of the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl
in 1977. What do we mean by consequences? If it only comprises things that
human beings value, as suggested by Klinke and Renn (2002), whose values
shall we consider? Need the consequences be measurable? How do we com-
pare consequences to life and limb, the environment and state economy? At
what point in the accident scenario do we measure the consequences? Shall
we model recovery operations and socio-political responses? How can we as-
sess long-term consequences that will prevail twenty years ahead?
The present study is devoted to clarifying the first of these questions. Not only is
the inquiry of what can happen? the most fundamental, it also appears as the most
capacious. Paradoxically, it is also the issue on which focused discussions remain
most few. An example of the contrary is the second question of how likely is it?,
which has been subject to heated academic disputes since the mid 1980s. This is
not to say that the debate is settled by any means; the interpretation of probability
in risk analysis still enjoys a focal role in current contributions (see, e.g. Aven, 2010b).
It is, however, in the opinion of this author that the first question is most in need for
theoretical maturing.
Although the second and the third question, what are the consequences?, urge
elaborate considerations in their own right, they still have implicit appearances in
the present study. This is because the first question forms the basis of the remaining
triplets in a definition that is utterly compound.
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Chapter 3
Counterconcepts to risk
3.1 Introduction
An alternative means to grasping an intricate concept is to clarify its related coun-
terconcepts. That is, to explain a concept based on what it is not. According to Luh-
mann (1991), it is a widely held belief that risk is a counterconcept to the German
word Sicherheit. This is a very broad term that can be translated to either safety, se-
curity or certainty. In the risk literature, safety and security have distinct meanings,
which interestingly, differ especially with respect to the third meaning of sicherheit.
In this chapter, risk is discussed in light of the related concepts of safety, security and
vulnerability. At first, the most central yet blurry concept to risk is examined, that is,
uncertainty.
3.2 Uncertainty
Risk is tied to uncertainty. Removing the component of uncertainty transmutes risk
into consequences that are destined to happen, hence emptying the concept of in-
trinsic value. The two notions are, perhaps of this reason, interchangeably used in
everyday parlance. Within the scientific community, the interconnectedness of risk
and uncertainty yields dissensions that are both linguistic and conceptual. Are risk
and uncertainty complementary, synonymous or constituent concepts? Ground-
breaking to this exposition is the demarcation of risk and uncertainty introduced by
economist Knight (1921), which is discussed after first considering uncertainty in its
own right.
3.2.1 Uncertainty is a counterconcept to certainty
Webster (1978) defines uncertainty as:
Uncertainty: Something not certainly and exactly known.
According to this definition, uncertainty is a trivial term applicable to all situations
where certainty is absent. Uncertainty is therefore ubiquitous and inescapable. Lind-
ley (2006) introduces his book Understanding uncertainty by clarifying that some
statements may be known to you as true and others false, but the vast majority of
statements you know as neither true nor false. You are uncertain. In Lindley’s view
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is uncertainty a general, but precise term that speaks the language of probability. To
measure your uncertainty of an event, Lindley invites you to compare your beliefs
with a standard of drawing a specific number of favorable balls from an urn. If you
assign a 0.6 probability that it will rain tomorrow, this equals the random drawing of
a ball from an urn consisting of 60 favorable out of 100 balls. Reviewing the termi-
nology in core references of risk assessment, Christensen et al. (2003) observe that
uncertainty is usually considered self-explanatory. Without elaboration they posit
that this is unfortunate, as uncertainty and its associated terminology is just as con-
troversial as that of risk. Although a sensible claim, it is in the opinion of this author
that at least on an abstract level, uncertainty is a less compound and more easily
understood notion than risk. This is because it is labeled by its very counterconcept
of certainty. The interpretation of uncertainty in risk assessment is, however, a com-
plicated issue indeed. The suggested definition of Christensen et al. (2003, p.194) is
adopted for clarification:
Uncertainty: Imperfect knowledge about the individual aspects of a
system as well as the overall inaccuracy of the output determined by
the system.
Uncertainty in the context of risk assessment is as much about the confidence we
have in the process and results of risk analysis as it is about the uncertain outcomes
as such.
3.2.2 Twomanifestations of uncertainty
Consulting the guidance of NUREG (2009) on treatment of uncertainties in proba-
bilistic risk assessment (PRA), uncertainty is something that impacts the robustness
of results. When documenting the conclusions of PRA, it is thus necessary to take
into account the associated uncertainties. Helpful is in this regard the distinction
between two manifestations of uncertainty:
• Aleatory uncertainty stems from intrinsic randomness in a known popula-
tion. For instance, this may be the height of an arbitrary child in a specific
kindergarten. There is only one type of aleatory uncertainty, that is, param-
eter uncertainty related to uncertainty in computation of input and output
parameter values.
• Epistemicuncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about fundamental phe-
nomena. An example is the effect of SO2-discharges on global warming. There
are three types of epistemic uncertainty;model uncertainty due to the inaccu-
racy of models in representing real world phenomena, completeness uncer-
tainty stemming from the risk contributors not considered in the analysis and
parameter uncertainty.
Whereas aleatory uncertainty is inherently irreducible, epistemic uncertainty may
be reduced with acquisition of knowledge. Uncertainty can thus be characterized
as epistemic if there is a possibility to reduce it by gathering more data or refin-
ing models or approaches. Faber (2005) finds it interesting that these classifications
are time dependent, noticing that phenomena which first have been conceived as a
mixture of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty, may become purely epistemic with
the progress of time and science. Kieureghian and Ditlevsen (2009) accordingly ask
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if there is nothing but epistemic uncertainty. In conclusion, they assert that the ad-
vantage of classification is mostly pragmatic, as it becomes clear which uncertain-
ties are prone to reduction at least in the short term.
3.2.3 Uncertainty and the interpretation of probability
The distinction between aleatory and epistemic uncertainty is valuable also in the
sake of transparency. Paté-Cornell (1996) worries that epistemic uncertainties tend
to be under-reported and often ignored in analyses of politically sensitive issues. As
an example, she points to the conservative hypotheses of the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC). Aleatory uncertainties is generally more acknowledged and
integrated in mathematical models. According to Paté-Cornell (1996), this is rooted
in the historical conflict over the meaning of probability.
Probability has traditionally been interpreted from two competing stances; the
frequentist and the Bayesian school of thought. Scholars of frequentist conviction
conceive probability as an objective property, defined by the limiting frequency of
an independent set of identically distributed observations. Following the Bayesian
interpretation, probability is a measure of your degree of belief and therefore only a
mental construct (Watson, 1994). Whereas aleatory uncertainties may be treated by
classical frequentistmethods, epistemic uncertainties canonly be addressed through
Bayesianmethods and expert opinions. Paté-Cornell (1996) presents six levels of in-
creasing sophistication for treating uncertainty in risk analysis. Figure 3.1 shows
that these range from purely qualitative to probabilistic assessments of aleatory and
epistemic uncertainty. The topmost level invites the debated issue on whether to
express uncertainty about uncertainty in terms of “secondary probabilities”. In Nor-
way, Aven (2003) has been influential in arguing that such treatment of uncertainty
only induces confusion in decision making. Moving across the Atlantic, NUREG
(2009) is clear in requiring both a qualitative statement of confidence and a quanti-
tative expression of the associated uncertainties. At the heart of this issue is the suf-
ficiency of probabilities in expressing uncertainty, as was early questioned by Apos-
tolakis (1989).
3.2.4 On Knight’s distinction between risk and uncertainty
Although uncertainty forms the bedrock of the risk concept, the above discussion
demonstrates that is is also complementary to risk in the sense of confidence. In-
fluential, yet contrasting to this exposition is the much debated distinction between
risk and uncertainty of Knight (1921). In his groundbreaking contribution Risk, un-
certainty, and profit, Knight posits that risk and uncertainty represent two funda-
mentally distinct concepts (Knight, 1921, p.19):
But Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the fa-
miliar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated.
[..] It will appear that a measurable uncertainty, or ‘risk’ proper, as we
shall use the term, is so far different from an unmeasurable one that it is
not in effects an uncertainty at all. We shall accordingly restrict the term
‘uncertainty’ to cases of the non-quantitative type.
According to Langlois and Boulder (1993), early scholars interpreted Knight’s dis-
tinction such that risk applies to situations where probabilities can be assigned,
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Level 0
Level 1
Level 2
Level 3
Level 4
Level 5
Identification of hazard 
(A source of potential harm?)
Worst case consideration
(How bad is the worst outcome?)
Plausiblee upper bound 
(Assessment of the most vulnerable targets)
Best estimate 
(Mean or central value)
Probability and risk analysis 
(Risk curve)
Display of risk uncertainties
(Secondary probabilities)
Risk Curve
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95%
5%
MeanMode
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density function
Figure 3.1: Six levels of quantification in the treatment of uncertainty in risk analysis
according to Paté-Cornell (1996).
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whilst uncertainty is reserved for situations in which one cannot. This interpreta-
tion has according to Tversky and Fox (1995) grown deep roots in decision theory,
where decisions under uncertainty are known to promote a different approach than
decisions under risk. While offering a sensible perspective in decision theory, this
exposition appears conceptually confusing in the context of accident risk (as found
in, e.g. Douglas, 1985).
Another common interpretation is fronted by Holton (2004), maintaining that
risk owes to objective probabilities, while uncertainty concerns subjective such. Al-
though this is central to Knight’s argumentation, it appears somewhat outdated in
light of today’s conventional acceptance of Bayesian probabilities. Taking a different
perspective, Langlois and Boulder (1993) find neither of the interpretations correct.
The main and misinterpreted message of Knight, they claim, is that risk is related to
situations of identifiable outcome states, whereas uncertainty rises with the impos-
sibility of exhaustive outcome classification.
3.2.5 Uncertainty is a wider concept than risk
The reader should note that Knight wrote from a frequentist perspective on proba-
bility. Albeit pioneering in his critique of this stance, he is still convinced that the
concept of probability rests solely within that paradigm (Bernstein, 1996). What is
more, the preface leaves no doubt that Knight primarily appeals to the financial au-
dience. It does not serve us to restwith the nuances of a contested perspective aimed
at a different domain in the first place. Nevertheless, the many interpretations of
Knight (1921) demonstrate the necessity of being vigilant when using the term un-
certainty.
Uncertainty is a wider concept than risk. Not only does it make a constituent
part of the latter concept, it also manifests itself onmany levels. We have uncertain-
ties about our values, what scenarios to expect and options to consider, the assigned
probabilities and our very capabilities of considering these (Hansson, 1996). Hence
pragmatically, it appears more useful to divert our attention to differentiating types
of uncertainty. It is in this regard interesting to note that the second interpretation
of Knight closely corresponds to the terms of aleatory and epistemic uncertainty
(Paté-Cornell, 1996). This shows the interconnectedness of the concepts of risk, un-
certainty and probability with respect to ontological realism. Whereas the prefix
of your uncertainty expressed through your probabilities is fundamental to Lindley
(2006), the notion of aleatory uncertainty implies the objective existence of some the
uncertainty and a ditto risk.
The critique of Langlois and Boulder (1993) offers a fruitful perspective to the
limitations of our conceptualization of risk. Consider the game of Russian roulette,
in which you know the chance of firing a bullet and you know that if it does go off,
you will most certainly die. Then, imagine you are Buzz Aldrin in the year of 1969,
contemplating the risk of the world history’s very first manned moon landing. You
can barely imagine what awaits you in space, and the possible outcomes are any-
thing but exhaustive. Do the two situations equally well subscribe to the notion of
risk? According to the general criteria of Section 2.2, the answer to this question
must still be yes. Having said that, how we conceive the conceptual relation be-
tween risk and remaining concepts is clearly influenced. Most conspicuous is the
conception of safety.
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3.3 Safety
Safety is for most people equated with freedom from risk (Reason, 1997). While it is
intuitively appealing that safetymeans the absence of risk, this conception runs into
difficulties confronted with the recognition that zero risk is utopia. More plausible
is therefore the technical convention of safety as defined in ISO/IEC Guide51 (1999,
p.2):
Safety: freedom from unacceptable risk.
Implicit in this definition is that safety is a state of low risk. It need not be zero, but
must be below a certain level. From this it appears that safety is a binary variable;
something is either safe or unsafe. Brown and Green (1980) contemplate this posi-
tion, reasoning that just as risk, is safety a dimension of continuous scale. While it
might be true that the adjective safe is misplaced in situations of unacceptable risk,
wemay still talk of different degrees of safety or safe.
Themain problem of the ISO/IEC Guide51 (1999)-definition is that it urges con-
templation on what is acceptable risk. Paraphrasing HSE (1992), acceptable risk can
be understood as the level of risk we are willing to live with in order to secure certain
benefits. The recent discussion of Johansen (2010) demonstrates that this is a very
complex issue. In the pursuit of a clear understanding of safety, we thus seem better
served consulting yet another source.
3.3.1 Safety is a concept of relatives, not absolutes
Much research has been devoted to studies of safety. The concept in itself, how-
ever, is under-theorized and most often taken for granted (Möller et al., 2006). An
exception is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO, 2009, p.2-2), who
clarifies safety as the outcome of organizational processes which have the objective
of keeping risk under control:
Safety: The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of prop-
erty damage is reduced to, and maintained below, an acceptable level
through a continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk
management.
Also ICAOconceives safetywith reference to acceptable risk, while providing a richer
description by emphasizing the element of control. ICAO reasons that most con-
notations of safety have one underlying commonality in the possibility of absolute
control. Since absolute control is an unachievable goal in dynamic operational con-
texts (Rasmussen, 1997), safety must encompass relative rather than absolute con-
trol. This reflects the flaws of the common interpretation as observed by Reason
(1997). The reader should, however, note that there need not be an isomorphic rela-
tion between absolute freedom from risk and absolute control.
Möller et al. (2006) extend the argument by distinguishing between absolute and
relative concepts of safety. The former covers interpretations of safety as freedom
from risk, while the latter reflects the definitions of ISO/IEC Guide51 (1999) and
ICAO (2009). In contrast to ICAO (2009), Möller et al. (2006) contend that there is
no need to add control to the notion of safety, as it is implicitly included through
its influence on the risk dimensions of probability and severity. This claim can be
challenged by referring to the studies of Slovic (1987), which reveal the significance
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X
Figure 3.2: Safety is a function that decreaseswith the probability of harm, the sever-
ity of harm and our ability to foresee this with confidence. x, y and z are levels of
safety such that x>y>z (adopted fromMöller et al., 2006).
of voluntariness and personal control to risk perception. While it is true that en-
hanced control need not yield reduced risk (Perrow, 1984), it seems unreasonable
to exclude the component of control from safety on the grounds that it influences
through other variables.
The latter discussion brings us to a second distinction, whichMöller et al. (2006)
draw between objective and subjective concepts of safety. As long as safety is con-
ceived with reference to risk, this is inextricably tied to the relativity of the risk con-
cept and thus equally debatable. While BrownandGreen (1980) believe that safety is
a purely personal construct, it is interesting to note that ICAO (2009) refer to safety as
some seemingly objective state. Möller et al. (2006) reconcile this with an intersub-
jective perspective of safety, which resembles the epistemological middle position
to risk of Shrader-Frechette (1991).
3.3.2 Is safetymore than the antonym of risk?
The definitions of ICAO (2009) and ISO/IEC Guide51 (1999) conceive safety as some
antonym of risk. There is an inverse relation between risk and safety; the lower the
risk, the higher the safety. According to Möller et al. (2006), this is a too narrow
conception because it disregards the significance of epistemic uncertainty. Safety,
they claim, is a function that decreases with the probability of harm, the severity of
harmand our decreasing ability to foresee it with confidence. This is depicted in Fig-
ure 3.2. The proposition can be traced back to the ideas of Ellsberg (1961), observing
that many people violate certain axioms of decision theory when faced with ambi-
guity1. Even if the expected outcome is less favorable, people show a strong ten-
dency to choose the option associated with the lowest ambiguity. The significance
of asking “what is the worst to be expected?” is thus lessened when two options of
differing ambiguity are compared (Ellsberg, 1961, p.668).
In a thorough critique of Möller et al. (2006), Aven (2009) agrees that epistemic
uncertainty is central to the concept of safety. Aven too, conceives probability, harm
1Ellsberg uses the notion ambiguity in characterizing situations of scanty, unreliable or conflicting
information, which makes a central part of our term epistemic uncertainty.
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and uncertainty as the three major components of safety. What he does not accept,
is the alleged link between risk and safety. The flaw in the reasoning of Möller et al.
(2006) as Aven sees it, is theway risk is conceptualized in the first place. If probability
and harm are defined as the major components of risk, safety is undoubtedly more
than the antonym of risk. If, on the other side, one adopts Aven’s risk definition in
which epistemic uncertainty is already included as a central component of risk, the
relation between safety and risk is affirmatively antonymous.
Alternatively, safety can be constructed without any reference to risk. Hollnagel
et al. (2006) scrap the idea of safety as the inverse of risk as outdated. Fundamental
to their paradigmatic framework, resilience engineering, is the conception of safety
as the ability to succeed under varying conditions. Resilience engineering empha-
sizes adaption instead of control (cf. ICAO, 2009). This transfers safety from a ques-
tion of risk to one of resilience, which is a concept to be examined in Section 3.6.
3.3.3 Coupling risk and safety
The academic correspondence between Möller et al. (2006) and Aven (2009) shows
the conceptually sensitive coupling between risk and safety. This calls for conscious
application of the two terms. Risk and safety are interchangeably used. While the
Americannuclear industry employs thenotationofprobabilistic risk assessment (PRA)
(NUREG, 2009), the International Maritime Organization (IMO, 2002) denotes what
is basically the same thing formal safety assessment (FSA). Discussions on accept-
able risk are repeatedly framed as a question of “how safe is safe enough” (see, e.g.
Jongejan, 2008). Considering the ambiguity surrounding both terms, aminimum re-
quirement must be to clarify the meaning placed in whatever one chooses to apply.
Furthermore, it raises the question of whether we are actually served having both
these words in our vocabulary.
Brown and Green (1980) argue that safety is a less ambiguous term that is prefer-
able to risk. In contrast, ISO/IECGuide51 (1999) goes as far as advising against using
the word safety, on the grounds that it introduces no extra information andwill only
lead to confusion. It is in the opinion of this author that both terms convey use-
ful information in their own means. On one hand, risk is a broader concept than
safety, as it is concerned not only with consequences of harm (Möller et al., 2006).
On the other hand, it might be argued that safety is a more capacious concept than
risk as it is not so restricted to future outcomes. It appears more meaningful to talk
of past safety than past risk. Following the argumentation of ICAO (2009), safety is
also a more compound concept, due to its strong connotations with the concept of
control. Depending on the interpretation of Kaplan and Garrick’s(1981) triplet def-
inition of risk, the component of epistemic uncertainty also makes a quintessential
additive to safety as the antonym of risk.
Recall the distinct examples of traveling to space and engaging in the games of
Russian roulette. Epistemic uncertainty makes safety a relevant complement to risk
in the former situation, while somewhat misplaced in the latter. There is, however,
another reason for this, namely that the two situations differ with respect to agency.
While the risk of Buzz Aldrin is primarily accidental, participants in Russian roulette
deliberately engage in the game of risk. Theymight be forced into participation, you
may argue, but even in this situation the term safety seems misplaced. Instead, we
describe the situation as one in lack of security.
On the grounds that it appears a less compound concept, risk is principally pre-
ferred over safety in thepresent study. This is in linewith the vastmajority of theoret-
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ical contributions on the subject. Notwithstanding this, safety serves an important
role as anadjective describing risk. For distinguishing between risk of accidental and
intentional origin, the notations of safety risk and security risk are used respectively.
3.4 Security
It seems like all the words of the risk discourse are fraught with a fuzziness that must
be initially recognized. Security is no exception. Within the engineering commu-
nity, the concept had been granted little attention before 2001 and the shocking
events of 9/11 (Apostolakis and Lemon, 2005). Consulting the political sciences, se-
curity has since the onset of the cold war been connoted with external threats to
state sovereignty (Bilgin, 2003). Social scientists, like Buzan et al. (1998), have con-
strued the concept around threats to societal identity, while law scholars, like Zed-
ner (2003a), problematize security as some counterconcept to crime. The semantics
of security are, according to Zedner (2003b), as obscure as those of risk. It is con-
ceived as a state of being and a means to an end, a positive or negative presence,
a material or symbolic good and a private or public service. Since its meanings are
various, conflicting and politically contested, Zedner argues that the concept of se-
curity defies simple definition. In remarkable contrast to the numerous definitions
on risk, security is left undefined even by those engaged in clarifying the concept.
For illustration, the risk lexicon of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
DHS (2008a) defines 73 terms of which their most focal notion of security is not one.
Rather than trampling this undiscovered ground, the focus of this examination is on
what distinguishes the security concept from those of safety and risk.
3.4.1 Security is characterized by intention to do harm
Safety and security are, althoughdictionary synonymous, conceived as twodisparate
concepts within the risk discourse. What separates them is the defining character-
istic of agency. While safety is conceptually reserved for accidental risk, security is
the counterconcept to deliberate risk from human intentions to do harm (Comfort,
2005). Substantial to security is the adversary intent and capability of a perpetra-
tor, that is, a threat agent (Garrick et al., 2004). Information about the intent and
capability of possible agents is denoted intelligence. These terms are defined and
discussed in Section 5.3, in connection with a thorough examination on the concept
of threat.
Based on the main feature of intentionality, a range of situations fall under the
domain of security. There aremundane criminal events like burglary, sexual assaults
or identity theft, as well as extraordinary situations of terrorism, war and sabotage
(Zedner, 2003b). While the focus of law scholar Zedner is on the mundane, central
to the risk assessment collective of Garrick et al. (2004) is by far the extraordinary.
3.4.2 The borderline between safety and security
The demarcation between safety and security is in some cases blurry. A prominent
example is the issue of insider threat from employees. DHS (2008b) addresses the
problemof trusted individuals exploiting their access to knowledge about an organi-
zation, which is clearly a security problem given the will to cause harm. Yet in most
cases, harm is caused not due to hostile intention, but from deliberate or routine
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violations of rules. Far from causing harm, the will of such everyday perpetrators
is simply to optimize their effort within organizational and individual constraints
(Battmann and Klumb, 1993). Is this a problem of security or safety? As maintained
by Reason (1990a), it is believed that violation of rules is a problem that can and
shall by confronted under the domain of safety. A less clear-cut problem is inten-
tional drug abuse at hazardous work-places, which may unintentionally cause slips
and mistakes resulting in accidents.
3.4.3 Security after September 11
The American Department of Homeland Security was established in 2001 in re-
sponse to the disastrous events of 9/11. Its initiative objective was to prepare a
national strategy for homeland security for protecting the US from terrorism. The
appeal, signed G.W Bush, goes as following (DHS, 2002, p. VI):
Our enemy is smart and resolute. We are smarter andmore resolute. We
will prevail against all who believe they can stand in the way of America’s
commitment to freedom, liberty and our way of life.
Interestingly, this line reveals that security is asmuchabout preserving theAmerican
identity of liberty as it is about protecting Americans from physical harm. Not only
does it give resonance to the reflections of Buzan et al. (1998) on societal identity, it
also captures how the analytical and moral complexities of security outdo those of
safety at once an enemy is appointed.
A momentous shift in the discourse of security followed the terrorist attacks in
New York. Nearly all collected articles in the deadlock of these events contemplate
how 9/11 has dramatically altered our conception of security. Slovic (2002) sets the
agenda, prophesying terrorism as a new species of trouble that strains the capacity
of quantitative risk analysis. What is the role of risk analysis, he asks, when the stakes
are high and the uncertainties enormous?
3.4.4 Security beyond risk
Collective efforts have subsequently been initiated to extend the analysis of risk to
deliberate acts of terrorism. A notable contribution is in the comprehensive work
of Garrick et al. (2004). Central is a joint focus on threats and infrastructure vulner-
ability, which is a concept later to be defined in Section 3.5. Because intelligence
information is more dispersed, guarded and limited than information on vulnera-
bility, the main source of uncertainty lies in the assessment of threats. Assessing
threats changes the first question of Kaplan and Garrick (1981) into how someone
can make something happen. Although acknowledging the remarkable uncertain-
ties associated with assessing risk of intentional origin, Garrick et al. (2004), Deisler
(2002) and Aven (2007a) defend that the traditional risk sciences have the potential
for dealing adequately with terrorism. After all, limited data and catastrophic conse-
quences was the precise background against which qualitative risk assessment was
developed.
Among the opponents to this position are Aradau and van Munster (2007), con-
tending that terrorism post-9/11 represents a double infinite of uncertainty and
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consequence that calls for a precautionary approach to riskmanagement2 . DeGoede
(2008, p.166) similarly argues that combating terrorism requires one to “think the
unthinkable” in a fashion that exceeds the logic of risk calculation. While the risk
disciplines are centered on predicting an uncertain future, anticipating the threats
of terrorism lies closer to the creative work of the entertainment industry in visual-
izing the wildest plurality of extreme futures. Referring to this contribution, Salter
(2008) maintains that the crucial difference betweenmatters of safety and security is
incalculability. In his case against quantification of aviation security, Salter protests
that in contrast to aviation safety, there are no reliable data on aviation security. This
author will neither defend nor contest this claim, but inform that there is an exten-
sive expert apparatus around ICAO known to be world-leading in the development
of security assessment (ICAO, 2010). Recognizing the risk of sabotage, hijackings
and terrorist use of civil aircrafts as well as technical failures, civil aviation is a field
where both safety and security uniquely come across.
3.4.5 Amplification of security risk
The link between security, risk and safety is challenged not only by the overarch-
ing presence of uncertainties. Also the question of ontology is left more difficult. It
is hard to imagine that something residing within human will can be anything but
subjective, while at the same time admitting the objective danger of an airplane that
is about to crash into a skyscraper.
Zedner (2003b) asserts that security is both an objective and subjective con-
dition. As an objective condition, security is predicated on the presence of what
threatens it. The subjective state of security is described by feelings alone as free-
dom from anxiety. Zedner remarks that it is a deep irony that the subjective feeling
of insecurity increases when averted to security risk. More than in the case of safety,
an antonymous mismatch between risk and subjective security therefore arises. An
interesting lens for viewing this phenomenon is the framework of social amplifi-
cation of risk launched by Kasperson et al. (1988). In essence, Kasperson and his
coworkers assert that dissemination of risk information amplifies risk above the in-
herently dangerous properties of a threat alone. This is exploited by terrorists, whose
very mission is to nourish a fundamental sense of insecurity with respect to future
attacks (Burgess, 2007).
Salter (2008) takes a further constructivist position in voicing that terrorism risk
is made real only through its assessment. According to Salter, quantifying security
produces risk in the sense of promoting new nightmares that neither targets nor
agents might have otherwise imagined. Unfortunately yet comforting, limited in-
formation can be sought on behalf of ICAO, since their publications on aviation
security are sealed with restricted access. Perfectly paradoxical, this is of security
reasons. As information about the assessment and management of security risk is
transformed into increased capability in the hands of threat agents, also “objective”
security risk increases with dissemination of information. Contrasting this with the
openly shared safety manual of ICAO (2009), highlighted is another complicating
distinction between security and safety.
2In very uncertain or vulnerable situations, relying on precaution is believed a more suitable strat-
egy than attempting to quantify risk based on highly uncertain parameters. The difference between
precautionary- and risk-based approaches to risk management is presented in Section 4.5.
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3.4.6 Means to the end of security
A final troubling characteristic of security is that attempts to control it invites severe
moral questions. In the context of general crime prevention, Zedner (2003b) pos-
tulates that there are attendant costs to pursuing security that stand counter to its
purported goal. The greatest paradox, she claims, is that the means to the end of
freedom from security risk has the strong tendency to infringe individual liberties.
Although philosopher Næss (1985) finds this true also for matters of safety, inten-
tional attribution necessarily calls for a different control of thought.
3.5 Vulnerability
The massive disruptions following the earth quake at Haiti January 2010 is a tragic
reminder of the concept of vulnerability. Not only was the country characterized by
weak government, poor infrastructure and lacking emergency preparedness in the
first place; the rescue operations were also hampered as existing critical functions
were severely disabled by the quake (Aftenposten, 2010). The stronger, but less dam-
aging earthquake that consecutively hit the more prosperous Chile, indicates that a
fair share amongst the 230 000 lost lives might have been saved had Haiti been less
vulnerable to this natural event.
3.5.1 Attributes of vulnerability
Vulnerability appears in a number of disciplines, from economics and anthropol-
ogy to psychology and engineering. As a scientific branch, it originated in the field
of ecology. According to Adger (2006), this is the only area in which it has a com-
mon, though contested, meaning. Einarsson and Rausand (1998) substantiate that
for technological applications, vulnerability has not yet sought a generally accepted
definition. Consulting the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emer-
gency Planning (DSB), vulnerability is defined by reference to the Norwegian Stan-
dard NS 5814 (2008, p. 6):
Vulnerability: the lacking ability of an object to resist the impacts of an
unwanted event and to restore to its original state or function following
the event. (Translated)
A slightly different interpretation is provided by the powerful assemblage of Turner
et al. (2003, p.8074):
Vulnerability is the degree to which a system, subsystem, or system
component is likely to experience harm due to exposure to a hazard,
either a perturbation or stress/stressor.
Common to both definitions is that vulnerability is a property of the object of analy-
sis. While the former is adopted for this study, the latter provides valuable insight in
that vulnerability is a matter of degree that acts on different levels of a system. The
system under analysis may be socio-ecological (see, e.g. Turner et al., 2003), socio-
technical (see, e.g. Einarsson and Rausand, 1998) or societal (see, e.g. Apostolakis
and Lemon, 2005). In line with all applications are three attributes of vulnerability
(Adger, 2006):
1. Exposure to stress (e.g., an earthquake or terrorism attack).
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2. Sensitivity as the degree to which a system is affected by this stress (e.g., the
susceptibility of Haitian houses to trembling ground).
3. Adaptive capacity as the ability of a system to accommodate change (e.g., the
effectuation of rescue operations and reconstruction).
All attributes influence the disruption time, which marks the time interval from an
event occurs until a new stable situation is established (Einarsson and Rausand,
1998).
3.5.2 Whatmake us vulnerable?
“Our free society is inherently vulnerable” it is stated in DHS (2002, p.7). The Ameri-
can way of living and the large, diverse and highly mobile population is claimed the
nation’s greatest strength, but also its vulnerability. What is it that makes something
vulnerable? The abovedefinitionsmake it clear that one is vulnerablewith respect to
a certain type of stress. In the case of DHS (2002), this is terrorists hiding within the
American midst. Regarding the event of an earthquake, the mobility of the Ameri-
can population is a poor determinant of vulnerability. More important in this case
is land use planning. This is reflected in a comment of philosopher Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, following an earthquake in Lisbon in 1755: “Why have we accumulated
20 000 houses with six to seven floors in a notably seismic location?”(Reproduced in
Hovden, 2003, p.1). In contemporary institutions like the Norwegian Directorate for
Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB, 2010) and the UK Health and Exec-
utive office (HSE, 2009), land use planning is conceived as a central determinant of
vulnerability to stresses of natural, technological and intentional origin.
Einarsson and Rausand (1998) categorize generic factors that influence the vul-
nerability of industrial systems as either internal or external. Internal factors are sys-
tem attributes, like the complexity of interactions and tightness of couplings, tech-
nical reliability and organizational factors. Typical external factors are environmen-
tal, financial and societal conditions and infrastructure criticality. If broadening the
scope to societal systems, the latter is of exceptional importance. Critical infrastruc-
tures are physical and information technology facilities, assets and networks so vital
that their incapacitation will have debilitating effect on health, safety, security or
economic well-beings of citizens or the effective functioning of governments (Euro-
pean Commision, 2004). Among these are energy installations and networks, com-
munications and information technology, health care, finance and water supply.
Our extensive use of technology makes possible the rapid exchange of goods,
services, people, information and knowledge (Comfort, 2005). Meanwhile, as the
critical infrastructures become increasingly complex and interdependent, modern
society is rendered extremely vulnerable. Infrastructure vulnerability is especially
critical to terrorism risk. This owes to terrorism’s exact aim ofmaximizing social dis-
ruption (Apostolakis and Lemon, 2005). The devastating effects of the Haiti earth-
quakes demonstrate that also natural events may strain infrastructures like those of
health care and food supply. It also illustrates that in most (but not all) cases, there
is a link between lack of endowments and vulnerability (Turner et al., 2003).
3.5.3 Separating risk and vulnerability
Conceiving vulnerability as a property that influences the effect of an unwanted
event, implies that it makes a central determinant of the third question of Kaplan
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Figure 3.3: Components of the vulnerability framework of Turner et al. (2003).
and Garrick (1981). Is vulnerability simply a pillar of the risk concept or is it a con-
cept entitled analysis in its own right? Einarsson and Rausand (1998) observe that in
some references, vulnerability is considered similar to or a slightly broader concept
than risk. An example is Aven (2007b), asserting that vulnerability is merely a part of
the broader concept of risk. Vulnerability, he claims, is the combination of possible
consequences and uncertainties given a source, while risk is the combination of this
source and the related vulnerabilities. Einarsson and Rausand (1998) contend that
vulnerability complements and extends the concept of risk. Vulnerability and risk
analysis are believed to offer necessary and complementary information. This is in
line with the guidelines of DSB (2010). Figure 3.3 illustrates that in comparison with
traditional risk analysis, vulnerability analysis regards the whole disruption period
until a stable situation is obtained. A second distinction is that vulnerability analysis
deploys open system models, whilst risk analysis mostly operates within the physi-
cal boundaries of a system.
The advantage of separating risk and vulnerability both in concept and analysis
is convincingly formulated by Sarewitz et al. (2003, p.809):
The relation between vulnerability and risk is not commutative: reduced
vulnerability always means reduced outcome risk, but reducing the out-
come risk does not always reduce vulnerability. (Original emphasis)
Instead of striving for reducing the probability of an unwanted event, Sarewitz et al.
(2003) recommend reducing a system’s vulnerability to this event. Regardless of the
improbability of an event, unfortunate outcomes may still occur. Reducing vulner-
ability on the other hand, will always attenuate risk through reduced consequence
severity. Especially important is this in cases of great epistemic uncertainty, as is
demonstrated in the difficulty of assessing terrorism threat compared to infrastruc-
ture vulnerability (cf. Garrick et al., 2004). Great challenges are, however, present
also in vulnerability analysis. Most pressing are the difficulty of measuring the dy-
namics and coupled complexities of societal and socio-ecological systems. There
is also a call for reconciling the gap between objective and perceived vulnerability
(Adger, 2006). Framing the problem as one of vulnerability instead of risk may be
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Figure 3.4: The different scope of vulnerability and risk analysis (adapted from
Einarsson and Rausand, 1998).
more critical with respect to ontology, since “objective” vulnerability (as observed or
analyzed) by and large depends on how people perceive and act upon it.
Equipped with the clever title The vulnerability of science and the science of
vulnerability, Cutter (2003) posits that our ultimate vulnerability is the shortcomings
in our knowledge about the world we live in. Our greatest source of vulnerability as
Cutter sees it, is the lacking ability of vulnerability science to anticipate surprise,
capture uncertainty and accept changes in our understanding. This is recognized
by DHS (2002), promising that the more we know about our vulnerability, the more
resilient we become.
3.6 Linking vulnerability and resilience
The nearest we come to a counterconcept of vulnerability is allegedly that of re-
silience. Yet, within their original field of ecology, vulnerability and resilience sub-
scribe to different research traditions which have just recently began to converge
(Adger, 2006). Paraphrasing Turner et al. (2003, p.8075), resilience can be defined as:
Resilience: A system’s ability to bounce back to a reference state after a
disturbance.
According to Carpenter et al. (2001), resilience has the following attributes:
1. The amount of change a system can undergo and still retain the same controls
on structure and function.
2. The degree to which the system is capable of self-organization.
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3. The degree to which the system can build the capacity to learn and adapt.
Only wordily nuances and a negative sign seem to separate themain attributes of re-
silience and vulnerability. Of special junction is the third attribute of resilience, cap-
turing that both resilience and vulnerability are concepts of dynamics. In contrast
to the closely related, but static concept of robustness, resilience means the ability
to tackle new and unexpected situations (Einarsson and Rausand, 1998). Recalling
the concerns of Cutter (2003), this is precisely what makes resilience quintessential
to vulnerability. In the proposed framework of Turner et al. (2003) in Figure 3.4, re-
silience is portrayed as the key to reducing socio-ecological vulnerability.
The framework also illustrates that vulnerability is more than some opposite of
resilience, as it is additionally conditioned on exposure and sensitivity. Resilience,
on the other hand, is a pervasive property that influences a system’s response to var-
ious stressors. This is what makes resilience such an attractive concept, but also
what complicates its means of achievement. Resilience engineering (as exposed
by Hollnagel et al., 2006), may be criticized precisely of such pragmatic cloudiness.
Nonetheless, complementing the negatively connoted concept of risk with a posi-
tive focus on resilience offers a promising perspective for mastering the dynamics
of future uncertainties.
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Chapter 4
Risk assessment
4.1 Introduction
Long before the time of Christ, Mesopotamian priests regularly assessed the im-
pacts of proposed technological projects. Despite like practices of our ancestors,
the rise of scientific risk assessment is claimed less than half a century old (Shrader-
Frechette, 1991). Some references (e.g. Kates and Kasperson, 1983) draw a line at
1969 with the groundbreaking publication of Starr (1969) on comparative analysis
of technological hazards. Most reviewers, however, date the birth of risk assessment
to 1975 with the so-called Wash-1400 report of USNRC (1975) on nuclear reactor
safety (Apostolakis, 2004). Since then, methodologies have advanced and the fields
of application broadened into probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of space systems
(see, e.g. NASA, 2002a), quantitative risk assessment (QRA) in the offshore oil and
gas industry (see, e.g. HSE, 2008) and assessment of human and environmental risk
from chemicals (see, e.g. EU, 2000), to mention a few.
This chapter presents the contents and role of risk assessment inmastering tech-
nological risk. First, risk assessment is briefly described with the visual aid of the
bowtie-diagram and an introduction to logic modeling. Contemplation follows on
the very purpose of performing a risk assessment. This leads to a discussion on the
strengths and limitations of risk assessment. Final attention is devoted to clarifying
the main features of risk-based and risk-informed decision making and discussing
the implications on risk assessment by way of communicability, relevancy and con-
ceptual clarity.
4.2 The contents of risk assessment
In the risk management vocabulary of ISOguide 73 (2009, p.5), risk assessment is
defined as:
Risk assessment: overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and
risk evaluation.
ISO31000 (2009) adopts this definition and conceptualizes risk assessment as shown
in Figure 4.1. Risk assessment is in this figure put in the wider context of risk man-
agement, which ISOguide 73 (2009, p.2) defines as:
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Figure 4.1: Contents of risk management and risk assessment according to
ISO31000 (2009).
Riskmanagement: coordinated activities to direct and control an orga-
nization with regard to risk.
Risk management lies beyond the scope of this study and is not further examined.
Having said that, the context in which risk assessment is placed influences the as-
sessment in significant matters. Figure 4.1 models the dominant influence of com-
munication and consultation with external and internal stakeholders throughout
the entire assessment process.
ISO31000 (2009) complements the framework ofNORSOKZ-013 (2001) as is rep-
resented in Figure 4.2. What differs is mainly the locus of attention. While ISO31000
(2009) is a generic standard on risk management, NORSOK Z-013 (2001) offers de-
tailed guidance on analysis of risk and emergency preparedness. Risk assessment
is slightly differently conceived as a collective process of risk evaluation and risk
analysis, which in turn consists of hazard identification and risk estimation. In a
review of generic and specific standards on engineering and chemical risk assess-
ment, Christensen et al. (2003) report similar conceptual nuances. They reconcile
that there is no need to seek a unified definition on the contents and distinction be-
tween risk analysis and risk assessment. Notwithstanding that demarcating hazard
identification from risk analysis/risk estimation is mostly wordily quibbling, it is in
the opinion of this author that separating risk assessment from risk analysis is expe-
dient. In this study, risk analysis is conceived as the process of answering the three
questions of Kaplan and Garrick (1981), while risk assessment covers the wider pro-
cess of both risk analysis and evaluation, as is held by both ISOguide 73 (2009) and
NORSOK Z-013 (2001).
Leaving definitional quibbles aside, risk assessment can be thought of as a struc-
tured, logical process of estimating themagnitude of risk, followed by a judgment of
the significance of results (HSE, 2003b). Depending on the required level of detail,
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Figure 4.3: Bowtie-representation of risk assessment (adapted from Rausand and
Høyland, 2004).
this can be a qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative process. The choice of
method is affected by the problem at hand, the availability of resources, risk accep-
tance criteria, data availability and the risk management strategy (NS 5814, 2008).
4.2.1 Inductive and deductive analysis of risk
Risk analysts are equipped with various tools, models and approaches. Among the
distinctive characteristics are their structure, scope and underlying assumptions
(NUREG, 2009). The essentials of risk analysis are aptly captured in the so-called
bowtie-diagram of Figure 4.3. This presentation format, originally developed within
the oil and gas-company Shell, is a popular feature in educational books (see, e.g.
Rausand and Utne, 2009b) and guidances (see, e.g. HSE, 2006) on the subject. A
bowtie-diagram represents the possible causes and consequences of a particular
event, together with the safety barriers that are in place for prevention, control and
mitigation.
Analyzing the left, midst and right part of the bowtie-diagram requires different
techniques of modeling as is indicated in Figure 4.3. This owes to the distinctive-
ness of two paradigms of analytical reasoning; induction and deduction. Induction
means drawing general conclusions from individual cases, whereas deduction is the
reasoning from the general to the specific. In analogue with crime investigation,
deductive analysis is the tool of all great detectives faced with a specific event of
uncertain cause. Inductive reasoning on the other hand, attempts to ascertain the
possible effects of a particular event (USNRC, 1981).
Induction and deduction perfectly complement each other in the consequential
and causal analysis of risk. To determine what system states are possible, inductive
methods like event tree analysis (ETA), failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and
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Figure 4.4: Simplified fault tree (adopted fromNASA, 2002a).
preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) are most suitable. To determine how a given sys-
tem state can occur, fault tree analysis (FTA) is our superior deductive tool (NASA,
2002a).
PHA and FMEA are but a few of many methods principally applicable to hazard
identification. The interested reader may consult for instance HSL (2000) or DOE
(2004) for a comprehensive overview on hazard identification techniques. These are
procedurally structured, in contrast to the logic models of FTA and ETA. The logics
of FTA and ETA offer in combination a communicable basis for answering the three
questions of Kaplan and Garrick (1981), and are therefore sketched in the following.
Fault tree analysis
Fault tree analysis is basically an analytical technique for identifying all credible
ways in which a specified, undesired system state can occur (USNRC, 1981). Fig-
ure 4.4 illustrates that a fault tree is a graphic model. It consists of parallel and se-
quential combinations of faults leading up to an undesired top event, for instance,
gas rupture. The faults can be associated with hardware or software failures, human
errors or other pertinent events. These are binary events of either success or failure,
connected by a complex of entities, called gates. The gates serve to permit or inhibit
the upwards passage of fault. The reader is referred to NASA (2002a) for an elabora-
tion on the numerous symbols. What is important in this context is to understand
that a fault tree is always tailored to its top event, and is therefore not a model of all
possible system failures or all causes of system failures. A vast number of fault trees
must thus be generated in risk analysis of complex industrial systems. The reader
should also note that covered are only the most credible faults as conceived by the
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analyst (USNRC, 1981).
While some refer to it as as a probabilistic model (see, e.g. NUREG, 2009), Siu
(1994) makes it clear that a fault tree is deterministic and of static structure. NASA
(2002a) emphasizes that a fault tree is a principally a qualitative model that can be
both quantitatively and qualitatively evaluated. By assigning probabilities to each
basic event, the top-event probability can bemathematically derived from the logic
structure of the tree. FTA thus provides significant input to Kaplan and Garrick’s
(1981) second question of how likely is it?
Event tree analysis
Event tree analysis is a technique for modeling the range of possible outcomes fol-
lowing an initiating event. Figure 4.5 shows that an event tree is structured as a deci-
sion tree. The branches represent different plant responses and external influences
(USCG, 2000b). These are the systems, equipment, human actions, procedures and
processes that can impact the consequences of an initiating event, for instance, ter-
rorist attack or gas rapture. Given the success or failure of such lines of assurance,
the accident trajectory is either mitigated or continues as a downward line from the
branch point until a final consequence is reached (Garrick, 2008). The probability
of each consequence is calculated by associating each branch point with a prob-
ability of occurrence. It is important to beware that these are conditional proba-
bilities, meaning that the probability of success or failure for a line of assurance is
conditioned on the success or failure of the preceding. This is both a challenge and
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a strength. It urges caution in constructing the logical progression of events, while
enabling efficient accounting of timing, dependence and domino effects among var-
ious contributors (USCG, 2000b). A particular challenge is to take account of sub-
tle system dependencies, like common components, operators and utility systems,
when assigning the branch probabilities. According to USCG (2000b), this is one of
twomain limitations of event tree analysis. The other is that like FTA, is ETA limited
to one initiating event only. The brilliance of it is that this event is what connects the
causal analysis of a fault tree with the consequential analysis of an event tree (Sve-
dung and Rasmussen, 2002). This is visualized in the bowtie-diagram of Figure 4.3.
4.2.2 Risk evaluation
ISOguide 73 (2009, p. 8) defines risk evaluation as:
Risk evaluation: process of comparing the results of risk analysis with
risk criteria to determine whether the risk and/or its magnitude is ac-
ceptable or tolerable.
According to this definition, risk evaluation is seemingly a mechanistic process of
determining whether a calculated risk falls above or below some predefined level.
Radically different is the conception of Shrader-Frechette (1991), who sees risk eval-
uation as a political process that demands procedural inclusion of democratic and
ethical principles. Tantamount to her contribution is the proper balancing of values
and scientific “facts” in risk assessment.
Shrader-Frechette (1991) continues pursuing theheritage of Fischhoff et al. (1981).
Themighty quintet discards common evaluationmethods as ethically and pragmat-
ically insufficient for capturing that risk acceptance is a complex phenomenon of
accepting options, not risk. Since the adequacy of risk acceptance criteria (RAC) to
this have been thoroughly discussed elsewhere (see, e.g. Johansen, 2010), risk eval-
uation is only superficially covered in the present study. What should be carried
forward from the findings of Johansen (2010) is the need for understanding that risk
acceptance criteria are fraught with severe limitations. Especially in problems of
great risk, epistemic uncertainty or multiple affected parties, should risk evaluation
never be reduced to a process of mechanistic comparison as implied in the defini-
tion of ISOguide 73 (2009). An alternative philosophy is discussed under the topic
of risk-formed decision making in Section 4.5, which first urges contemplation on
the purpose and limitations of risk assessment.
4.3 The purpose of risk assessment
The aim of risk assessment is according to HSE (2003b) to identify significant risk
to the environment, health and safety of employees and any others who may be
affected by an undertaking. But what is the very purpose of performing a risk as-
sessment? The only reason for undertaking a risk assessment is, according to Bley
et al. (1992), to understand a risk in order to do something about it. Such a view, in
which risk reduction is considered the main objective of risk assessment, is a typ-
ical misconception according to Aven (2010a). Risk reduction is never a goal in it-
self. This owes to the recognition that creating value necessitates risk taking. The
purpose of risk assessment is thus not principally to facilitate risk reduction, but to
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provide input to a particular decision in a larger context. The vast majority of ref-
erences confirm this position, unanimously stating that risk assessment is a tool to
inform decision making in management of risk (HSE, 2001; NASA, 2002a; NUREG,
2009; NORSOK Z-013, 2001; IMO, 2002). Typical decision situations are:
• Accept a new project, activity or technology.
• Prioritize between concepts.
• Initiate improvements or relocate risk reducing measures.
• Verify new or existing regulations.
Common to all situations is the decision maker’s need for reducing his uncertainty
regarding the outcome of a decision. At a deeper level, risk assessment can thus be
seen as a tool to address and a language to express our uncertainty about the future
(Bley et al., 1992). Accepting this implies that risk assessment shall never purport to
justify past decisions (HSE, 2003b), nor shall it be used as an advocacy tool (Paté-
Cornell and Murphy, 1996). Rather, it is amanagement tool with the primary func-
tion of providing information pertinent to a forthcoming decision (USNRC, 1981).
4.3.1 The intrinsic value of risk assessment
It is not unreasonable to conclude that themain objective of risk assessment is to in-
form decision making. However, adopting this view raises the question of whether
risk assessment has an intrinsic value beyond that of decision making. Is it reason-
able to seek understanding simply for the sake of understanding alone? According
to IAEA (1998), risk assessments have traditionally been performed by regulatory
agencies to gain generic insights, or by licensees to demonstrate compliance with
regulatory requests and for understanding key plant vulnerabilities. Arguably, these
cases need not be related to a particular decision. In the case of demonstrating com-
pliance, the purpose of risk assessment may simply be seen as a matter of duty for
licencees. And as for the aim of gaining generic insights, one can suggest that knowl-
edge acquisition is a purpose as good as any other. The principal point is that even
the purpose of gaining generic insights is tied to one or more decisions. Do we need
to gain even more knowledge? And how are we to act upon the acquired insights?
Without such stated purposes, risk assessment can hardly provide useful results.
Principally, this is because the decision context shall dictate the results of risk as-
sessment rather the other way round (Aven, 2010a).
4.3.2 Decisionmakers, stakeholders and objectivity
Recalling the viewpoints of Luhmann (1991), it is extremely rare that risk cannot
be traced back to one or more decisions. And if risk assessment, as risk, is always
attributable to a decision, it is also attributable to a decision maker. What follows is
that risk assessments are principally intended for someone in pursuit of influence.
This has severe implications for risk assessment as well as the ontological riddle of
risk subjectivity. Is it ultimately the perception of the orderer that matters?
What would complicate such an inference is the diversity of stakeholders in-
volved in great questions about risk. Some are in the position to directly exert in-
fluence, while others have little or implicit influence in contributing with data, per-
spectives or values on selected topics. Yosie andHerbst (1998) report that there is no
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agreed upon definition of a stakeholder. This is unfortunate, as it not only compli-
cates the task of identifying relevant stakeholders, but also induces inconsistencies
regarding their role and relative influence. Narrowlydefining stakeholders as parties
who want to be involved in the decision, may exclude affected parties not currently
aware of the activity. Conceiving stakeholders simply as affected parties may, on the
other hand, exclude parties that could significantly impact the decision. Yosie and
Herbst (1998) sketch the following stakeholder categories:
• People who are directly affected by a decision to take action on an any issue
or project.
• People who are interested in a project or activity, want to become involved in
the process and seek an opportunity to provide input.
• People who are more generally interested in the process and may seek infor-
mation.
• People who are affected by the outcome of a decision but are unaware of or do
not participate in stakeholder processes.
All these are comprised by the definition of ISO31000 (2009, p.4), which is adopted
for this study:
Stakeholder: Person or organization that can affect, be affected by, or
perceive themselves to be affected by a decision or activity.
The controversy surrounding the ongoing construction of a storage tank for lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) at Risavika, Norway, illustrates the difficulty of identifying,
prioritizing and involving direct and indirect stakeholders. Vatn (2009) reports sig-
nificant resistance amongst neighbors of the facility, although the localization is ap-
proved by local authorities. Authorization from DSB to store and treat inflammable
goods was based on preliminary risk analysis in 2007, while updated risk analysis is
required for obtaining final authorization. While it is the responsibility of the local
energy supplier Lyse to provide these analyses, the decision of approval rests en-
tirely within DSB. Does this reduce the purpose of risk assessment to matter of duty
for Lyse? And may the external locus of decision making encourage bias towards
approval? In order to influence the decision, also neighbors, workers and potential
investors were interested in the results of risk analyses. What is problematic is that
the interests of these stakeholders are ostensibly quite distinct. While the neigh-
bors are likely concerned with major accidents that may harm their children and
local environment, investors may share this concern but of different reasons, be it
loss of property or declining stock prices. Workers at Lyse, on the other hand, may
have principal interest in occupational accidents and emergency preparedness. De-
pending on whose questions you serve to answer, the focus and execution of risk
assessment must necessarily differ. Recapturing the epistemological conviction of
Rosa (1998), this implies that risk assessment is never entirely objective, no matter
how real the risk under study might be.
What can be concluded from this discussion is that risk assessments are per-
formed for a reason, and that neither the analytical process nor its results should be
considered in isolation from that reason.
42
4.4 The limitations of risk assessment
If the purpose of risk assessment is to inform decision making, Bley et al. (1992)
make a disturbing observation in that many decisionmakers are discomfortable us-
ing the results of risk analysis. Apostolakis (2004) reports similar tendencies, notic-
ing that only in the fewest of domains has risk assessment come to earn the confi-
dence of decision makers. What does this reveal about the usefulness of risk assess-
ment? Momentarily leaving the realm of risk, Lindley (2006) finds an unrecognized
paradox in that you always expect your uncertainty to decrease with the acquisition
of data, albeit the opposite might actually occur if the data contradicts your current
information. Does this imply that risk assessment might actually increase uncer-
tainty?
4.4.1 The flaws of risk assessment according to Beck
The usefulness of risk assessment has been questioned from many stands. Most
trenchant is probably the slaughtering of Beck (1992), who dismisses risk analysis
as entirely incapable of reacting adequately to contemporary risk. This owes to a
failure in the techno-scientific rationalities that is “systematically grounded in the
institutional andmethodological approach of the sciences to risk”, allegedly serving
to increase risk in contrary to its purported aim (Beck, 1992, p.51). Although Beck
(1992) represents a landmark in the risk discourse, this author finds his accusations
far-fetched and poorly substantiated. This is in line with the critique of Campbell
and Currie (2006), sentencing Beck’s understanding of risk analysis as badly flawed.
Campbell and Currie (2006) secrete the objections of Beck in that (1) risk analysts
have vested interests in underestimating risk and are (2) unable to fulfill the impos-
sible scientific standards of proving causal links. Moreover, probability assignments
are accused for (3) being irrefutable and (4) displacing the focus from catastrophic
potential, which is disastrous since Beck alleges that (5) even low-probability events
are inevitable in the long run. As none of these objections stand up to scrutiny,
Campbell and Currie (2006) conclude that risk assessment- although not flawless-
earns a legitimate role in contemporary society.
4.4.2 Historical data, values and expert opinions
In contrast to the poorly articulated attack of Beck, risk assessment has also encoun-
tered well-founded critique among theorists and practitioners. HSE (2003b) has de-
voted a constructive report to counter the pitfalls of risk assessment, in which in-
appropriate use of historical and statistical data is a recurring theme. Aven (2009)
substantiates that the scientific quality of risk analysis by and large depends on how
probabilities are derived. Only when a large amount of relevant data is available, do
traditional statistical methods meet the criteria of reliability and validity. Also con-
cernedwith problems of validity, Shrader-Frechette (1991) takes a different perspec-
tive in calling for redefinition of conventional accounts of scientific rationality. The
main concern of Shrader-Frechette (1991) is the often neglected inclusion of val-
ues in risk assessment. Especially conspicuous is this at the stage of risk evaluation.
However, also the process of risk analysis is pervaded by value judgments regarding
what method to choose, what events and consequences to consider and so on. The
problem relates to the use of expert opinions, which is one of three problems Bley
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et al. (1992) find to create discomfort among decisionmakers. One of themost com-
mon criticisms leveled at risk assessment is over reliance on expert opinions in the
absence of “objective” evidence. Instead of asking experts of their opinion, the trio
replies, one shall ask for their evidence.
A second critique addressed by Bley et al. (1992) is the difficulty of analyzing hu-
man reliability. Human reliability analysis (HRA) attempts to predict the impact of
human interactions on system reliability in terms of probability of successful per-
formance (NASA, 2002b). Despite the numerous efforts made in this pursuit is HRA
still considered an overly complex field.
4.4.3 The inclusion of organizational factors
The third limitation encountered by Bley et al. (1992) is the inability of traditional
risk assessment to model the impact of organizational factors. This is certainly a se-
vere defect, considering that the vast majority of major accidents are attributed to
such factors (Reason, 1997). Responding to the challenge, Paté-Cornell andMurphy
(1996) have developed a framework titled SAM (system-action-management). SAM
structures and describes human and management effects on risk by a set of con-
ditional probabilities. The aim of SAM is to improve risk assessment as a tool for
managing and reducing risk.
Inspired by the same objective, Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) present a set of
graphical representations to account for the dynamics of organizational decision
making in structuring the analysis of socio-technical accidents. Their work builds
on the pioneering article of Rasmussen (1997), Risk modeling in a dynamic society.
Rasmussen models the hierarchical levels of decision making involved in risk man-
agement and regulatory rule making as shown in Figure 4.6. An alternative means
for relating this model to risk assessment is suggested in Figure 4.7. The vertical lev-
els of Rasmussen (1997) are rotated and merged with a bowtie-diagram. This pre-
sentation format depicts the influence of organizational actors in causal modeling,
and carries the promise of well-directed recommendations to risk management de-
cisions.
4.4.4 The deeper issue of uncertainty
What is striking with the limitations addressed by Bley et al. (1992), is that all em-
anate from the single, deeper issue of uncertainty. The reason why human perfor-
mance, organizational influences and expert opinions create discomfort among de-
cision makers, is that they are sources of substantial uncertainty. This takes us back
to the initial query of whether risk assessment is an adequate tool for dealing with
uncertainty in decision making.
Risk in complex systems transcends the realm of ordinary experience. Of this
reason, does risk assessment occupy a uniqueniche that is difficult to disprove (Kates
and Kasperson, 1983). Notwithstanding its limitations, the bulk of critics ultimately
seem to agree that risk assessment is a powerful tool that provides decision makers
with a platform for understanding, communicating and prioritizing actions (Apos-
tolakis, 2004). Ironically, since risk assessment offers a language for addressing un-
certainty beyond the perceptual, it may also deliver an increased sense of uncer-
tainty. According to Aven (2003), this hinges on the communication of epistemic
uncertainty. Resonance is given to an alternative explanation of Bley et al. (1992),
suggesting that all limitations represent problems of communication. The key to
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Figure 4.6: The socio-technical system involved in risk management (adopted from
Rasmussen, 1997).
45
HE
M
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
S
ta
ff
W
o
rk
R
e
g
u
la
to
rs
, 
a
s
s
o
c
ia
ti
o
n
s
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
Causal chain Consequential chain
Figure 4.7: Conceptual framework for including organizational actors in risk analy-
sis.
successful management as they see it, is to convey clarity in the expression of un-
certainty both internal and external to the analysis team. Grasping the problem as
one of communication carries an important implication, namely the criticality of
having a clear and consistent language of risk assessment. Otherwise yet another
source of uncertainty is introduced, that is, one of linguistics.
4.5 Using risk assessment in decisionmaking
The plurality of stakeholders and the prevalence of uncertainties represent twoma-
jor challenges for implementing risk assessment results in decision making (Amen-
dola, 2001). Not only do they call for elaboration on the role of risk assessment in
decision making, but also on how this reflects back by way of requirements to risk
assessment. USNRC (1998) distinguishes between two philosophies of application:
Risk-based decision making: The decision is solely based on the re-
sults of risk assessment. USNRC (1998) applies the notion of risk in-
sights when referring to the results of risk assessment. This may be
dominant accident scenarios, estimations of core damage frequency,
expected number of fatalities or importancemeasures like Fussel-Vesely
(see, e.g. Cheok and Sherry, 1998). The option is chosen that have the
lowest risk, fulfills some predefined requirement or scores best one an
importancemeasure, without reference to other attributes or constraints.
Risk-informed decision making: The decision is based on joint con-
sideration of risk insights and other relevant factors. Technically, US-
NRC (1998) describes this as an integration of probabilistic and deter-
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ministic approaches to safety. The former refers to a pure risk-based
philosophy, whereas the latter represents traditional engineering prin-
ciples of redundancy, diversity and safety margins (Niehaus and Szik-
szai, 2001). Examples are the defense in depth-philosophy and the re-
quirements to architectural constraints in IEC61508 (1998). The latter
was introduced to avoid that quantitative assessments alone determine
hardware integrity (see, e.g. Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). Contextu-
ally, risk-informed decision making spans beyond the incorporation of
different perspectives on safety, to a philosophy of balancing safety with
other attributes, for example, costs and economical benefits (Christou
et al., 2000).
Albeit the distinctionbetween risk-based and risk-informeddecisionmaking is fairly
recognized,many authors use the terms interchangeably or in a contradictory sense.
A prominent example is USCG (2000a), who lets the notation Risk-based decision
making guidelines front a series of guiding documents on risk assessment and risk
management. This is an obvious misnomer, since USCG (2000a, p.6) in fact stresses
that “In risk-based decision making, all of the identifiable factors that affect a de-
cision must be considered”, which is further claimed to be “more than just risk”.
Bohnenblust and Slovic (1998) similarly characterize a proposed framework for in-
tegrating technical aspects and public concerns as “risk-based decision making”.
From this it appears that many who allegedly embrace a risk-based approach are
in fact promoters of the contrary. Also those who consciously apply the scheme of
USNRC (1998) express an almost unanimous preference for the risk-informed ap-
proach. Representative is Apostolakis (2004, p.518), postulating that:
I wish to make one thing very clear: QRA results are never the sole ba-
sis for decision making by responsible groups. In other words, safety-
related decision making is risk-informed, not risk-based. (Original em-
phasis)
Apostolakis reflects a current attitude within regulatory decision making. This has
evolved from a traditional deterministic perspective, via a risk-based philosophy to
an integrated, risk-informed approach (Niehaus and Szikszai, 2001). What is inter-
esting is that despite the general and spoken preference for risk-informed decision
making, many experts and managers tend towards a risk-based approach in prac-
tice (Aven, 2010a). Resolving this tension urges understanding of the practical and
conceptual implications of both approaches.
4.5.1 Risk-based decisionmaking
The perhaps greatest advantage of the risk-based approach is its simplicity of use on
behalf the decision maker. This is because risk assessment provides direct input to
the decision as such, and not simply the process of decision making (Aven, 2010a).
Since the numbers are required to speak for themselves, the decision is in principle
given before reaching the hands of the decision maker. All the decision maker is re-
quired to do, is to choose the risk insight most relevant to the decision and pick the
option that best fulfill this measure. Alternatively, the results can be compared with
a predefined set of risk acceptance criteria as depicted in Figure 4.8. For a thorough
discussion on the merits and disadvantages of this approach, the reader is referred
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Figure 4.8: Comparing the results of risk assessment, R, with a predefined set of risk
acceptance criteria, R¯ (adapted from Breugel, 1998).
to Johansen (2010). An attractive feature is that consistency is sought across de-
cisions in the establishment of a clearly defined decision rule. Such coherence is
according to Lindley (1985) a cardinal quality in any decision context.
Optimization of neither safety nor development
The reader should note that risk acceptance criteria do not generally foster a risk-
based approach in the strict sense of USNRC (1998). A risk acceptance criterion
only serves as an upper constraint. Even if one or more options fall below this re-
quirement, NORSOK Z-013 (2001) evokes the ALARP-principle1 by requiring other
factors, like costs and sound engineering principles, to be considered in addition
to risk. This ensures effective expenditure on risk reduction measures along with a
balanced consideration of options (HSE, 2001).
Mechanical compliance with risk acceptance criteria is indeed a risk-based ap-
proach. Such application has been repeatedly criticized by, for example, Ersdal and
Aven (2008). Ersdal and Aven reinforce the ideas of Fischhoff et al. (1981), clarifying
that there is much more to risk acceptability than risk. This pinpoints the most fun-
damental deficiency of risk-based decision making. In a world where exploration
opportunities and limited resources enable and confine the progress of mankind,
risk-based decision making optimizes neither safety nor development. Although it
may yield pragmatic and fast solutions (Bohnenblust and Slovic, 1998), they are thus
hardly very good solutions.
The numbers are given an authority that cannot be justified
The more emphasis that is put on risk insights, the more stringent become the re-
quirements to the quality, level of detail and scope of risk assessment (Caruso et al.,
1999). Quality refers to the adequacy of modeling, while scope reflects the com-
pleteness of identified scenarios. What is discomforting is that along with level of
1ALARP is the acronym for As low as reasonably practicable. ALARP is the British risk acceptability
framework, providing conditional rather than absolute risk acceptance criteria. A suite of guiding docu-
ment are offered by HSE, see for instance, HSE (2001) and HSE (2003a).
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detail and model complexity also comes increased uncertainty (Niehaus and Szik-
szai, 2001). A second deficiency of risk-based decision making is therefore the ap-
parent paradox of requiring amore precise analysis while at the same time demand-
ing more confidence in the results. This places great demand on the presentation
and communication of uncertainties. In a continuation of her discussion on six lev-
els of uncertainty treatment, Paté-Cornell (2002) worries that differing assumptions
and presentations of uncertainty make a major source of inconsistencies in deci-
sion making. For two options to be meaningfully compared and ranked, they must
be based on the same level of conservativeness. A plausible upper bound-estimate,
for instance, cannot readily be compared with an estimation based on mean fre-
quencies. And even if two options are treated on the same level of uncertainty, the
problem remains if the results are to be compared against some predefined criteria.
Ultimately, this not only diminishes our confidence in the ranking of results, but also
the grounds on which risk assessment is granted overriding importance. The num-
bers are merely given an authority that cannot be justified (Aven, 2010a). In light of
the subjectivity and imperfectness of risk assessment that is pinpointed in Section
4.4, this makes a compelling argument for dismissing a pure risk-based approach to
decision making.
Admittedly, it must be noted that uncertainty is an issue that riddles both prob-
abilistic and deterministic approaches to safety (Niehaus and Szikszai, 2001). An
advantage of risk assessment in comparison with the latter is, in fact, its ability to
quantify uncertainty. A summary of the strengths and limitations of deterministic
and probabilistic approaches to safety is outlined in Table 4.1. Hence the principal
flaw of risk-based decisionmaking lies not in the flaws of risk assessment, but in the
failure to compensate these weaknesses by considering more than one side of the
same problem.
4.5.2 Risk-informed decisionmaking
Simply flipping the above discussion reveals the advantages of risk-informed deci-
sion making. Principally, the risk-informed approach offers a more compound so-
lution, since more than one factor is under consideration. As for the issue of safety,
the integration of probabilistic and deterministic approaches serves to complement
and compensate each other’s weaknesses. From this a second advantage follows, in
that the requirements to precision in risk assessment become somewhat lessened.
In a wider context, the above discussion dictates the benefit of considering not
only different perspectives on safety, but also other factors that are relevant to risk
acceptability. Hence conceptually and ethically, risk-informed decision making is
supreme compared to the risk-based approach. The problem is that this comes with
an operational prize.
Separate layers of requirements or optimized decisionmaking?
One of the key challenges to risk-informed decision making is to reconcile prob-
abilistic and deterministic insights (Niehaus and Szikszai, 2001). Often, these in-
sights contradict each other. And in the absence of a method for reconciliation, the
deterministic and probabilistic requirements will end up as separate layers of re-
quirements, rather than a tool for optimized decision making. Caruso et al. (1999)
agree to this position, admitting that there is currently no harmonized way for com-
bining such insights, not to say the various accounts of uncertainty (cf. Paté-Cornell,
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Table 4.1: Summary of the strengths and limitations of deterministic and probabilis-
tic approaches to safety (Extracted fromNiehaus and Szikszai, 2001).
Deterministic Probabilistic
Strengths -Principles of defense in depth, redun-
dancy and diversity provide technically
sound criteria.
-Accident frequencies and consequences
are dealt with quantitatively based on re-
alistic assumptions.
-Responsible for outstanding safety
record.
-Quantitative approach to evaluating im-
pacts of uncertainties on risk estimates.
-Resulting requirements are expressed in
pass/fail rules and are straightforward to
implement and verify compliance.
-Facilitates ranking of technical issues
and events based on contribution to risk.
Limitations -Deals with a limited set of uncertainties
by use of conservative assumptions and
safety margins. Combination of conser-
vative assumptions tends to obscure un-
derstanding of realistic behavior
-Results highly dependent on and limited
by state of knowledge; subject to change
as knowledge evolves.
-Limited to somewhat arbitrarily defined
design basis. Protection for beyond de-
sign basis only implicitly provided.
-Uncertainties in risk estimates may be
too large to support certain decisions.
-Assurance that decisions create no un-
due risk to the public is made on a quali-
tative and subjective basis.
-Limited to accidents caused by ran-
domly occurring failures; requires as-
sumed validity of the deterministic basis
of the plant.
2002). Any suchmethod would have to consider the nature of the decision problem,
the risk insights to be used and the detail and quality of the risk assessment pro-
cess. The problemmultiplies when accounting for other factors beyond safety, as is
demonstrated by Christou et al. (2000) in a case study on the integration of safety,
local community and economic considerations in land-use planning.
Stakeholder involvement in risk-informed decisionmaking
Bohnenblust and Slovic (1998) provide a list of contentious issues concerning the
use of risk assessment in decision making. Uncertainty and the combination of
probabilistic and deterministic perspectives are central challenges. They are, how-
ever, only of secondary importance to this duo:
The actual point of discrepancymay not necessarily be related to safety.
Often it turns out that controversies go back to basic disagreements be-
tween the different parties involved. Even the best safety analysis can-
not solve such issues. (Bohnenblust and Slovic, 1998, p.151)
The main challenge as these authors see it, is the lacking of a framework for bring-
ing technical information and public perceptions together in a normative sense in
decision making. This pivots on the recognition that transition from risk-based to
risk-informed decision making not only broadens the number of factors under con-
sideration, but also the group of involved actors. This is not to deny the importance
of stakeholder involvement in risk-based decisionmaking. Their voices should nev-
ertheless be heard in the specification of risk insights prior to risk assessment as
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depicted in Figure 4.1. Yet since risk assessment makes the sole basis for decision
making, there is neither need nor room for non-technical deliberation beyond this
point. When other factors are allowed for consideration, the question becomes not
only what risk measures to consider, but what other factors to include and their rel-
ative importance. The principal point is that different stakeholders are likely to have
diverging opinions on both issues. Stakeholder involvement is thus a given com-
panion in any risk-informed decision making process. This parallel development
fromrisk-based to risk-informeddecisionmaking and the increasing focus on stake-
holder communication is caricatured by Fischhoff (1995, p.138):
• All we have to do is get the numbers right
• All we have to do is tell them the numbers
• All we have to do is explain what wemean by the numbers
• All we have to do is show them that they have accepted similar risks
• All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them
• All we have to do is treat them nice
• All we have to do is make them partners
• All of the above
A prima facie challenge to risk-informed decision making is indicated in the latter
item. That is, to elicit and integrate stakeholder opinions with scientific informa-
tion in a just and practical way (Amendola, 2001). Adopting Apostolakis (2004)’s
standpoint that risk decisions should never be risk-based, but risk-informed, urges
a decision making framework that accentuates this feature.
4.5.3 A framework for risk-informed decisionmaking
Figure 4.9 depicts a basic framework for risk-informeddecisionmaking. It is adapted
from Aven (2003), who at the outset asks what is a good decision. Different stake-
holders are likely to yield different answers to this question. What is further compli-
cating is that the goodness of a risk-informed decision cannot principally be judged
by the outcomes, since one is unable to observe the outcomes of anything but the
chosen alternative. What is a good decision must instead be judged by the process.
According to Aven (2003, p.97), there are two basic principles for reaching a good
decision:
1. Establish an optimization model of the decision-making process and choose
the alternative that maximizes (minimizes) some specified criteria.
2. See decision-making as a process with formal risk and decision analysis to
provide decision support, followed by an informal managerial judgment and
review process resulting in a decision.
The former covers, but is not restricted to, risk-based decision making. An opti-
mization model may equally well incorporate other factors than risk. Examples are
cost-benefit analysis (see, e.g. Wilson and Crouch, 1982), formal Bayesian decision
analysis (see, e.g. Lindley, 1985) and multiattribute utility theory (see, e.g. Keeney
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Figure 4.9: Framework for risk-informed decision making (adapted from Aven,
2003).
and Raiffa, 1976). The principal point of Aven (2003) is that although these mod-
els are (more or less) useful, they provide support to the decision maker rather than
input to the decision as such. Only in the rarest of cases will such models provide
all the answers that are important to a decision maker. The second of Aven’s princi-
ples is therefore embraced and conceptualized as in Figure 4.9. The figure splits the
process of decision making into four steps:
1. Identification of the decision problem, decision maker(s), options, relevant
boundary conditions and stakeholders. This includes clarification of the goals
and preferences of interested parties and the measures that best reflects these
attributes.
2. Assessment of options by, for example, risk analysis, cost-benefit analysis and
so on.
3. Managerial review and judgment of options, by evaluating and relating the
results of analysis to the goals, criteria and preferences of interested parties.
4. Selection of options (decision).
The original figure of Aven (2003) is refined to pinpoint that risk analysis is never
the sole analytical basis in risk-informed decisions. By splitting the forth step into
different types of analyses, the figure conveys that analysis of risk is accompanied
by deterministic evaluations and analyses of costs, socio-economical impacts and
so on. Figure 4.10 illustrates that if this is not the case, decision making is simply
risk-based.
Even though the second and forth steps have traditionally received most atten-
tion, are the remainder promoted as the key to truly good decisions. Predefining the
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Figure 4.10: Risk analysis is the sole analytical input to risk-based decision making.
decision situation is cardinal for ensuring that analyses provide the required deci-
sion support. Managerial review ensures that all relevant factors are considered and
that critical limitations, uncertainties and assumptions are addressed. Pervasive to
both stages are the boundary conditions depicted in the upper box, reflecting the
values and interests of relevant stakeholders. These may be formulated as organiza-
tional goals, criteria, standards, preferences or political and ideological views. The
original figure of Aven (2003) is adapted to emphasize the variety of boundary con-
straints, ranging from laws and regulations to corporate and public opinions. Fur-
ther refinement can possibly be achieved by indicating that there is a hierarchy of
power among stakeholders. As an example, the air traffic control company Avinor
has more influential power than commercial airlines in deciding whether to allow
for air traffic in the presence of volcano ash clouds.
Figure 4.9 depicts that analysis is framed by deliberation and that deliberation is
informed by analysis. This interactive approach is commonly referred to as analytic-
deliberative procedure (Amendola, 2001). A fundamental recognition is that value
judgmentsmakes an inherent feature of decisionmaking aswell as expert approaches
to risk assessment. Conceptually, the framework of Aven (2003) can be seen as an
increased resolution of the framework of ISO31000 (2009). Stakeholder commu-
nication is emphasized in both frameworks, as is also the importance of managerial
review. A difference is that while ISO31000 (2009) characterize the outcome in terms
of risk treatment, does Aven (2003) describe it simply as a decision. This reflects the
premise that risk-informed decision making is not necessarily about reducing risk,
but a balancing act of values, risk factors and other attributes. Unfortunately but
not accidentally, the framework restrains from prescribing the relative importance
of these factors and the procedural inclusion of stakeholder opinions.
Science against the people?
Twomajor challenges follow the inclusion of stakeholders in risk-informed decision
making as this author sees it. The first is practical and concerns the means for iden-
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Figure 4.11: Strategies and actors in the risk management escalator of Klinke and
Renn (2002).
tifying relevant stakeholders, eliciting their opinions and collocating this into useful
information. It is beyond the scope of this study to explore the various approaches
of participatory decision making. The reader is referred to Breakwell (2007) for a
comprehensive overview. Common to all is that they are fraught with pragmatic
and ethical constraints, as is concluded by Yosie and Herbst (1998) in a review on
the use of stakeholder processes in environmental decision making. Many stake-
holder processes are sentenced as badly managed, unfit to the relevant problem,
excluding to relevant parties and for making ineffective use of scientific knowledge.
The latter reflects the common apprehension that stakeholder-based and science-
based decision making represent competing approaches. This is according to Yosie
and Herbst (1998) a critical misconception, since there are no inherent reasons why
the two processes cannot be mutually supportive as suggested in the framework of
Aven (2003). Dictated is a second major challenge, which is the normative question
of the how to balance stakeholder values and scientific evidence. In the scientific
proceduralism of Shrader-Frechette (1991), this riddle is traced back to fundamen-
tal ontological and epistemological considerations. Risk assessment is considered
an invaluable tool for making decisions about risk. It does, however, presuppose
that one overcomes the naive positivist account to rationality, in which risk assess-
ment is considered the perfect and only provider of truth. Calibration, peer reviews
and ethical weights through deliberation aremethodological suggestions for amore
procedural account of rationality.
The riskmanagement escalator of Klinke and Renn
The seminal paper of Klinke and Renn (2002) extends and complements the con-
tributions of Shrader-Frechette (1991). In response to five controversial themes re-
garding the legitimate role of risk assessment for regulatory decisionmaking, Klinke
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and Renn (2002) draw up a tripartite classification scheme for the optimal integra-
tion of analytic and deliberative processes. Essentially, this is determined by the
prominence of three major challenges to risk management; complexity, uncertainty
and ambiguity.
Problems characterized by complexity are prescribed a risk-based approach, in
which risk assessment and cognitive deliberation among expertsmake the prime in-
put to decisions. If epistemic uncertainty is the dominant characteristic, aprecaution-
based strategy is advised for resilience and reflexive discourse on the trade offs be-
tween competing extremes of over- and under-protection. Problems of high ambi-
guity necessitate a discourse-based approach, in which value-trade offs and stake-
holder participation is the ruling principle.
The different strategies and associated actors are summarized in Figure 4.11. It
should be stressed that the strategies are not mutually exclusive. In reality, making
the right decisions is a matter of balancing the perspectives according to the dom-
inant characteristic of the problem at hand. This promotes the general conclusion
that risk-informed decision making must be tailored not only to the specific risk,
but also the wider context in which decisions are taken. Not all decisions requires
extensive stakeholder participation, in the samematter as risk assessment is granted
less influence in situations of great uncertainty or conflicting values. This does not,
however, mean that the scientific requirements to risk assessment decrease along
the axis of deliberation. Rather, it places increased demands on the relevancy and
communicability of results, in order to ensure that decision making is informed by
the best available technical and scientific knowledge (Apostolakis, 2004).
4.5.4 Implications on risk assessment
Adopting the framework for risk-informeddecisionmaking in Figure 4.9 carries con-
siderable implications on the process and use of risk assessment.
Relevancy
Firstly, any meaningful application of risk assessment in decision making presup-
poses that it produces relevant information. An inference that follows is the need
for risk analysis to provide a much broader risk picture than is typically done to-
day (Aven, 2010a). Figure 4.9 addresses this explicitly in the importance of clari-
fying stakeholder interests prior to risk assessment. Albeit obvious, neglecting this
point represents a commoncontributor to poor utilization of risk insights in practice
(Amendola, 2001). If the various stakeholders are not involved at this early point, it
seems unrealistic to expect them to approve the outcome of risk analysis at stage 3.
Communicability
The production of relevant results makes a fundamental requirement to risk assess-
ment. No guarantee is, however, provided that the results are conceived as relevant
by the decision maker and interested parties. Regardless of the analyst’s intentions,
the results are of limited use if the receivers fail to relate the results to the problem at
hand. Ultimately, this is an issue of communication. Required is not only a feasible
presentation format, but also a clear and consistent use of words. In a case study on
communication of risk assessment information to risk managers, Thompson and
Bloom (2000), report that decision makers prefer simple charts and graphs that are
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not overly busy or detailed. The information must be structured in such a way that
central risk contributors and the impact of risk reduction measures are readily re-
flected. At the same time, the results should be extensive and detailed enough to
convey multiple measures or attributes of risk. Reconciling this represents a funda-
mental challenge. Either, the decision maker receives an aggregate result in which
value trade offs or risk contributors are hidden, or, he is overloaded with ambiguous
information in demand for interpretation. A rule of thumb is that the results should
be “as simple as possible and as complex as needed”(Leeuwen and Vermeire, 2007,
p.24).
Confidence
Communication of risk assessment is not simply about communication of results.
Equally important is it to ensure that stakeholders have confidence in the results.
On the practical side, this requires coherent presentation of key uncertainties (cf.
Paté-Cornell, 2002) and honest communication of underlying assumptions and the
amount of review the assessment has been through (Thompson and Bloom, 2000).
Froman epistemological viewpoint, itmotivates continuous scientific improvement
of risk assessment methodologies andmore sophisticated means for understanding
and representing uncertainties (Shrader-Frechette, 1991). Stakeholders must, how-
ever, also take their share of responsibility by improving their understanding of the
fundamentals of risk assessment (Aven, 2010a). This reflects back on the risk assess-
ment community through demands for harmonization of methodology, terminol-
ogy and results.
4.5.5 A call for harmonization
Decision makers are confronted with a variety of methodologies for assessing and
presenting risk. Inconsistency in assessments performed by different analysts or
for various end users is a significant barrier to the use of risk assessment in deci-
sionmaking (Niehaus and Szikszai, 2001; Kirchsteiger andCojazzi, 2000). Amendola
(2001) explains this in terms of operational uncertainty. Operational uncertainty re-
flects uncertainty introduced not from lack of knowledge, but from inconsistent use
of it. Differences in operational background, choice and use of physical or logic
models and misconception of fundamental concepts, are all factors which take risk
assessment farther from the ideal of objectivity. This complicates communication
across different parties in the risk assessment community and ultimately, the possi-
bility of decision makers to get at proper understanding of the process and results
of risk assessment. An attractive fix is technical harmonization of risk assessment
and risk-informed decision making. The issue is promoted for future research by
Niehaus and Szikszai (2001) and Amendola (2001), but is it feasible and realistic?
Necessary pragmatism
The need for an internationally accepted, generic standard for risk-informed deci-
sion making motivated a workshop held by the European Commission in 2000. In
the summary paper of Kirchsteiger and Cojazzi (2000), it is pinpointed that most
existing standards are industry-specific and adopt different definitions, models and
approaches to risk assessment. No existing standard was at that time found to satis-
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factorily bridge thesenonconformities. Notwithstanding the recent efforts of ISO31000
(2009), this still seems to be the case ten years later.
Promoting risk assessment along harmonized procedures offers an attractive so-
lution. Not only would it promote consistency and understanding across differ-
ent domains and applications, it would also encourage a more transparent deci-
sion process in which all stakeholders can be involved. Despite these advantages,
Kirchsteiger and Cojazzi (2000) conclude in disfavor of a harmonized, prescriptive
approach to risk assessment and decision making. Somewhat paradoxically, this is
precisely because the requirement of stakeholder involvement calls for pragmatic
application of methodologies and measures to produce relevant results. Substan-
tiation of this claim is provided by Amendola (2001), stressing that any attempts
at procedural harmonization must take into account the decisional framework in
which risk assessment is performed. As this ultimately depends on the time, activity,
cultural and regulatory context, neither risk assessment nor consultation processes
can be readily transposed across socio-economical contexts.
Aminimumpromise of coherence
Although a universal, prescriptive standard is discarded as neither desirable nor re-
alistic, Kirchsteiger and Cojazzi (2000) still see the necessity for linking the work of
different international standardization organizations (e.g., CEN, ISO and IEC) on
a generic, technical level. Such an effort would focus on generic aspects of risk-
informed decisionmaking (e.g, principles for setting risk acceptance criteria), while
refraining from specifying low level, technical aspects (specific methodologies or
decision criteria). Most fundamentally, Kirchsteiger and Cojazzi (2000) call for har-
monization of central terms and concepts.
A consequence of the iterative link between process and results in Figure 4.9, is
that different stakeholders may dictate conflicting indicators of risk. Notwithstand-
ing that integrating these is challenging, this author beliefs that such diversity repre-
sents a true barrier to risk-informed decision making only when analysts, decision
makers and stakeholders talk at cross purposes. Albeit perplexity cannot be removed
by standardization of results ormethodology, a conscious and clear use of terminol-
ogy holds a minimum promise of coherence in risk-informed decision making.
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Chapter 5
What can go wrong?
5.1 Introduction
Foundational to the risk definition of Kaplan andGarrick (1981) is the questionwhat
can go wrong? Since queried is virtually everything and anything, a set of termino-
logical knobs is essential for piloting our analysis of risk. Kaplan and Garrick pre-
scribe the word accident scenario for this purpose. Unfortunately, they refrain from
defining it in anything but a circular manner; an accident scenario is simply the
answer to the question of what might go wrong. It is in the opinion of this author
that the latter inquiry necessitates a fundamental set of terms beyond the notion of
accident scenario. Considering the widespread understanding that hazard- and sce-
nario identification makes the most informative yet challenging part of risk assess-
ment (Haimes, 2009), terminological consistency is especially critical at this step.
This chapter seeks to tidy up the toolbox of concepts for answering the first def-
initional question of risk. Focus is on the left and midst part of the bowtie-diagram,
while the overarching concept of accident scenario is deferred to Chapter 6. The ba-
sic concepts of hazard and threat make a natural start of inquiry. As a foundation
for entering the jungle of terms relating a hazard to events of cause and realization,
a philosophical briefing on the concepts of event and causation follows thereafter.
The midst of the bowtie-diagram is then clarified by stating a preference for haz-
ardous event. In order to describe how hazardous events come about, triggering
event is subsequently discussed in light of the ideas of Reason (1990b) and Wage-
naar et al. (1990). An alternative perspective is presented in the concept of safety
issues as fronted by ARMS (2009), which is finally contrasted and set in context with
our remaining terminological knobs.
5.2 Hazard
Fundamental to risk is the comparatively plain concept of hazard. A closer exami-
nation confirms this assertion, while at the same time revealing that hazard by no
means is exempted from difficult issues of demarcation and ontology.
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5.2.1 A hazard is a source of potential harm
Hazard is in everyday parlance interchangeably used with its synonyms of danger
and peril (Garland, 2003). In the language of risk scholars, hazard is by and large the
preferred designation for something with possibility to cause harm (HSE, 2001). Un-
like most other terms in the comparative analysis of Christensen et al. (2003, p.187),
only nuances seem to separate the definitions under study. Their compound defini-
tion is as following:
Hazard: the inherent property/properties of a risk source potentially
causing consequences/effects.
Common to all definitions is the potential or possibility of adverse effects. Slight dis-
agreement appears on whether to distinguish risk source from hazard. The former
is defined as (Christensen et al., 2003, p.185) :
Risk source: Activity, condition, energy or agent potentially causing un-
wanted consequences/effects.
From the two definitions, it appears that hazard is amore restricted term that consti-
tute a part of the wider concept of risk source. Consulting ISO31000 (2009), the op-
posite is apparent, as it is specified that a hazard can, but need not be a risk source.
Since this author considers it unnecessarily confusing to separate the two notions,
hazard is chosen as a collective term that simply describes, as is definedby ISO14121
(2007, p.2):
Hazard: source of potential harm.
5.2.2 Situations as hazards
The ISO14121 (2007)-definition is extended in IEC60300-3-9 (1995, p.11), with the
amendment “(..) or a situation with potential for harm”. Recall the Hillsbourough
tragedy in 1989, where 96 football fans were crushed to death (LFC, 2002). This was
a situation of overcrowding that definitely brought potential of harm, hence clearly
falling under the hazard definition of IEC60300-3-9 (1995). Would it not be consid-
ered a hazard according to ISO14121 (2007)? The answer is seemingly both yes and
no. ISO14121 (2007) differentiates between hazard and hazardous situation. The
latter is described as a circumstance of exposure to hazard. In this manner, over-
crowdingmay simply be seen be a situation of exposure to some other “true hazard”,
for example, a poorly load bearing terrace.
A crowd of people can also be a source of harm in its own means. This was
tragically demonstrated when nine festival participants died of suffocation during
a Pearl Jam-concert at Roskilde in 2000 (BBC, 2000). Another borderline case is that
of ergonomics, which leads you to think of a situation in which a dazed operator is
doomed to loose control over a poorly designed device. Although ergonomics may
not inflict harm in itself, it is even so an intrinsic property that has earned inclusion
on ISO14121 (2007)’s list on machinery hazards. From that it can be suggested that
situations enter into the hazard definition when constituting a harmful potential in
its own right. Since this basically means being a source of harm, it follows that the
amendment of IEC60300-3-9 (1995) is somewhat superfluous.
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Figure 5.1: The framework for organizational accidents of Reason (1997).
5.2.3 Hazards as causes
In comparison with the proposition of Christensen et al. (2003), the definition of
ISO14121 (2007) gains in clarity by omitting the notation of cause. Although haz-
ards certainly cause harm, this author beliefs that definition by explicit reference to
cause may imply a simplistic causal relationship between hazard and effect. In re-
ality, this link is shaped by how people and systems interact with the hazard. This
is aptly captured in the conceptual framework of Reason (1997) in Figure 5.1. The
figure also implies the existence of a set of underlying causes beyond the level of
hazard, which are collectively termed organizational factors. Although crucial to
the prevention of major accidents, considering remote causes as representing some
“true hazard” is pragmatically unfeasible if the aim of analysis is to identify possible
hazardous events (HSE, 2001). Precisely of this reason are hazard identification and
causal analysis considered separate parts of risk assessment in the risk assessment
framework ofNORSOKZ-013 (2001) in Figure 4.2. Implied is the benefit of excluding
cause fromour definition of hazard, but so is also the blurry connection between the
two modes of analysis. Are technical failures and human errors causes or hazards?
Arewe in need of a richer terminology to bridge the identification of hazards to their
related causes and effects? These questions will, along with the framework of Rea-
son (1997), reappear in section 5.6. For now, let us settle by accepting the purpose
of hazard as to enable us to identify what can go wrong.
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Table 5.1: Checklist of type, origin and potential consequences of hazards (extracted
from ISO14121, 2007).
Type Example of origin Example of potential consequences
Mechanical hazards Acceleration, deceleration Crushing
Falling objects Shearing
Rotating elements Stabbing or puncture
Electrical hazards Arc Electrocution
Short-circuit Burn
Thermal radiation Shock
Thermal hazards Explosion Burn
Flame Dehydration
Noise hazards Cavitation phenomena Permanent hearing loss
Scraping surfaces Tinnitus
Whistling pneumatics Tiredness
Vibration hazards Vibrating equipment Neurological disorder
Worn parts Vascular disorder
Radiation hazards Ionizing radiation source Damage to eyes and skin
Low frequency electromagnetic
radiation
Effects on reproductive capability
Material/substance
hazards
Aerosol Cancer
Fibre Infection
Oxidizer Poisoning
Ergonomic hazards Access Fatigue
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5.2.4 Origin, characteristics and categories of hazards
Checklists are one of many approaches for identifying hazards. A checklist is a pre-
defined list of possible hazards likely to prevail in a given domain, for instance, the
process industry or offshore installations (HSL, 2000). Table 5.1 exemplifies a check-
list of typical machinery hazards. Even though the original list is considerably larger,
ISO14121 (2007) stresses that its inherent lack of exhaustiveness urges analytical
vigilance. While noticing that any assessment will only be as comprehensive as the
list used, this is a disadvantage that holds for all checklists (HSL, 2000).
ISO14121 (2007) divides hazards into eight categories as shown in Table 5.1. The
hazards are further qualified according to their origin and nature of harm. Origin
can, in a wider perspective, be seen as a dichotomy between natural andman-made
hazards (Reason, 1997). Common natural hazards are lightning, earthquakes and
avalanches. Man-made hazards are sometimes called technological hazards. Kates
and Slovic (1983) apply the latter as a collective term for hazards originating from
human needs and wants. In their early comparison of technological hazards, Kates
and his partner identify 93 predominating hazards in contemporary life. These carry
the potential for release of either energy ormaterial. Within the former category are
fireworks, handguns and dams, while the latter is exemplified by alcohol, asbestos
and fossil fuels. Four differing characteristics are observed:
• Energy hazards persist for much shorter periods than those of materials.
• Energy hazards have immediate consequences, while the consequences of
material hazards are typically delayed.
• Material hazards have transgenerational effects, in contrast to those of energy.
• Material hazards may significantly affect nonhuman mortality, while energy
hazards do not.
Another and somewhat detached characteristic is that of intentionality (Kates and
Slovic, 1983). Also Reason (1997) is concerned with this descriptor, noticing that
although hazard usually means some inanimate danger, the hazard to be guarded
against is in many situations other people. This is depicted in Figure 5.2, where
the dichotomy between technological and natural hazards is broadened to include
those originating from human will and powers. Mirrored with the dimension of
harm to what, the grid draws attention to themulti-faceted nature of hazards. Albeit
not erroneous, it is in the opinion of this author that the right quadrants in Figure 5.2
hold a matter too complex for the sole notion of hazard. Rather, the term threat ap-
plies, which is examined in the forthcoming section.
An interesting digression can be made in the notion of moral hazard. This is
related to release of neither material nor energy, but of information (see, e.g. Hom-
ström, 1982). Moral hazard is, admittedly, of little relevance to studies of bodily risk.
Yet it serves to remind us that just as risk, is hazard a capacious term which is con-
noted with hazardous systems, substances and technologies as well as people or sit-
uations. Demarcating hazard from risk is an important means for narrowing down
both concepts.
5.2.5 Hazard 6= risk
Hazard is not the same as risk, although the notions are mixed both in dictionaries
and everyday parlance. It is not uncommon that newspapers reveal that imported
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Figure 5.2: The multi-faceted nature of hazards.
toys, psychologically unstable people or unhealthy food are risks, although they in
fact are hazards. According to Christensen et al. (2003), this is a common source of
misunderstanding and poor communication. The principal difference is that hazard
does not include the probability of adverse outcomes, as it exists simply as a source
(Kaplan and Garrick, 1981, p.12). Risk, on the other hand, entails the probability
of that source being converted into loss. This implies that the moment a hazard is
realized, it is no longer a hazard but an event. Figure 5.3 illustrates this point by
demarcating the situation of living under an escarpment after a winter of heavy pre-
cipitation from that of experiencing an actual avalanche. We may speak of risk in
both situations, but of drastically different proportions. This leads us to a second
distinction, which is illustrated by further refining the sketch in Figure 5.4. Although
little can be done to reduce the potential energy of mammoth masses of snow, the
risk of fatalities may be reduced by safeguarding the mountain hill as well as taking
precautions like closing the road and the primary school nearby. While wemay nei-
ther eliminate nor alter the particular hazard, we can still reduce the risk. Kaplan
and Garrick (1981) express this symbolically in the form:
Risk=
Hazard
Safeguards
(5.1)
Albeit differently presented, this simple ideamakes the foundationof Reason’s (1997)
perspective on organizational accidents. By illustrating the relationship between
hazards, defenses and losses as in Figure 5.3, organizational accidents can be under-
stood as the breaching of safeguards that separate hazards from vulnerable people
or assets. Interesting is in this regard the taxonomy of Schupp et al. (2004), distin-
guishing between primary hazards of direct harmful potential and functional haz-
ards that indirectly cause harm by adversely affecting safety barriers.
Resonance is given to the bowtie-representation of Figure 4.3, which aptly cap-
tures that risk is a concept of both hazard and vulnerability. Although a hazard has
potential for causing great harm, the riskmay be insignificant if either its probability
of realization is negligible (or reducible by safeguards), or the system has multiple
reactive safeguards in place. When hazards are communicated as risk, this asym-
metrical relationship is likely disregarded and by that the (perceived) risk exagger-
ated.
Conceiving hazard as something existing only as a source is conceptually chal-
lenging. Does it rule out any meaningful comparison of the “hazardousness” of dif-
ferent hazards? After all, is it not the severity and nature of hazard realization that
would allow such a ranking? Although Kates and Slovic (1983)’s grading of hazards
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Figure 5.3: Hazard is existing only as a source.
Figure 5.4: Safeguarding against hazards.
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is founded on a somewhat muddled distinction between hazard and risk, they make
a principal point in that it is the probability of realization that is disregarded and
not the realization itself. Although we may no longer consider a released hazard a
hazard, it is still the consequences of this event we imagine when we identify and
evaluate hazards. What does this imply for the ontology of hazards?
5.2.6 The realism of hazards
According to Garland (2003, p.51), dangers (which is his pronounced synonym for
hazard) become dangers only when they relate to us in ways of carrying adverse
effects:
Dangers are dangers for someone- for specific individuals or groups or
species, under certain conditions- nothing is dangerous as such, not
even floods and lightening. On the other hand, anything and everything
has the potential to become a danger to something or someone.
It is admittedly true that just as risk, must hazard be identified as such in order to
serve its designation. Yet this is the case also for potatoes, an extreme relativistmight
claim. And just as potatoes show certain characteristics, do many hazards have in-
trinsic properties or dispositions almost objectively recognizable as sources of harm
(HSE, 2001). Hazards related to potential energy, for instance, carry the promise of
pan cultural recognition (Rosa, 1998). Also the kinetic energy of a discharged bullet
may be assumed similar recognition. While it is true that many hazards, like nan-
otechnology, carry dubious potential, it is in the opinion of this author that hazard
is more easily claimed ontological realism than risk. The most pleading argument
to this claim is that hazards are properties of the present, and may thus be observ-
able (albeit many are not). Risk, on the other hand, is a property of the future and
is hence inherently unobservable. It is no wonder then, that hazard identification
makes up the most cardinal and tangible part of risk assessment.
5.3 Threat
In an annotation to the hazard definition of DHS (2008b), it is clarified that hazard
differs from a threat in that hazards are not directed. A threat, on the other hand,
relates to an entity, asset, system, network or geographic area. Myagmar et al. (2005)
confirm this assumption when asserting that a threat cannot exist without a target.
Threat is by DHS (2008b, p.33) defined as:
Threat: natural orman-made occurrence, individual or entity, or action
that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations,
the environment and/or property.
Apart from the specification of likely targets, the definition differs only marginally
from that of hazard. The issue of potentiality is still in focus, as is also that of harm.
Is threat simply a target-specific extension of the concept of hazard? It is not clear
whether DHS (2008b), who is exclusively concerned with problems of security, sub-
scribes to this position. If confronting those involved in assessment of both safety
and security risk, it is most likely an insufficient specification. Credible represen-
tatives of this group are Garrick et al. (2004), who clarify that hazard and threat are
primarily distinguished by intentionality. Their definition is adapted for this study
(Garrick et al., 2004, p.136):
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Threat: An expression of intention to inflict evil, injury or damage.
Before further examining this conception, the subject gains in comprehensibility by
first exemplifying types and agents of threat.
5.3.1 Agents, types and strategies of threat
A threat agent is an individual or group that can manifest a threat. Vidalis (2004)
suggests the following classification of threat agents:
• Hostile nations
• Terrorism and terrorist groups
• Corporations seeking competitive advantages
• Organized crime and criminals
• Empowered small agents motivated for ideological, political or religious rea-
sons
Threat agents are also known as threat sources or adversaries. A threat agent in com-
bination with a particular threat type form a specific threat (Baybutt, 2002). Baybutt,
who is concerned with threats to process plants, exemplifies threat types in terms
of on-site and off-site release of hazardous materials, interference with production
and plant shut-down. Broadening the perspective, DHS (2008b) speaks of nuclear,
biological, toxic or cyber attacks as tactics of threat. All these are relevant means to
the strategy of terrorism. This can be seen as an element of yet a higher level threat
typology. Terrorism enters into The issues Threat List of the American FBI, as one of
eight categories of threat strategies (represented in Roper et al., 2006):
• Terrorism
• Espionage of national defense information
• Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
• Proliferation of advanced conventional weapons
• Economic espionage of sensitive financial, trade or policy information
• Targeting the national information infrastructure
• Targeting the government
• Perception management by manipulating or propagating deceptive informa-
tion
• Other foreign intelligence activities
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5.3.2 Motivation, capability, opportunity and impact
The threat-definition of Garrick et al. (2004) invites a range of concerns beyond
those of hazard. Of interest is not only what inherent properties have the potential
to cause harm, but also by whom, how, why and to whom or what harm is inflicted.
These elements are all captured in the functional definition of Vidalis (2004):
Threat= Function (Motivation, Capability, Opportunity, Impact) (5.2)
Motivation refers to the motivational drivers of a threat agent. These may be po-
litical, secular and religious, relate to personal gain, power and revenge or simply
intellectual challenge. Synonymous is the term intent, meaning the desire to con-
duct an attack (DHS, 2008b, p.19):
Intent: Determination to achieve an objective
Intent (or motivation) is one of two elements commonly considered when estimat-
ing the likelihood of terrorist attacks. The other is capability, defined byDHS (2008b,
p.16) as:
Capability:Means to accomplish a mission, function or objective
Capability expresses the degree to which an adversary is able to implement a threat
(Vidalis, 2004). Included is the availability of tools and techniques to implement
an attack, as well as the ability to use these correctly. To constitute a threat, an
agentmust thus be bothmotivated and capable. Baybutt (2002, p.271) reminds us of
the saying “where there is a will, there is a way” and calls for conservative assump-
tions on capabilities. Having said that, neither capability nor motivation is suffi-
cient should the conditions be unfavorable. For a threat agent to bring its capability
to bear against a target, he must also have occasional opportunity to do so and the
target must be vulnerable to attack. If motivation, capability and opportunity are
present, the treat will reach the target and an impact will follow, potentially ranging
fromminor to catastrophic loss and disruption.
5.3.3 Hazard and threat- revisited
Let us concludingly return the distinction between threat and hazard. The above
characteristics attest that threat is a broader concept than hazard. This is not only
because it is composed bymore attributes, but also because hazard itself must enter
into the concept of threat. Admittedly, the list of FBI shows that not all threats directs
at physical damage. Information security is a relatively well-matured field, in which
traditional attributes are the availability, confidentiality and integrity of information
(Myagmar et al., 2005). Creatively scanning the horizons up to 2017, HSE (2008) de-
picts that cyber-threats will vastly surpass bodily security issues in the future. Since
the society has come to rely on increasingly dependent information systems, attacks
on cyber networks can cause unimaginable consequences also to life and property
(CIST, 1999). Yet in the case of direct bodily threat, one or more hazards must nec-
essarily make a constituent part of the tactics and capability of a threat agent. The
opposite does not hold, as something can be a hazard but not a threat given the ab-
sence of a target. What disturbingly follows is that all hazards have the potential of
forming a threat. Not until recently has this been widely recognized by operators
in hazardous industries. It calls for risk assessment not only of accidental releases,
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Figure 5.5: The motivational threat classification of Vidalis (2004) suggests that cy-
ber threats may be unintentional. For most other purposes, threat is reserved for
intentional harm.
but also of hazardous materials being exploited in malevolent acts of terrorism and
crime (Baybutt, 2002).
Presupposed in the above discussion is that hazard and threat is distinguished by
intentionality. In honest review, this is not a general convention. When searching for
threat in any scientific database, a fair share of hits pertains to environmental harm
that, albeit ostensibly man-made, cannot be assigned any motivational intention.
As an example, both natural phenomena and developmental actions are by Salafsky
et al. (2008) regarded as direct threats to biodiversity. Also in the field of information
security are unintentional threats included, as is sketched in themotivational threat
classification of Vidalis (2004) in Figure 5.5. Since inattentive users make a central
contributor to breaches of data integrity, this does not appear unreasonable. Yet in
the case of bodily harm, it seems feasible to let threat designate intentional origin
alone. This is because analysis of security risk requires a term that uniquely cap-
tures the distinctive interconnectedness between motivation, capability and target.
In conventional analysis of accidental risk, “threat” adds nothing but bewildering
information. An example is Haimes (2009), who inconsistently applies the term in
reference to hazard, initiating event and influencing conditions. In order to avoid
such confusion, this section concludes with an appeal for reserving the concept of
threat to the anatomy of security. Needed is rather a terminology for relating haz-
ards to events of realization and causation. Before exploring this undulating ground,
some words about events and causation offer an interesting basis for reflection.
5.4 On the concepts of event and causation
Hair dying, airplane crashes, birthdays and war have one thing in common in that
they all may be thought of as events. But what is an event? In the science of classical
statistics, event is simply conceived as a set of states (Savage, 1972). By example, we
may estimate the probability that 1 egg in a dozen is rotten, which is an event con-
sisting of 12 states. An event may hence be conceived as something we can assign
a probability, as any subset of a sample space of possible outcomes (Tijms, 2007).
Lindley (2006) represents a somewhat extreme conviction, claiming that we can as-
sign a probability to the event that the capital of Cambodia is Phnom Penh. Admit-
tedly, this conception hardly converges with everyday interpretations of event. The
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principal difference is recognized by Savage (1972), pinpointing that the concept
as formulated in the statistics is timeless. Since risk assessors are concerned with
events of temporally defined starts and endings, it seems that more is gained from
conferring scholars of philosophy.
5.4.1 Something involving changes
An event may be narrowly conceived as something involving changes (Kim, 1973).
The event of hair dying involves the changing of hair color, having birthday marks
the transformation of age, while war and airplane crashers involve a variety of alter-
ations of which termination of human lives is the most severe. Kim (1973) calls for
an extension of this narrow view, conceiving events as concrete objects that are ex-
emplifying a property at a certain point of time. An event thus comprises states and
conditions, as a complex of objects and properties, time points and segments. Fol-
lowing this account, every event has a unique constitutive property in the sense that
it subscribes to a generic event, for instance that of dying. What complicates this
picture is that each individual event is usually thought to fall under many generic
events, like the one and same event of dying may be the moving of a finger, the
pressing of a trigger, a shooting and a mercy killing. Complicated is not only the
conception of event, but also the relation between causal events and those of effect.
To elaborate on this difficulty, Riker (1957) is invited to the panel, who admirably
explains the event-concept in an easily understood and entertaining fashion.
5.4.2 An event is bounded by subjective starts and stops
Riker (1957) begins his examination by admitting that a general term like event can-
not be ostensively defined. Rather, it must thus be defined in context (e.g, war and
chemical reactions are events) and genetically (the existence of some perceivedmo-
tion or action, sometime, some place). On the basis of these specifications, Riker
(1957, p. 58) constructs a formal definition:
Event: an event is any subjectively differentiated portion of motion of
or action.
While this definition is only preliminary to Riker, it is considered sufficient for the
purpose of this study. Vital is the adverb subjectively, which denies the existence
of any objective event. This is because the actions and motions under study are
continuous; they are without beginning and end. Each temporally defined segment
ofmotion or action succeeds a previous segment and precedes a latter, meaning that
they are neither instantaneous nor eternal. Riker (1957, p.58) continues:
But, although reality is continuous, human perception is not. For a vari-
ety of reasons we are unable to comprehend the whole of this continu-
ous reality (..) Faced with the complexity of continuous reality, humans
understand it by breaking it up into pieces. Although a continuous re-
ality cannot, by definition, consist of discrete motions and actions, we
imagine starts and stops. What lies between the starts and stops we call
events. (Added emphasis)
Events are thus created by the verbal imposition of boundaries that, regardless of the
objective existence of the motions and actions, are entirely subjective. These starts
and stops are by Riker (1957, p.61) called situations , which are:
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Situation: an arrangement and conditions of movers and actors in a
specified, instantaneous, and spatially extended location.
The arrangement (which is the spatial relation between movers and actors and the
boundaries) and the conditions (meaning the previous history ofmotion and action)
make the form of a situation. In contrast to events, which contain at least a portion
of reality, are situations entirely artificial. It is also crucial to note that the initial and
terminal situations are defined as such only in relation to the bounded event.
5.4.3 Ambiguous events and implications for causality
An event must according to Riker (1957) be bounded by situations that include all
and only its movers and actors. This means that the movers and actors of the ini-
tial situation shall be included also in the terminal situation. If not, the event has
either two or more beginnings or two or more endings. As this involves the self-
contradiction that the initial situation is not the initial situation, Riker labels such
affairs ambiguous events. An excellent manifestation is the First World War, over
which historians still quarry to establish the triggering situation.
The great problem accompanying ambiguous events is the riddle of causation.
If an event is understood as having two or more starts, it may also have two or more
causes. What is troublesome is not the existence of multiple causes as such, but
the assertion that any of these are sufficient and necessary conditions for the event
to occur. Riker launches five canons for avoidance of ambiguity in events. Most
relevant is the fifth advice of preferring small events to those of greater extent. This
is because events of large extent and duration andmanymovers and actors are likely
to be more ambiguous. Not only can small events be more precisely bounded, the
remaining ambiguitymay be resolved using statistical techniques that, based on the
very assumption that a small slice of reality has a greater chance of occurring than a
large one, are designed to cancel out the ambiguity in imprecisely bounded events.
An example is the failure of a basic component, which can be adequately assessed
using generic failure rate data from databases like OREDA (2004).
In the context of risk assessment, all events are ambiguous since they are hy-
pothetical; neither the initial nor terminal situation is unique. Instead, logical fault-
and event trees are applied tomodel the range of possible causes and consequences.
Without ambiguity in the terminal situation of an event, the concept of risk looses
its meaning indeed. Accepting that ambiguity cannot be eliminated, the beauty of
minutely portioned events with well-defined starts and stops still offers a valuable
canon for asking what can wrong. Along comes the recognition that mastering the
boundaries of events is a subjective task, which further confirms the importance of
a set of well-defined terminological knobs for enhancing consistency. Especially im-
portant is this according to Kim (1971), who maintains that only within a coherent
framework of events is causal talk possible.
5.4.4 Causality
Closely related to the concept of event is that of causality. Most often we talk of
events as causes or effects, although notions like conditions, states, phenomena and
processes also engage us in causal talk (Kim, 1971). In a public lecture by one of the
preeminent researches on the field, Pearl (2000) explains causality as our awareness
of what causes what in the world and why it matters.
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The dual role of causality
Throughout history, causality has served a dual role for mankind. On one hand, it
has been used for targeting credit and blame for past events. On the other hand,
understanding causality has enabled mankind to exert better control over future
events. Accident investigation illustrates the former, while risk assessment makes
a perfect example of the latter. Pearl notes that even if we by no means can practice
control, deep understanding of causation may still yield sufficient sense of being in
control. Recapturing the discussion in Section 4.3, this offers an intriguing perspec-
tive on the intrinsic value of risk assessment.
Riddles of causal inference
Causality is, despite its prominence in human reasoning, a notion of mystery and
controversy that many scientists and philosophers refrain from using. Pearl (2000)
narrates that statisticians and physicists have been especially hesitant. This is no-
tably due to the difficulty of defining when one event truly causes another. In the
former field, the less stringent concept of correlation is by and large preferred over
causation. What constraints the science of physics is the enigma of directionality.
Although the sun is repeatedly observed to rise following the crow of the rooster, we
all understand that it is not the rooster that causes the break of dawn. The problem,
as observed by Pearl and many before him, is the impossibility of translating even
this simplicity into a mathematical equation. Pearl (2000) is devoted to resolving
this enigma, claiming that logical diagrams make a quintessential complement to
the language of probability. The logics of a fault tree makes an excellent example,
indicating that risk assessors have the necessary language for expressing causality
at hand.
Pearl’s account to causality is still threatened by two remaining problems of cau-
sation. These are inflicted by the ideas of the 1800th century philosopher Hume
(Represented in Pearl, 2000). Causal connections are according to Hume the prod-
uct of observations. This induces a first riddle regarding the learning of causal in-
ference. How are causal connections established? And even if causal connections
may be ever so correctly set, a second riddle follows when questioning: How can we
make use of this information? Returning to the realm of risk, the first problemmay
be seen of as one of risk analysis, while the latter concerns the wider issues of risk
assessment and risk management. The two problems are interconnected in that the
latter necessarily influences how one is answering the first.
5.4.5 The focus of investigation
Essential for solving both riddles as well as the enigma of directionality, is to rec-
ognize the significance of focus to your investigation. If the entire universe is cho-
sen as the object of investigation, causality would disappear as there would be no
such thing as intervention or circumscription. Instead, the scientist or risk ana-
lyst carves up a piece of the universe as the focus of investigation. The rest of the
universe is considered as background or boundary conditions. According to Pearl
(2000), it is this choice of ins and outs that creates the asymmetry that allows us to
talk about causality and directionality of cause and effect. This is because causation
basicallymeans predicting the consequences of an intervention, be it the crowing of
a rooster or the failure of a technical component. If we carve up the universe in a dif-
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Figure 5.6: The cloudy events of risk analysis.
ferent manner, the inputs and outputs will correspondingly change, along with our
understanding of causality. Reconsider the proposed rearrangement of the vertical
model of Rasmussen (1997) in Figure 4.6. Depending on what levels we include in
our causal analysis of risk, distinct root causes are revealed and with it the possible
means of control.
Putting the pieces together, Kim (1971)’s claim that circumscriptionsmostly take
the form of events makes a powerful alliance with the assertion of Riker (1957) that
events are confined by subjectively imposed situations. Demonstrated is not only
the significance of boundary definitions to risk analysis, but also the subjective na-
ture of both cause and consequence.
5.4.6 The events of risk assessment
Having explored the concepts of hazard and event, the foundation is in place for
considering events that involve hazards. Invaluable for maneuvering through the
plethora of related terms is the bowtie-diagram of Figure 5.6. Suggested in the figure
is the feasibility of a tripartite focus in separating events of initiation, release and
escalation. The former relates to events of causation, for example, triggering event
(TE) and safety issues (SU). Among the many candidates of the midst category are
hazardous event (HE) and accidental event (AE). The third group follows the trajec-
tory of a hazardous release and is occupied by more sporadically denoted interme-
diate and terminal events. The forthcoming sections endeavor to map the words of
the two former. Since the center of the bowtie-diagram is centripetal to the analysis
of risk, it makes a feasible starting point of our examination.
5.5 Hazardous event
In Section 5.2 it was stressed that a hazard exists simply as a potentiality or source.
From that it followed that the moment this potential is realized, we no longer speak
of hazard, but an event. Unlike the notion of hazard, there is no generally accepted
term for this realization. The preceding section explains the added complexity. An
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event is, in contrast to the ontological reality of hazards, bounded by subjectively
imposed starts and stops.
In search of a designation that is as unambiguous as possible, this author be-
lieves that advantage is gained by explicitly relating it to the more objective concept
of hazard. Instead of using ambiguous prefixes like critical or accidental, the node
of the bowtie-diagram is preferably denoted hazardous event. This is in line with
the practice of the RAMS-group at NTNU (see, e.g. Rausand and Utne, 2009a). Haz-
ardous event is defined at the end of the section, after first presenting a selection of
apparently synonymous contenders.
5.5.1 Events and incidents
In the vocabulary of ISOguide 73 (2009, p.6), event is applied without prefix and is
widely defined as “the occurrence or change of a particular set of circumstances”. A
set of explanatory notes establishes its location at themiddle of the bowtie-diagram.
Furthermore, it is specified that an eventmay consist of something not happening(!)
and may be referred to as an incident or accident. According to this standard, inci-
dent is reserved for events without consequences, whereas accident denotes events
of adverse outcomes. Contrasting is the nomenclature of DHS (2008b), conceiving
incident as the single event-related termof any hazardous realization. Following this
interpretation, ISOguide 73 (2009)’s notion of accident may be considered a subset
of the wider notion of incident. There are, however, gray areas between these terms.
Is there some lower threshold of adverse consequences for the designation of acci-
dent? It is in the opinion of this author that the definitions of ISOguide 73 (2009)
and DHS (2008b) are both too vague for unambiguously serving the analysis of risk.
This also holds for the notions of accident, incident and event.
Also Christensen et al. (2003, p.186) prefer the single notion of event, while defin-
ing it in a more confined manner:
Event: isolated incident or a number of interrelated circumstances/incidents
resulting in release of agents and/or energy.
By specifying the realization of a harmful potential, this definition places itself in
the center of the bowtie-diagram. Another observation is made in that an event
may consist of many smaller events or circumstances. Recalling the advice of Riker
(1957), this may pose a problem for the initial bounding of events. While the termi-
nal situation is comparatively clear in the release of a potential, the starting point
is left wide open to interpretation. It might be minutely portioned in close approx-
imation to the end situation, but may also be located in the left part of the bowtie-
diagram. Such indeterminacy is especially confusing when applied to define a ca-
pacious notion like event.
5.5.2 Accidental event
Like Christensen et al. (2003), does NORSOK Z-013 (2001, p.5) open up for multiple
events in their term accidental event (AE):
Accidental event: Event or chain of events that may cause loss of life, or
damage to health, the environment or assets.
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The above problem of ambiguously defined initiation still holds. Vatn (1998) wit-
nesses that some applications stretch AE back to the initiating event. Since section
6.2 demonstrates that initiating event is an equivocal term that goes far beyond the
realization of a hazardous potential, this introduces unnecessary conceptual diffi-
culties.
NORSOK Z-013 (2001) makes a valuable specification in that accidental events
are acute, unwanted and unplanned. Excluded from analysis are thus hazardous
releases occurring over longer time periods. Examples are occupational exposure
to asbestos or continuous releases of toxic substance. Not only are such instances
difficult to confine in time, required is also a distinctive analytical approach. The
reader may consult HSE (1992) for an elaboration on the subject.
5.5.3 Undesired event
Consulting yet another standard, NS 5814 (2008, p. 6) employs the term undesired
event (UE):
Undesired event: event that may lead to loss of values.(Translated from
Norwegian)
An undesired event is described as the concretization of a corresponding hazard.
This indicates its residence at the center of the bowtie-diagram. Depending on the
purpose of analysis, the concretization is claimed further specification concerning
time, place, scope and nature. A rough specification is exemplified as “fire”, while
one of richer details is given as “fire in board no. 8”.
In the guidance of USNRC (1981), undesired event is understood as the topmost
event in a fault tree. The concept has in this regard only implicit reference to hazard.
UE is instead conceived as complete or catastrophic system failure, meaning fail-
ures that may lead to accidents of death or crippling injury. Since this need not be
hazardous release, but an event located farther in the causal or consequence chain,
the interpretation of USNRC (1981) lies somewhat beyond our current quest.
5.5.4 Critical event
Delvosalle et al. (2006) explicitly conceive critical event as the center of the bowtie-
diagram. Also Svedung and Rasmussen (2002, p.405) prefer this term, specifying that
a critical event:
(..) reflects the release of a well-defined hazard source, such as ‘loss of
containment of hazardous substance’, or ‘loss of control of accumulated
energy’.
Delvosalle et al. (2006) explain that loss of containment refers to the release of fluids
in the process industry. For solids, critical events relate to loss of physical integrity,
that is, a change in the chemical’s chemical or physical state. Examples of process-
related critical events are the start of a fire and leak from a pipe. Both Delvosalle
et al. (2006) and Svedung and Rasmussen (2002) stress that the definition of critical
eventmust fit the purpose of analysis. Defined as neither too coarse nor specific, the
set of critical events helps structuring the identification of relevant hazards as well
as proactive measures.
74
Figure 5.7: Trying to escape a hazardous event.
In bridging a situation of potential harm to one of realization, the conception of
critical event falls close to the idea as initially advanced. There is one thing to indict
though, which is simply the ambiguity embedded in the word critical. Depending
on the interpreter, the term may refer to the severity of possible consequences, the
cardinality of branches in the consequence chain or the relative impact on the over-
all functioning of a system. It seems like nothing but ambiguity is lost by relabeling
the concept to hazardous event.
5.5.5 Hazardous event
It is in the opinion of this author that hazardous event (HE) offers the most precise
designation for the center of the bowtie-diagram. Unfortunately, the term is inmost
RAMS-publications only contextually defined, like by exemplifying gas leakages and
high pressures as hazardous events (see, e.g. Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). A
generic definition is provided by Kjellén (2000, p.377):
Hazardousevent: Loss of control of energy in the system or bodymove-
ment, resulting in a potential for exposure of personnel (or the environ-
ment/material asset) to the energy flow.
Essential to Kjellén’s conception of hazardous event is the loss of control of a source
that may result in target exposure. This will serve as the basis for a refined defini-
tion. Two revisions are considered feasible, thereof to broaden the scope from loss
of control of energy to the release of a hazard. Although Kjellén (2000) maintains
that physical harm results from exposure to energy, Section 5.2 implies the feasibil-
ity of distinguishing betweenmaterial and energetic releases, which both enter into
the concept of hazard. The second specification is that the event not only has the
potential for resulting in exposure, it will lead to exposure if not adequately con-
trolled. The essential point is that the event is terminally bounded subsequent to
hazard realization, but prior to reactive control. For illustration, let us return to the
example of living under an escarpment in Figure 5.3. If still, the mammoth masses
of snow remain a source of potential harm, that is, a hazard. When the masses are
set in motion and the moment sufficient momentum is gained, a hazardous event
occurs in the release of an avalanche. If an unprotected person stands in the middle
of this trajectory, he will most certainly experience harm. However, whether he finds
shelter in a nearby house ormanages to run in a non-cartoonish matter (Figure 5.7),
is conceptually excluded from the event of hazardous release.
Based on these annotations and the insights from the more or less synonymous
concepts above, hazardous event is in this study defined as:
Hazardous event: Event confined to the first significant release of a haz-
ard that will result in harmful exposure if not controlled.
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Figure 5.8: Different hazardous events for the same scenario.
The definition is intended for accidental releases as well as intentional threats to
bodily harm. Excluded from consideration is the continuous release of harmful sub-
stances. This is implied by confining the event to initial and terminal situations of
close approximation. Precisely how closely these are set is, however, not the princi-
pal object of inquiry. This owes to the recognition of ARMS (2009) that themid event
is more an imaginary concept than a real-life event, introduced to help the system-
atic assessment of accident trajectories and categorizing barriers as either preven-
tive or reactive. More acknowledgeable is it that the analyst is left with considerable
freedom in marking the limit between prevention and mitigation. For instance, the
onset of a fire and an explosion may be two stages of the same accident trajectory
that both account to our definition of hazardous event. The two imply different cen-
ters of gravity in the bowtie as sketched in Figure 5.8. What event to choose is prag-
matically conditioned, but all the same heuristically guided by the first part of our
definition.
Although the center of the bowtie obeys a variety of names and necessitates
pragmatic interpretations, it remains a clear concept at least on an abstract level
as the analytical crossover between prevention andmitigation. Neither the start nor
the end of the diagram is blessed with such conceptual clarity.
5.6 Reason’s events of causation
A listing of hazards marks the “start” of the bowtie-diagram in Figure 4.3. For il-
lustrating the conceptual link between hazards, a hazardous event and its potential
consequences, this representation is unproblematic. Nor does if fail to the guide the
identification of hazards and their related hazardous events. However, to enable us
going back and answerwhy a hazardous event occurs and how it may be prevented,
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the sketch is in need for refinement. There are two reasons for this. The first follows
from our definition of hazard. Since hazard is conceived as a source of potential
harm, it is neither an event nor a situation in the terms of Riker (1957). It is merely a
condition. From that it follows that it cannot by itself mark the initiation of an event,
but must enter into a triggering event or situation, that is, to form a cause.
A second rationale comes from the recognition that a hazardous event may al-
ways have several causes; each one necessary, but singly insufficient (Reason, 1997).
In principle, these can all be traced back to the big bang. As a tragic example, Reason
tells the story of the principal investigator of the Chernobyl accident, whose suicide
letter is said to reveal that the true cause of the accident was the Union’s dysfunc-
tional economy since before 1917. Obviously, this recognition is of little preventive
help as long as man is unable to travel back in time. A more topical example is a
recent railway accident in Norway, where three persons were killed by a cargo ran
amuck. Subsequently, the Norwegian National Rail Administration and the cargo
operating company have both been blamed for long-term negligence in matters of
maintenance and safety (TV2, 2010). Was this accident caused by organizational
recklessness, operational errors or technical failures? By relating the incident to Fig-
ure 4.7, it becomes clear that the sole notion of hazard is insufficient to guide causal
analysis of such situations. That is, unless one applies a very capacious hazard con-
ception that also includes poor railway organization. Elucidated is not only theprag-
matic challenge of demarcating hazards from their underlying causes, but also the
significance of how we carve up our accidental universe in the sense of Pearl (2000).
These considerations combine in the work of Reason (1990b) and the collaborative
project of Wagenaar et al. (1990).
5.6.1 Triggering events
What is it that enables the realization of a hazard into a hazardous event? In the
framework of Reason (1997) in Figure 5.1, losses and hazards are separated by a line
of defenses that if all breached, may lead to an accident. Although Reason does
not apply the concept of hazardous event, the triggering events that catalyze this
transformation are the basis of his research. Or, to be more correct, they make a
focal topic in demonstrating what not to focus on.
Triggering event is an informal and undefined term which Reason (1990b) in-
terchangeably uses with the notion local triggering factors. For the purpose of this
study, a triggering event can be understood as the most immediate cause of a haz-
ardous event. This may be technical faults, atypical system conditions1 or active
failures. Reason, who is professor in cognitive psychology, is by and large concerned
with the latter. Active failures are errors and violations committed at the sharp end
of a system by train drivers, control room personal and like. They are character-
ized as active due to the immediacy of their adverse effects, which is the reason why
such failures appear as the obvious instigators of hazardous events. This is implied
by the downstream arrow of causal investigation in Figure 5.1 (active failures are
in this figure labeled unsafe acts). In Reason (1990a)’s pioneering work Human er-
ror, unsafe acts are dissected into subgroups of slips, lapses, rule- and knowledge-
based mistakes. The essential point is that these are neither random events nor
1In light of the discussions in Section 5.4, one may question whether system conditions can actually
be considered events. But, the fact that they are atypical suggests that they are not normally present,
and hence can be assigned a start, and end and a probability. Moreover, the notation of triggering events
serves to prevent confusion with the related but dissimilar term latent conditions.
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Figure 5.9: General accident progression according to Wagenaar et al. (1990).
causes, but consequences of a responding set of psychological precursors (labeled lo-
cal workplace factors in Figure 5.1). The precursors are psychological processes that
determine the actual behavior of workers on the shop floor (Reason, 1995). They
are functions of the task, the local environment and the presence of hazards, and
may be manifested as, for example, stress, unwanted attentional captures or inade-
quate tools. Psychological precursors are in an extensive collaboration project with
Wagenaar and Hudson launched as the neglected link between active failures and
their root causes. The generalized framework of Wagenaar et al. (1990) on accident
causation is represented in Figure 5.9, showing how unsafe acts are promoted by
psychological precursors which, in turn, are caused by latent failures.
5.6.2 Latent failures
Reason (1990b) explains latent failures in analogy with the resident pathogens of the
human body. Rather than arising from single causes, cancer is brought about in the
combination of resident pathogens and external stressors. The aetiology of organi-
zational accidents follows the same logic. Like pathogens, latent failures lie dormant
within the system, only to become fatal when combined with local triggering events
or stressors. They are the result of bad management decisions, which have taken
place well before the onset of a recognizable accident sequence. Their latency is
thus not in the sense of being invisible, but due to their error generating capacity
(Wagenaar et al., 1990).
Figure 5.10 depicts how latent failures propagate along what Reason (1995) de-
notes an active failure pathway to promote the occurrence of unsafe acts. A sec-
ond causal pathway is the latent failure pathway, running directly from the orga-
nizational processes to the defenses that separate hazards from vulnerable people
and assets. Poor design, for instance, may weaken the system responses by creating
“holes” in its line of defenses. Latent failures not only increase the occurrence of
hazardous events, but also enhance the possibility of adverse outcomes.
A source of confusion is that latent failures go under multiple names. In subse-
quent revisions, Reason (1997) uses the term latent conditions on the grounds that
it is a more appropriate descriptor of causal indirectness. Reason still applies the
synonym general failure types (GFT), which is a classifying notion introduced in the
original work of Wagenaar et al. (1990). The term type was chosen to signalize that
latent failures represent a set of phenomena and not individual tokens, as are the
psychological precursors and unsafe acts. There is a many-to-many mapping be-
tween these types and tokens (Reason, 1990b). Deficiencies in, for example, train-
ing, may translate into a variety of precursors, like time pressure and inappropriate
perception of hazards. On the other hand may undue time pressure be the prod-
uct of several latent failures, for instance, poor scheduling and inappropriate proce-
dures. In turn can a psychological precursor, alone or in combination with others,
provoke an almost infinitely large set of unsafe acts. From this follows the critical
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Figure 5.10: Latent and active failure pathways (adopted from Reason, 1995).
recognition that foreseeing all active failure pathways is impossible. Not only does
this leave triggering events difficult to control, focusing on their elimination may
even be counterproductive. This is because combating triggering events will only
cure the symptoms and not the disease, with the result of concealment or exacer-
bation of the real root causes. The grand conclusion of Wagenaar et al. (1990) is the
imperative ofmaking latent failures the primary target for accident prevention. This
forms the bedrock of motivation behind the Tripod-Delta approach, which aims at
preventing the onset of accident scenarios before ever taking place.
5.6.3 Tripod
Tripod is a philosophy and a methodology developed by Wagenaar and his asso-
ciates on commission of the petroleum company Shell. Since the project’s begin-
ning in 1988, Tripod has been cultivated via a suite of papers (see, e.g. Wagenaar
et al., 1994), and is now a great selling trademark fronted by consultancy firms and
a comprehensive manual. At the heart of Tripod lies the classification of 11 general
failure types most likely to elicit precursors of unsafe acts:
• Hardware tools and equipment of poor quality and availability (HW).
• Design that promotes errors and violations (DE).
• Maintenancemanagement yielding inadequate planning and inefficiency (MM).
• Procedures of poor quality, accuracy, relevance, availability and workability
(PR).
• Housekeeping that neglects impending problems (HK).
• Incompatible goals leading to individual, group- and organizational goal con-
flicts (IG).
• Communication problems ofmisinterpretation, dysfunctional or absent com-
munication channels (CO).
• Organizationwhich allows warning signs to be overlooked (OR).
• Training that fails to provide workers with the necessary skills and knowledge
(TR).
• Defenses that lack or fails in detection, warning, recovery and so on (DF). This
is the only GFT that is specifically safety-related.
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1994).
• Error enforcing conditions as a compound of the remainder GFTs (EC).
In essence, Tripod is about controlling the controllable and disregardingwhat is not.
And according to Wagenaar et al. (1994), what is controllable are the general failure
types. For each GFT, a failure state profile is created as exemplified in Figure 5.11.
The profile indicates the extent to which each GFT is likely to contribute to an acci-
dent. Failure state profiling may be performed either reactively or proactively, that
is, as an accident investigation tool or for predicting the causal structure of future
accidents. The respective methodologies are differentiated as Tripod Beta and Tri-
pod Delta.
A major presumption of Tripod-Delta is that general failure types are amenable
to measurement via psychological precursors. By combining the theoretical frame-
workwith an extensive, empirically derived database, the observed tokens are linked
with the general failure types. For a particular operational context, profiles are then
generated from comprehensive diagnostic checklists in assistance with advanced
software tools. By indicating the most contributive GFTs, a practical means is pro-
vided for managing a limited set of latent failures in lieu of an infinite number of
triggering events.
5.6.4 Tools for auditing vs. decision support
Tripod-Delta has, according to Reason (1997), been successfully applied across a va-
riety of continents, cultures and operations. A plausible explanation is the extreme
variety of situations it is designed to encounter. Uniquely, it allows the transmission
of local considerations into generic andmanageable profiles (Wagenaar et al., 1994).
Another explanation is its solid theoretical basis, which is developed by a venerable
group of safety researchers.
The reader should note that the purpose and methodology of Tripod-Delta dif-
fers fundamentally from those of risk assessment. Whereas quantitative risk assess-
ment chiefly purports to inform decision making in preoperational phases, Tripod-
Delta is an audit tool designed for periodic measurement and control of operational
risk. In the former case, GFTs cannot be measured as is, but if possible only as in-
tended. Does the Tripod-framework still offer a useful perspective to our quest? Ar-
guably, it forces us to contemplate our ability to foresee the ways inwhich hazardous
events come about. Following the reasoning of Reason and his associates, only lim-
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ited gains will follow an analysis of triggering events, as these are bound to reveal
themselves in unprecedented ways. Emphasis should instead be on contextual di-
agnosis of organizational deficiencies. For illustration, let us return to the galloping
cargo at Sjursøya, whichmay have been instigated by a variety of active failure path-
ways. With hindsight, it is tempting to claim that the actual pathway is of nothing
but secondary importance to the organizational weaknesses that had been prevail-
ing for years. Sooner or later, one might argue, an accident was bound to happen
in one way or another. Notwithstanding that, Section 2.2 makes it clear that the
concept of risk looses its meaning in retrospective. The important question is thus
whether one could foresee that these deficiencies would combine with local trigger-
ing events to kill three people.
The very motivation behind Tripod is to understand the junction between latent
failures and triggering events (Wagenaar et al., 1994). Looking back, Reason (1997)
admits that focusing on latent conditions rather the combination per se has a logical
defect. After all, latent conditions are present in all systems, even those of immac-
ulate accident records. What discriminates between normal states and accidents is
thus not the presence of latent conditions. Triggering events, on the other hand,
are the ultimate determinants of whether or not a hazardous event occurs. Despite
these objections, Reason still finds the above arguments compelling to why latent
conditions are cardinal; in contrast to triggering events, they can both be identified
and controlled. If we as risk assessors are to accept this inference, a second riddle
comes forward. How can we integrate the concepts of Figure 5.9 into our bowtie-
diagram?
5.6.5 Locating triggering events and latent conditions
Locating the concepts of latent failures, psychological precursors and triggering ev-
ents in Figure 5.12 requires consistency with our proposed definition of hazard and
hazardous event. Reason (1990b) leaves little doubt that triggering event takes place
prior to and in close approximation to our concept of hazardous event. It is a crucial
recognition that several events, for instance, technical failure and operator error,
may combine to trigger the hazardous event. In order to serve its analytical pur-
pose, our diagrammust thus allow for multiple triggering events in an active failure
pathway. An enigma the framework does not seem able to address, is how several
hazardsmay combine into amplified hazardous events.
Wagenaar et al. (1990) stress the importance of distinguishing triggering events
from mere error-enforcing conditions. It is, however, in the opinion of this author
that psychological precursors are only of indirect importance to our depiction of ac-
cident causation. This is because they are individual tokens rather than types, which
are vital to our understanding of organizational accidents, but only as an explana-
tory link between general failure types and unsafe acts. It is of this reason considered
sufficient to include only the GFTs in our conceptual illustration.
Locating GFTs in Figure 5.12 is conditioned on our conception of hazard. Are the
general failure types to be interpreted as hazards or are they external to our sketch?
It appears that the former only complicates our conception of hazard, and by that
also the process of hazard identification. Placing GFTs subsequent to hazard seems
similarly inadequate, if only to entangle our identification of hazardous events. Yet,
Section 5.2 suggests that there are borderline cases which fuse the notions of hazard
and their underlying causes. Ergonomics, which is the suitability of design for hu-
man operation (Wagenaar et al., 1990), is an example of a general failure type close
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Figure 5.12: Integrating general failure types and triggering events in the bowtie-
diagram.
to our notion of hazard. It is, however, worth to remember that none but one of the
GFTs are specifically related to issues of safety. Rather, they are general processes un-
derpinning both safety and quality. This indicates that GFTs are not hazards per se,
but make a set of deeper underlying causes located to the left of the bowtie-diagram
as suggested in Figure 5.12.
5.6.6 Complementing the concepts of hazard and hazardous event
In conclusion, let us return to the question of what the framework of Reason and
his associates has to offer our terminological assessment of risk. It should be noted
that its value is not merely the imperative of broadening the analysis to organiza-
tional factors. Promising methodologies for including organizational factors in risk
analysis have been suggested elsewhere (see, e.g. Paté-Cornell and Murphy, 1996),
as has also the added complexity of multiply involved organizations (see, e.g. Ras-
mussen, 1997). What our quest boils down to is the benefit of complementing the
concepts of hazard and hazardous event. It is in the opinion of this author that ex-
tending the vocabulary is useful in two means. Firstly, placing general failure types
outside the original bowtie-diagram offers an explanatory notion to the underlying
causes of hazards. It also serves to remind us that by removing a hazard, the accident
sequence may actually be stopped before it has even begun. This makes the first
andmost preferable out of ten strategies of accident prevention as first presented by
Haddon (1973).
Yet, inmany cases is the hazard the very reason for a company’s existence. Elim-
inating the potential energy involved in commercial aviation, for example, certainly
makes a preposterous suggestion. Deduced is a second yet contradictory rationale,
which is that hazards relate to risk only in contemplation of their realization. Com-
plementary to analyzing the hazardous substance inside a tank as in Figure 5.14, is
thus envisioning the ways in which the substance might escape the tank. And to
express these means of instigation, triggering event offers a communicable term.
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The problem of adopting the concept is the peripheral role it is assigned by its
own originators. If triggering events are as impossible to anticipate as claimed by
Wagenaar et al. (1990), how can they be meaningfully included in the vocabulary of
risk assessors? One possible solution is to follow the suggestion of ICAO’s to focus
on so-called safety issues. Before examining this concept, the present discussion on
triggering events is closed by calling attention to its perhaps greatest value. That is,
to serve as a necessary reminder of the inherent limitations of our causal extrapola-
tion of future hazardous events.
5.7 Safety issues
Whereas Reason (1990b) carves up his causal universe in the combination of trigger-
ing events and latent conditions, ARMS (2009) makes a different cut in the alliance
of triggering events and hazards. ARMS (Airline Risk Management Solutions) is a
working group aiming at improving themethodology of operational risk assessment
for aviation organizations. A key focus is the identification and assessment of safety
issues (ARMS, 2009, p19):
Safety Issue: amanifestation of a hazard or combination of several haz-
ards in a specific context. The Safety Issue has been identified through
the systematic hazard identification process of the organization. A SI
could be a local implication of one hazard (e.g. de-icing problems in
one particular aircraft type) or a combination of hazards in one part of
the operation (e.g. operation to a demanding airport)
This definition is somewhat imprecise and inert. The examples provided by ARMS
(2009) reveal that safety issue is a concept of many manifestations: “wind shear at
approach to xxx”, “operation into zzz in high altitude and short runway” and “fatigue
on red-eyeflights”. What they have in common is seemingly their context-specificity
only. Due to the conceptual cloudiness introduced by its very originators, demarcat-
ing safety issues from those that are not seems hardly expedient. So is instead a short
discussion on themerits and disadvantages of this perspective. For this purpose, re-
definitional freedom is taken by interpreting safety issue as one or more hazards in
combination with local triggering events.
5.7.1 Safety issues in principle and practice
Safety issues provide the starting point of risk estimation in ARMS. They are identi-
fied by analyzing recurring patterns in historical events, or may in the case of future
changes be derived from conventional hazard identificationmethods (ARMS, 2009).
Albeit the latter is claimed beyond the scope of the ARMS-process, it suggests that
safety issues are applicable also to preoperational risk assessment.
Principally, safety issues serve to focus and localize the assessment of risk. The
specification of safety issues is concretely and contextually defined. Each issue is
subject to detailed risk assessment, allegedly based on the frequency of the initial
hazard(!), the effectiveness of avoidance and recovery barriers and the severity of
the most probable accident outcome. This implies that safety issue is not solely
confined to hazard identification, but is also linked to the outcomes to the right of
the bowtie-diagram. The rationale is provided by ARMS (2009), specifying that a
safety issue usually links with several events. It is not a single event as those in the
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Figure 5.13: Integrating general failure types, triggering events and safety issues in
the bowtie-diagram.
accident records, but a well-defined issue that is highlighted by several events. How
this argument is to be interpreted appears unclear. Does a safety issue give rise to
various hazardous events, or to one hazardous event with a range of outcomes? Is
it possibly meant that each hazardous event or outcome links to a variety of safety
issues? Considering themany-to-many relationship Reason (1990b) finds to charac-
terize active failure pathways, neither of these interpretations seem logically flawed.
The challenge is to account for this multiplicity in the bowtie-diagram.
Safety issues are in this study interpreted as in Figure 5.13. A hazardous event
may rise from a variety of safety issues, which in turn can trigger a range of haz-
ardous events. The latter point is, however, only expressible by drawing a multiple
set of bowties.
5.7.2 Combating local factors
Focusing on safety issues will, according to ARMS (2009), result in a more scientific
and objective risk assessment than the conventional approach of ICAO. It is pro-
moted as a bridging solutionbetween two evils in the traditional ICAO-methodology;
the delusion of assessing past events and the subjectivity of projecting future events.
Safety issues, one reads, can be adequately scoped and defined, leaving little room
for subjectivity in risk assessment. Simplicity of use is a second advantage that
holds for both assessors and managers of risk. Risk assessment is claimed easier
due to the structuring of focus, while managing risk is reduced to a matter of man-
aging your safety issues. The pleading argument of ARMS (2009, p.19) is that “you
can do something about safety issues” since they are based on local implications
rather than general assumptions. This stands in contrast to the underpinning ideas
of Tripod-Delta. Would not the specific nature of safety issues yield the exact oppo-
site conclusion had Wagenaar et al. (1990) been invited to the panel? Although the
two perspectives seem diametrically distinct, they have a common denominator in
acknowledging the prominence of local factors. Consulting Figure 5.13, it is also true
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Figure 5.14: Safety issue is a combination of triggering events and hazard.
that both frameworks gain from reducing the occurrence of triggering events. The
difference is that Reason and his coworkers believe that this battle can only be in-
directly fought; by combating neither the triggering events nor the local factors, but
the latent conditions. ARMS (2009) appears of a different conviction, claiming that
it is the safety issues as such that should be managed. This is not to be interpreted
as a quest for combating all triggering events; in focus are only those that combine
with hazards to produce hazardous events.
The number of possible pairs must admittedly be as large as the infinite number
of triggering events. This suggests that any list of safety issues is inherently incom-
plete. Paradoxically, this principal weakness may also be considered a pragmatic
strength. In a universe of endless causal combinations, the concept of safety issues
offers a just terminology for singling out those issues causing multiple or critical
hazardous events. Let us return to the example of the tank in Figure 5.14. The tank
may be subject to a vast number of triggers, for example, maintenance errors, cor-
rosion or someone firing off a bullet. Instead of unilaterally asking what may trigger
the substance into realization, safety issues help focusing the investigation by ask-
ing how the hazard may respond to common triggers. In comparison, also Tripod
reduces the causal universe into a manageable few, but on an underlying level and
without explicit reference to hazard.
5.7.3 Including safety issues in our vocabulary of risk assessment
The reader should note that the above reasoning is based on the conception of haz-
ard and hazardous event as defined in the present study. In ARMS (2009), these con-
cepts are somewhat differently conceived. Erroneous inferences are thus likely to
haunt our conceptual discussion. The reason for taking such interpretative freedom
is not only that safety issues is a relatively unexplored idea that is still under de-
velopment, but also because the presentation of ARMS (2009) signifies a rather poor
understanding of fundamental risk-related concepts. By example, the authors speak
of risk assessment of historical events and the frequency of initial hazard. According
to the discussions of Section 2.2 and Section 5.2, these are conceptually troublesome
statements. Notwithstanding this, it is believed that safety issues offer an interesting
perspective that is worthy of theoretical refinement.
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Ahelpful, but subjectivemeans for structuringhazard identification
It appears as no coincidence that the concept of safety issues is developed for avia-
tion organizations. In the aviation industry, the hazards are varied and numerous, as
are also the events that may trigger their realization. Both potential and kinetic en-
ergy are given premises for flight operations. In turn, these may combine with nat-
ural hazards (e.g.lightning), intentional threats (e.g. hijacking) and triggering events
(e.g. engine component failure). Faced with such diverse possibilities, safety is-
sues offer a helpful means for structuring the process of both hazard identification
and causal analysis. A detailed assessment is, according to ARMS (2009), relatively
simple due to the concrete specifications of safety issues. The argument that the
assessment is also rendered more objective and scientific is, however, more diffi-
cult to follow. Even if the process becomes more transparent, one cannot escape
the fact that selecting the issues per se is a subjective matter. If these underlying as-
sumptions are hidden, an “objective” assessment of safety issues may only serve to
conceal the subjectivity Shrader-Frechette (1991) finds so important to reveal.
The grand question
Safety issues have a more pragmatic appeal than the framework of Wagenaar et al.
(1990). Rather than focusing on distant generic factors, safety issues shed light on
tangible localities both operators and assessor can physically relate to. The argu-
ment of ARMS (2009) that you can do something about safety issues is therefore
sensible. Yet, the grand question is not whether you can do something about safety
issues, but whether doing something about your safety issues will affect the overall
risk. If Reason (1990b) has taught us one thing, it is that combating accidents on this
level is hardly sufficient. Does this imply that the concept of safety issues should
be rejected? Safety issues, as presented in ARMS (2009), are definitely in need for
both theoretical and methodological refinement. It is still in the opinion of this au-
thor that safety issues supplement our vocabulary of hazard and hazardous event,
by uniquely describing the interplay between the former and triggering events. Es-
pecially relevant is this for contexts in which many hazards are likely to combine
into hazardous events. Moreover, the concept makes a valuable complement to the
proactive framework ofWagenaar et al. (1990). Whereas the latter assists in stopping
the causal flow before entering the bowtie, safety issues offer a powerful alliance
when recognizing the impossibility of full prevention. How to balance the two per-
spectives is, however, amatter of riskmanagement that lies beyond the scope of this
study.
Finally, it should be stressed that the two perspectives are compared on a con-
ceptual level only. Tripod-Delta is an audit tool, whereas safety issues are intended
for (operational) risk assessment. The latter would thus have been of superior rele-
vance had our quest been one of methodology. On a conceptual level, both frame-
works offer valuable descriptors for the initial extent of the bowtie.
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Chapter 6
Accident scenario
6.1 Introduction
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) introduce accident scenario as the answer towhat can go
wrong? It is a peculiar recognition that the concept so dear to Kaplan and Garrick
is left undefined both in the original source and the clarifying retrospect of Kaplan
(1997). What is also disquieting is that so many theorists and practitioners have
adopted the triplet definition of risk, while focused discussions on this fundamental
concept remain rare. An attempt of definition is found in the appendix of Garrick
(2008, p.246):
Accident scenario: a sequence of events, starting with an event known
as the initiating event (..) or an initial condition, and then proceeds
through a series of events until the system either corrects itself or the
scenario of events is terminated at a damaged, degradated, or destroyed
state.
A simpler means for conceiving accident scenario is to view it as a single path in
an event tree. This is illustrated in Figure 6.1, showing that an accident scenario is
uniquely determined by an initiating event (IE) and its path to a corresponding end
state (ES) (Kaplan, 1997). The structuring of accident scenarios shows the logic of
how a system responds to different types of events and conditions. An accident sce-
nario is not an experienced, but a hypothetical sequence of possible events (Khan,
2001). Just like risk, is accident scenario hence a prospective term. For the purpose
of describing an accident that has already occurred, accident course is considered
more appropriate.
The concept of accident scenario is cardinal to the quantitative definition of Ka-
plan and Garrick (1981) and has remained so in the later work of both authors. It is
foundational to what Garrick (2008) denotes the scenario approach to quantitative
risk assessment. This is a methodology that embodies the triplet definition of risk.
After identifying, categorizing and selecting a critical set of scenarios, the probability
and consequence of each scenario are calculated and collocated in the representa-
tion formats of Table 1.1 and Figure 1.4. This is, however, not a general convention.
An alternative approach is recommended by NORSOK Z-013 (2001), replacing acci-
dent scenario with the concept of accidental event (i.e. our preferred notion of haz-
ardous event) as the focal point of analysis. Accident scenario is left undefined in
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Figure 6.1: An accident scenario is a single path in the event tree.
this otherwise declarative standard, which is true also for the vast majority of other
guides under study. Only in IMO (2002, p.4) is a proper definition sought:
Accident scenario: A sequence of events from the initiating event to one
of the final stages
Due to its conciseness in capturing the distinctive features of accident scenario, the
definition of IMO (2002) is adopted for the present study. Most importantly, it is
considered true to the concept as presented in, for example, Kaplan (1997). This is
not to say that the definition provides a sterling description on its own; required is
an explanation of what is meant by “initiating event” and “final stages”. The impor-
tance of clarifying these boundaries is substantiated by Khan (2001), who reports
wide variation in the portrayal of scenario extent in practice. The following sections
endeavor to clarify what is meant by initiating event and end stages. Ultimately,
this serves to further illuminate the concept of accident scenario. A final discussion
pulls the threads together by questioning the soundness of accident scenario and
contrasting the scenario approach to risk assessment with the approach of NORSOK
Z-013 (2001).
6.2 Initiating event
A quick search in Kaplan and Garrick (1981) reports no matches to the term initiat-
ing event. In Kaplan (1997), it appears as a central yet undefined word, describing
the point of departure for an accident scenario. Not until consulting Garrick (2008,
p.246) is a concise explanation sought, defined in parenthesis as:
Initiating event: (an event that upsets an otherwise normally operating
system)
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N1 2 i. . . . ES0N-1
Figure 6.2: Depiction of the success scenario S0 (adopted fromGarrick, 2008).
NN-11 2 i. . . . ES0
IE
What can go wrong?
i
Figure 6.3: Identifying initiating events (adopted fromGarrick, 2008).
6.2.1 Initiating event according to Kaplan and Garrick
Garrick (2008) explains initiating event both conceptually and methodologically by
reference to Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3. The first diagram depicts the success scenario,
S0, describing the functioning of a system when working as planned. After going
through N , as planned events, this scenario leads to the successful end state, ES0.
By asking what can go wrong? for every i ; i = 1,2...,N , possible departures from
S0 are identified and portrayed as in Figure 6.3. A prerequisite for answering this
question is a proper understanding of the system and its interactions with the en-
vironment. Invaluable is also the aid of hazard identification methods like FMEA
and HAZOP (Kaplan et al., 2001). The answers may range from equipment failure to
natural events and intentional acts. What they have in common is that they all rep-
resent one or more initiating events. For some applications, initial conditions (IC)
is considered a more appropriate term. A nuclear waste repository, for instance, is
not somuch threatened by initiating events as it is by a concurrent set of conditions,
like annual rainfall.
The notation of initiating event signals that it initiates an accident scenario, Si .
Figure 6.4 illustrates that depending on the subsequent events, an initiating event
may ramify into a range of possible end states, ESi . Each path in this state space
represents an accident scenario. Just as each IE can result in many end states, may
different IEs end up at the same end state. Kaplan (1997) suggests that accident sce-
narios thus in principle can be identified either by inductive or deductive reasoning;
by fault tree analysis of an end state or event tree analysis of an initiating event. The
latter is by far the conventional practice according to Garrick (2008). Fault tree anal-
ysis serves in turn for quantification of IE-probabilities. IE thus constitutes the top
event of the FTA and the initiating event in the ETA.
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Figure 6.4: An initiating event may ramify into a range of end states.
6.2.2 Locating initiating events in the bowtie-diagram
Kaplan and Garrick’s conception of initiating event is far from universal. An excep-
tional case is themethodology of ARAMIS (Delvosalle et al., 2006), reserving the term
for the events farthest to the left in the fault tree analysis(!), that is, what is conven-
tionally denoted basic events (USNRC, 1981). Following this nomenclature, initiat-
ing event denotes the most fundamental causes of a hazardous event. Consulting
another source, Khan (2001) insinuates that initiating events are equivalent to our
conception of hazardous event. Albeit these differences seem like terminological
quibbling, they have distinct methodological implications.
The initiating events of Garrick (2008) are modeled in the event tree and may
be stopped before they evolve into a hazardous event. For Delvosalle et al. (2006),
theymark themost basic level of causal investigation and are thus excluded from the
event tree. This is conceptually confusing, sincewhat is denoted IE in the two frame-
worksmay in fact be one and the same event, for instance, some operator error. Less
ambiguity follows the practice of Khan (2001). This is because hazardous event is
naturally situated at the center of the bowtie-diagram and not easily mistaken for
events earlier in the event sequence. The problem is that Khan, like so many oth-
ers, applies the notion of initiating event in subordinate clause and without further
contemplation. Readers familiar with, for instance, Delvosalle et al. (2006) or Ka-
plan (1997) are thus likely to interpret the concept according to their own frame of
references. This makes a certain recipe for inconsistency across analyses.
An obvious recommendation for ARAMIS is to replace initiating event by the
term basic event. Khan (2001) is in the same manner advised to rather employ the
term hazardous event. This is primarily to avoid confusion, but also because the
above discussion implies that initiating event is a vague descriptor that in principle
can be placed anywhere in the bowtie-diagram of Figure 6.5.
Further substantiation is given by Murphy et al. (2009) in a summary of their
forthcoming guideline book on layer of protection analysis (LOPA). LOPA is a semi-
quantitative tool for assessing the response of independent protection layers (IPL)
to an initiating event in the process industry. The concept of initiating event is so
central to LOPA that it makes the main topic of the coming book. According toMur-
phy et al. (2009), a key requirement is that the initiating event must be defined to
lead to adverse consequences given the failure of all safeguards. From the examples
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Figure 6.5: Initiating event can in principle be placed anywhere in the bowtie-
diagram.
provided by the trio, it is clear that an initiating event may be either a hazardous-
or a triggering event. Further clarification is sought in IAEA (1998), pinpointing that
some initiating events might lead directly to a hazardous event, whereas a combi-
nation of subsequent events is needed if a number of barriers are in place for miti-
gation. Where in the bowtie-diagram the initiating event is located, is thus given by
the nature of hazard and the safeguards under study.
6.2.3 Initiating event is a vague concept
If anything can be concluded from the above discussion, it is that initiating event
is an analytical term that principally serves to mark the point of departure of your
event tree analysis. To accentuate this point, it is tempting to redefine the concept
in a circular manner; initiating is what marks the initiation of an accident scenario.
This would be unfortunate, as the analyst is left with little guidance on where to
start her analysis. In turn, it would also cloud our very conception of accident sce-
nario. Nonetheless, it signals that for all other purposes but bounding an accident
scenario, initiating event is a somewhat superfluous term. It is in the opinion of
this author that the concepts of basic event, hazard, triggering event and hazardous
event provide a less ambiguous terminology.
For the purpose of scenario structuring, initiating event remains a cardinal con-
cept. Instead of merely mapping where it might be placed in the bowtie-diagram,
one should thus ask where it ought to be. Garrick (2008) offers a principal advice
in the point at which an otherwise normally operating system is upset. A problem
is that this necessarily raises the question of what the “normal” sequence of events
is. Not only doesmapping the interactive operations of complex systems require ex-
tensive effort, but what is normal may in fact be departure from planned operations
(Hollnagel et al., 2006). Adaptation to normal disturbances makes the paradigmatic
basis of resilience engineering.
Putting these constraints aside, it seems a plausible inference that Kaplan and
Garrick’s understanding of initiating event resembles Reason’s conception of trig-
gering event. Where these are situated in the bowtie-diagram is pragmatically con-
ditioned on the system and hazard under study. To suggest a more generic location,
one is forced to question the very scenario approach to quantitative risk assessment.
That prosecution is deferred to the concluding discussions of Section 6.4, while for
now settling with initiating event as a concept given by departure from successful
operation.
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6.3 The termination of an accident scenario
The terminationof an accident scenario is closely connected to the third definitional
question if it does happen, what are the consequences? In Kaplan and Garrick (1981),
the answer to this question is given in a measure of damage, X . This is not a single
parameter, but a vector quantity that is both uncertain and time-dependent (Ka-
plan, 1997). The same X is by Garrick (2008) set equivalent to the end state of a
scenario, which indicates that X and ES are actually one and the same thing. Even
though this inference is disclaimed in the following, it certainly proves that the end-
ing of a scenario depends on the consequences under consideration and vice versa.
A key feature is the extent of which intervening, or pivotal, events to include in the
event tree. This is intertwined with the issues of analytical purpose and what time
frame to consider.
6.3.1 Adding a fourth question to the triplet definition of risk
Introductorily, it was noted that Haimes (2009) suggests adding a fourth question to
the triplet definition of risk in over what time frame? Answering what can go wrong,
he claims, has got everything to do with the timing of adverse effects. Haimes illus-
tratively points to the diversity of consequences following the hurricane Katrina in
2005, ranging from loss of life, property and jobs to erosion of confidence in gov-
ernment and technology. Anymeaningful assessment of future hurricane scenarios
should according toHaimes include a similar vector of consequences. The challenge
is that these outcomes not only differ in their temporal proximity to the initiating
event, they also continue to evolve as a function of time and the vulnerability and
resilience of the system. This can be illustrated by the recent tragedy at Haiti, where
the number of reported fatalities continued to increase formany weeks after the ini-
tial earthquake. Whether one stops to measure the consequences immediately after
the quake or when the last survivor is dug out four weeks later (Times, 2010), is thus
decisive when assessing the risk of future disasters.
Kaplan and Garrick’s conception of accident scenario is perplexed by the recog-
nition that some consequences are revealed in considerable time after an initiating
event. Does this mean that an accident scenario continues to evolve until the final
consequences are manifest? The hurricane Katrina and the earthquake at Haiti in-
dicate the justness of this supposition. Terminating an accident scenario without
considering the timing of recovery actions would in the latter case be deluding, as
many people died not in the initial quake but while waiting for help. A presumption
is the existence of a certain point in time when survivors are no longer expected to
be found, which serve as a natural endpoint of the scenario. In principle, this may
be true also for damage to environment and property. Yet for more distant conse-
quences, such as increased crime or loss of trust, the whole idea of setting a definite
end state seems rather absurd. Not only may these in principle be of infinite regress,
they also become less tangible (if ever) along with the temporal distance to a haz-
ardous event. Although immaterial consequences are rarely considered in conven-
tional risk assessment, they are determinative to authoritative priority setting on risk
control (Hokstad and Steiro, 2006). More importantly, they raise a question that also
concerns latent consequences to human health and the environment. Are scenarios
of distant effects principally boundless?
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Figure 6.6: Different interest horizons following a hazardous event.
6.3.2 End states are not equivalent to consequences
The riddle of consequence timing encourages us to contest Garrick (2008) by demar-
cating end states from consequences. Following the recognition of Riker (1957), an
end state is merely an artificially imposed situation that serves to bound an event
or a sequence of events. A consequence on the other hand, is an ontologically re-
alistic outcome to be measured from this state. The principal inference is that the
timing ofmeasurement need not coincide with that of the end state. Although a sce-
nario is said to cease with the stabilization of an event sequence, the accounting of
consequences may still take place at a later point of time. Especially important is
this for hazardous events in potency of latent consequences. The increased rates of
Thyroid cancer following the Chernobyl accident serve as a tragic reminder of this
point (WHO, 2006). Notwithstanding thedifficulty of envisaging the extent of distant
outcomes, the tragedy demonstrates the importance of considering consequences
subsequent to the stabilization of an identifiable sequence of events. Flipping the
coin, one can suggest that the ending of a scenario is not principally a question of
when to stop and measure the consequences, but what pivotal events are crucial to
their undesired development.
6.3.3 Undesirability of outcomes and stakeholder interests
End states are inmost literature described as a set of undesirable outcomes (see, e.g.
USCG, 2000b; Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Due to the subjectivity inherent in the
notion undesirable, this appears unfortunate at first glance. It does, however, per-
fectly coincide with the risk definitions of Rosa (1998) and Klinke and Renn (2002). If
risk relates to consequences of what humans value, any modeling of consequences
is necessarily determined by what is considered undesirable/desirable by someone.
This is not to question the undesirability of, for instance, fatalities or financial loss,
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Figure 6.7: Risk acceptance criteria as determinative to scenario end state.
but a reminder of the importance of stakeholder interests to risk assessment. Fig-
ure 6.6 suggests that a worker might be most concerned with acute health effects,
while a shareholder’s prime concern are economic ripple effects. Many companies
have gone bankrupt after experiencing a major accident, not necessarily due to im-
mediate poverty loss but from loss of reputation (Hokstad and Steiro, 2006). Yet for
other companies, liquidity might be improved in the long run as a result of reactive
quality improvements or confident handling of crisis. In both cases is scenario ex-
tent decisive for judging the undesirability of an outcome. This implies that what
end state to consider depends on the commissioning party, by virtue of setting the
purpose of analysis.
6.3.4 The end state is given by the purpose of analysis
The objective of risk assessment is not only a function of a decisionmaker’s interest,
but also of regulatory requirements. The Petroleum Safety Authority in Norway, for
instance, requires operators to compare the results of risk assessment with a pre-
defined set of risk acceptance criteria (PSA, 2001). Among the required criteria are
measures of fatality, pollution and loss of main safety functions. Since these are dif-
ferently located in the progression of an accident scenario as suggested in Figure 6.7,
the end points will differ accordingly (NORSOK Z-013, 2001). The most common
measure for environmental pollution is damage duration, that is, the recovery time
froma spill occurs until restorationhas been completed. When calculating thismea-
sure, the end state is given at the point of complete restoration (Vinnem, 2007). For
fatalities the picture is not so clear-cut, as no guidance is provided on which pivotal
events to include in the counting of fatalities. Should one stop the analysis when
people lie in the water or after a series of rescue operations?
USCG (2000b) offers a solution by modeling the succession of one and the same
hazardous event over two event trees. The first models the onset and development
of a fire. If not extinguished, the fire will lead to an end state of people in the wa-
ter. From that state yet another tree is drawn, modeling events and conditions (e.g.,
water temperature and the presence of other vessels) that determine the success of
rescue prior to Hypothermia. Whereas the former serves for evaluation of defenses
against fire, the latter assesses the efficiency of the United States Coast Guard’s res-
cue operations. The accident scenario can either be seen as a prolonged path from
the beginning of the first diagram to the end state of the second, or as two or more
scenarios determined by two different end states.
What this all boils down to is the necessity of choosing an end state relevant for
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the study’s purpose. As such, it appears a feasible suggestion that an accident sce-
nario follows the entire sequence but can be partitioned in two parts. One follows
a hazardous event through the lines of reactive barriers, and the other the subse-
quent recovery actions. The former normally lies within the scope of risk analysis,
while the latter is covered by emergency and preparedness analysis (EPA) (NORSOK
Z-013, 2001). An alternative division can be made between analyses of risk and vul-
nerability, as is suggested by Einarsson and Rausand (1998) in Figure 2.2. Where to
draw the line might still be unclear, as all modes of analysis are closely intercon-
nected. The interested reader may consult NORSOK Z-013 (2001) and DSB (2010)
for guidance on performing risk analysis as basis for EPA and vulnerability analysis.
6.3.5 Maximum-credible accident scenarios
TheU.S. Environmental ProtectionAgency recommends emergency plans to bebased
onworst-case scenarios (Khan, 2001). Considered are typicallymaximumshort-term
consequences of instantaneous release of a large amount of a chemical, assuming
the failure of all mitigation systems. This is according to Khan (2001) an unfortunate
confinement, as the approach not only de-emphasizes the probability of scenario
occurrence, but also disregards possible domino effects over a longer time frame.
As an alternative, Khan introduces the principle ofmaximum-credible accident sce-
narios (MCAS), requiring a scenario to be within the realm of possibility (i.e. have a
probability higher than 10−6 per year) and have potential to cause significant dam-
age (i.e. at least one fatality). In order for emergency plans to be effective, they
shall be based on themost realistic paths of escalation and addressmultiple param-
eters of damage. Khan admits a conceptual weakness in that scenario escalation is
a hitherto neglected topic that lacks solid theoretical basis. One can furthermore
speculate whether the MCAS-approach is basically a variant of the expected value-
conception of risk. Although its ingeniousness can be contested, Khan (2001) offers
a principal point in how scenario extent and selection influence the mode and use
of risk assessment- and vice versa.
6.3.6 Uncertainty at the point of further ramification
Accepting that the end state must fit the purpose of analysis shatters the hope of
any imperative termination of accident scenario. This recognition makes an impor-
tant premise, but should not deter us from seeking general advice on the subject.
One recommendation is offered by IAEA (1998), stating that event trees should be
developed only up to the point where the nature of event sequence is uniquely de-
termined. This implies that a scenario should not proceed in the absence of dis-
crete pivotal events of clear sequential ordering. A contrary example is the scenario
projections of IPCC (2007) on anthropogenic climate change. These are based on
continuous emissions and distant human and natural responses, which would yield
considerable uncertainties if modeled in an event tree. The scenarios are instead
derived from advanced models of physical simulation.
Also Garrick (2008) is concerned with the issue of uncertainty, pinpointing that
the farther one extends an accident scenario, the more uncertain are the results.
This is one of the main reasons why core damage frequency (CDF) is the most com-
mon measure of nuclear power plant risk. Compared to calculating the probability
of radiation health effects, one ismuchmore confident if stopping the analysis at the
point of core damage. Despite this obvious advantage, Garrick prescribes caution in
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Figure 6.8: Cutting of the event tree at the point where specific modeling expertise
is required.
letting surrogate endpoints like CDF reflect consequences further out in the event
chain. The reason is that downstream risk measures might be inversely affected
by a reduction in the precursor. Depending on the means by which core damage
frequency is lowered, the frequency of secondary containment and fatalities might
actually increase. This calls for a holistic approach in understanding the coupled
processes between endpoints at different stages of scenario development. As such,
Garrick (2008) finds it necessary to trade confidence with coherence in extending
the scenario for further development. What further complicates the picture is that
a whole treeful of end states reside within each category. Core damage actually in-
cludes a spectrum of damages, as do health effects in ranging from acute fatalities to
latent injuries and cancer deaths. This not only challenges the logical construction
of event trees, but also how different damage states are collocated and compared.
An attractive fix is presented in Rasmuson (1992), cutting of the scenario at the
point at which specific modeling expertise is required for dispersion, dose-response
relationships and so on. Ending the scenario within the competence radius of the
risk assessor is a sensible idea, since extension beyond this point would introduce
an obvious source of epistemic uncertainty. It will also improve the manageabil-
ity of analysis, as the vector of consequences could possibly emanate from a com-
mon node as depicted in Figure 6.8. It should be noted that the modeling efforts
exemplified in this figure enter into many of the same boxes; assessment of acute
health effects, for instance, also requires dispersion modeling of the reach of expo-
sure (Leeuwen and Vermeire, 2007). Rasmuson further recommends constructing
event trees with enough detail to partition short-term and long-term damage se-
quences, while admitting that this is difficult to achieve inpractice. Notwithstanding
this, it is cardinal to note that any meaningful comparison across sets of scenarios
presupposes that the end states are cut off at the same level.
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6.3.7 Terminating the accident scenario
Three main inferences can be drawn from the above discussion on scenario end
states. The first is that if the concept of initiating event is ever so vague, the termi-
nation of a scenario is even more difficult to establish. Secondly, this owes to the
inference that what end state to consider is ultimately a question of purpose. This
can be seen to work at two levels; implicitly through the selection of relevant conse-
quences and their timing, and explicitly in the relevancy of pivotal events. Central to
the former are stakeholder interest and regulatory requirements. The latter is prag-
matically determined by the system or unit under analysis and the hazardous event.
For example, it may be adequate to model the efficiency of a technical system’s re-
sponse to a specific hazardous event up to the breaching of the final reactive barrier.
Vulnerability or EPA analyses on the other hand, gain from extension to the very last
recovery action or the point of final restoration. This is pinpointed in the illustration
of Einarsson and Rausand (1998) in Figure 3.4. The figure also implies that it takes
more than one bowtie-diagram to contrast varying end-states, as the bowtie’s end
by default marks the termination of the accident scenarios.
What further complicates thepicture is the interconnectedness between all types
of analyses. Especially trenchant is this when constructing scenarios of security
threats, as the initiating event is in itself a complex of the adequacy and extent of an-
ticipated responses and vulnerability (Garrick et al., 2004). In an ever uncertain fu-
ture, this is restricted by our third andmost general conclusion; any scenario should
end when further development of the event tree is unfeasible. Adapting the rec-
ommendation of IAEA (1998), the reader is advised against developing a scenario
beyond the point at which relevant branches may be uniquely identified and se-
quentially ordered. This is not to say that consequences beyond this point are dis-
regarded. An end state is not a consequence in itself; it is the point from which con-
sequences are measured- either instantaneous or in latency. Rather, it restrains us
from introducing further uncertainty by extending the scenario beyond the knowl-
edge of the risk assessor. It is nevertheless important to carry on the advice of Gar-
rick (2008), stressing that sole reliance on surrogate endpoints may yield counter-
productive measures. This calls for holistic and careful evaluation of consequences
that ramify at different end points in the sequence of events.
6.4 Is accident scenario a sound concept?
Accident scenario is an intuitive concept, which after closer examination rises as a
complex of vaguely defined initiating events and pragmatic end states. Focus has
hitherto been on the extent of a scenario, in search of a canonical starting point and
a clear finishing line. Although a handful of advice and quite a number of cautions
are promoted, the closest one comes to a grand conclusion is probably that accident
scenario is not subject to universal bounding. While this need not be a bad quality, it
certainly offers a pretext for questioning the necessity of employing this vague con-
cept. The soundness of the concept of accident scenario is therefore contemplated
in this final discussion, first from a conceptual standpoint and then in light of prac-
tical risk assessment and the understanding of its results.
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6.4.1 Refining the triplet definition of risk
The task of finding, organizing and categorizing accident scenarios is according to
Kaplan (1997) part science and part art. Subsequent to the seminal paper of Kaplan
and Garrick (1981), this systematic process has been titled Theory of Scenario Struc-
turing (TSS). Within it are well-knownmethods like FT, ET, FMEA and HAZOP, along
with unconventional methods like Anticipatory Failure Determination (AFD) (see,
e.g. Kaplan, 1997). TSS is thus not a specific method or theory, but a general per-
spective for envisioning and tracking the effects of hazards and threats on a system
(Kaplan et al., 2001). One can say that accident scenario is the end, TSS the means
and the triplet definition of risk the motivation. The concept of accident scenario
makes a constituent part of the triplet definition of risk, which in turn guides the
structuring and quantification of scenarios. Transferring this link into practice has
shown that the concept of accident scenario is not without flaws.
A principal problem stems from the recognition that different methods within
TSS can lead to different sets of scenarios for the same underlying problem. Kaplan
et al. (2001) admit that this is conceptually awkward in light of the triplet definition
of risk. To eliminate this awkwardness, the trio finds it necessary to refine the origi-
nal definition of risk by making explicit three requirements that have formerly been
implicit. That is, that the set of accident scenarios used in a quantitative risk analysis
shall be:
1. Complete, in the sense that the set contains all possible scenarios.
2. Finite and denumerable, which is a presumption for making a table as in Ta-
ble 2.1.
3. Disjoint, meaning that Si ∩ S j = 0, in order to sum the probabilities over all
scenarios.
The issue of completeness has haunted the triplet definition since it was originally
introduced in Kaplan and Garrick (1981). Back then, the authors answer to a cri-
tique of theWash-1400 report, objecting that since the listing of scenarios in reality
is infinite, no risk analysis can ever be complete. To improve the formalism of risk
analysis, Kaplan and Garrick introduce an “other” category, SN+1, representing all
scenarios not otherwise included. The set of scenarios is now logically complete as
this remainder can be assigned a probability. This is not further pursued in Kaplan
(1997), where an alternative solution is suggested by adding a c to the set of triplets:
R =
{〈
si ,pi ,xi
〉}
c (6.1)
The refinement is to emphasize that risk by definition is the complete set of scenar-
ios. This signals the importance of identifying if not all, at least those that are most
important. Kaplan et al. (2001) agree with this rationale, but find it incompatible
with the variances seen in practical scenario structuring. How can the scenarios be
complete if every man comes up with his own set to the same problem? The sug-
gested solution is yet another refinement to the triplet definition of risk:
R =
{〈
sα,pα,xα
〉}
,αǫA (6.2)
In essence, the subscripts convey that the actual set of scenarios is neither finite nor
denumerable as is implied in the original definition. Whereas the quality of com-
pleteness naturally holds, they are as continuous and non disjoint as any aspect of
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Figure 6.9: Consequence spectrum following a hazardous event.
reality (cf. Riker, 1957). The scenarios of risk analysis are only approximations to this
true set of scenarios, which is partitioned into complete, finite and disjoint subsets.
This takes the ontological troublesome idea of a finite set of scenarios out of the def-
inition of risk. In the same turn, it justifies that different methods yield dissimilar
scenarios, as they are simply different approximations to the same underlying truth.
According to Kaplan et al. (2001), this is both conceptually and practically satisfac-
torily.
Although the refined definition of Kaplan et al. (2001) might be conceptually sat-
isfactorily, it is ultimately a recognition of the omnipresent uncertainty in the sce-
narios you fail to envisage. The epistemological foundation of Kaplan and his asso-
ciates resembles the position of Rosa (1998), where risk is interpreted as a real world
phenomenon to be separated from our subjective knowledge of it. Rosa makes a
crucial point in that all approximations are not equally good representations of the
truth. Since any risk analysis is only as good as the set of identified set of scenarios,
this implies the benefit of applying diverse techniques for scenario identification.
Chiefly, this holds for the identification of initiating events, but also for what pivotal
events are considered relevant for further ramifications (Garrick, 2008).
Kaplan and Garrick refrain from admitting any other weaknesses of the concept
of accident scenario. Funnily enough, this is also true for the contrary; compelling
arguments for why accident scenario is such a fundamental concept remain notably
absent. Instead, it is launched as a given companion to the triplet definition of risk.
What is further remarkable, is the scarcity of focused discussions amongst thosewho
have adopted or disclaimed the triplet definition of risk, like the otherwise concep-
tually engaged Aven (2010b). Onemeans for initiating such a discourse is to contrast
the scenario approach to risk assessment with the practice of NORSOK Z-013 (2001).
6.4.2 Contrasting the scenario approach to risk assessment
The conventional approach in the Norwegian petroleum industry is to calculate risk
relative to a set of hazardous events. For referential purposes, this is denoted the
NORSOK Z-013 (2001)-approach in the current study. NORSOK Z-013 (2001) lists a
set of hazardous events1 , which shall, as a minimum requirement, be considered to
1NORSOK Z-013 (2001) uses the term accidental event, which is equivalent to our conception of haz-
ardous event. Following the argumentation in Section 5.5, the latter is consistently applied in the follow-
ing, even when in direct reference to NORSOK Z-013 (2001).
99
Table 6.1: Presentation format of risk relative to a set of hazardous events (adapted
from Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
HE Pr(HE) Loss of lives Material damage Environmental damage
Pr(C1) Pr(C2) Pr(Cn ) Pr(C1) Pr(C2) Pr(Cn) Pr(C1) Pr(C2) Pr(Cn)
the extent they are applicable. Amongst these are:
• Blowouts
• Process leaks, unignited and ignited
• Collisions
• Falling/swinging objects
• Structural collapse
• Loss of stability
For each hazardous event, a probability, Pr(HEi ), is assigned and a spectrum of con-
sequences identified (Vatn, 1998). The consequences are uncertain and describable
by a joint probability density function, Pr(C1,C2.. | HEi ), given the occurrence of
a hazardous event. Alternatively, this may be written as a vector of consequences
and their associated probabilities, [C1,C2..Cn ][p1 ,p2 ..pn ]. The risk of each hazardous
event can then be described as:
R(HEi )= Pr(HEi ) · [C1,C2..Cn][p1 ,p2 ..pn ] (6.3)
To get a description of the total risk picture, the risk associated with every hazardous
event may furthermore be summarized and compiled. With reference to the dis-
cussion on expected value in Section 2.4, caution is urged when summing up risk
in this manner. Another difficulty is that only consequences of similar dimensions
are summarizable (Rausand and Utne, 2009b). Although summation is required for
comparison with overall risk acceptance criteria (Vinnem, 2007), it is for many pur-
poses satisfactorily to view the consequence spectrum in its entirety as in Figure 6.9.
A feasible presentation format is shown in Table 6.1. It is inspired by Rausand and
Høyland (2004), portraying the consequence spectrum of each hazardous event and
the associated probabilities. The consequences are, by example, split into three cat-
egories of n uniquely defined subcategories. Within the category “loss of lives” can,
for instance, Pr(C1), correspond to one fatality. The table perfectly answers the three
questions of Kaplan and Garrick (1981) and is hence adequate at least from a defini-
tional point of view.
6.4.3 Twomain differences
Table 6.1 is not surpassingly different fromTable 2.1 as presented in Kaplan andGar-
rick (1981). Principally, the approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001) is nor very distant to
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Figure 6.10: Comparing (a)the scenario approach to risk assessment with the frame-
work of (b)NORSOK Z-013 (2001).
the scenario approach of Garrick (2008). Both derive a set of consequences fromone
ormore initiating events, and for one and the other are pivotal events determinative
to this purpose. Event tree analysis is central to both approaches. The single appar-
ent difference is that the former considers each path individually, whereas the latter
looks at the joint set of paths. There are, however, at least two principal dissimilari-
ties as this author sees it.
Pairs vs. sets of consequences
The first is that while the results of Garrick (2008) are given in pairs of initiating
event and consequence, the approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001) yields a set of con-
sequences for each hazardous event. In the former, consequences are typically un-
derstood as events, while the latter represents consequences as random variables
(Vatn, 1998). This is not to deny the multidimensionality of damage in the frame-
work of Kaplan and Garrick (1981), but a representational difference in the linking
of initiating events and end states. Figure 6.10 illustrates this in terms of one-to-one
and one-to-many relations respectively. Whereas the former renders it easy both to
calculate and track the probability of each pair, the latter yields a large and more
intractable set of consequences and their associated probabilities. On the positive
side, this will give a neater and more systematic list as each hazardous event is pre-
sented only once.
Departure from normal operation vs. hazardous event
A second difference lies in the starting point of the event tree. The distinction is
depicted in the bowtie-diagram of Figure 6.11. By following the practice of Garrick
(2008) and starting the scenarios at departure from successful operation, some of
the succeeding paths may not evolve into a hazardous event. It is also likely that
different initiating events give rise to one and the same hazardous event. Both have
the unfortunate implication that the identified sets of scenarios end up unnecessar-
ily large.
Starting the event tree analysis at the point of hazardous event will avoid this
problem, as one considers only those paths leading to damage if not controlled.
WhatKaplan (1997) denotes initiating events are instead included in the causal anal-
ysis of a fault tree, in a similar way, but with a different terminology than Delvos-
alle et al. (2006). This appears more conceptually and practically satisfactorily. Not
only does it carve up a line between cause and effect (cf. Pearl, 2000), offered is also
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Figure 6.11: Comparing (a)the scenario approach to risk assessment with the frame-
work of (b)NORSOK Z-013 (2001).
a more focused means for identifying hazardous events. Further substantiation is
sought in the perspective of Reason (1990b). Since one and the same hazardous
event can be triggered by a vast number of initiating events, a leaner analysis is
achieved by banishing these sporadic causal factors to the causal analysis. It also in-
dicates that scenario completeness can be easier claimed, as there are fewer means
of hazardous realization than the almost indefinite variants of initiating events.
6.4.4 Simple, but extensive calculus
Computationally, the scenario approach to risk assessment is comparatively straight-
forward. This is because one in principle arrives at only one probability per scenario,
that is, Pr (ASi ) (Garrick, 2008). Since a scenario consists of a single initiating event
and a corresponding end state, each pair is assigned a probability based on the ini-
tiating event and branch point probabilities (cf. Figure 6.1):
Pr(AS)= Pr(IE ) ·Pr(A¯ | IE ) ·Pr(B¯ | IE ∩ A¯) ·Pr(C | IE ∩ A¯∩ B¯) (6.4)
Equation 6.4 is strikingly simple in comparison with Equation 6.3, due to the feature
that only one end state is under consideration at the time. The approach of NORSOK
Z-013 (2001) deals with a vector of end states that each has a different probability. To
calculate the risk of each hazardous event, the various end state probabilities must
thus be collocated. This is arguably a more arduous task. There are, however, at
least two reasons why one should not jump to the conclusion that the scenario ap-
proach is computationally superior. Firstly, it necessitates a considerably longer list
of issues to be quantified. Although each scenario is easily quantified, the list of sce-
narios undergoing this operation is contrastingly large compared to the approach
of NORSOK Z-013 (2001). This is not only because each scenario calls for separate
consideration, but also on the grounds that more and larger event trees are likely
to follow when initiation is set prior to the level hazardous event. The paths not
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leading to a hazardous event and/or undesirable end states are naturally screened
out for calculation. Beyond that, little advice is offered for abridging the list of sce-
narios. This relates to a fundamental dissension within risk evaluation. Shall one
prioritize the scenarios that are most severe or those that are most probable? Clear-
cut advice is rendered difficult as these two dimensions are generally inversely re-
lated, ultimately displacing the issue from one of practicality to the realm of ethics
(Shrader-Frechette, 1991).
Whether the prolonged list offsets the benefit of simple calculus is difficult to
demonstrate, as it is likely to differ with the extent of both hazardous events and the
range of possible end states. It can be suggested that few hazardous events com-
bined with large spectra of end states favors a scenario approach. This is because
the list of scenarios is left relatively short compared to the number of columns that
would have to be included in Table 6.1. The more hazardous events, the more incal-
culable becomes the list of scenarios, and themore advantageous is the approach of
systematic handling by each hazardous event.
A more perplex objection owes to the difference between end states and con-
sequences as revealed in Section 6.3. Although it is conceptually unproblematic
that each scenario is determined by a single end state, this is muddled by the ob-
servation that consequences and end states are treated as synonymous. This owes
to the recognition that consequences are, as is repeatedly stressed by Kaplan and
Garrick (1981), multidimensional vectors that are time-dependent and uncertain.
As such, the authors render it unclear whether the second question of how likely is
it? in fact refers to the probability of the aggregate consequences, a single conse-
quence or even the initiating event. The approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001) is still
more comprehensive, as multiple end states are considered in addition to the issue
of multidimensionality. Yet, this seems to reaffirm that none of the approaches can
be acclaimed computational sovereignty.
6.4.5 Disjointness
A challenge that seems to riddle both approaches is the requirement of disjointness.
This is not troublesome to the purpose of identifying scenarios or consequences,
but makes a fundamental premise for summarizing consequence probabilities (Ka-
plan et al., 2001). Probability theory tells us that the probabilities of two non-disjoint
events cannot simply be added without considering the areas that overlap (Lindley,
2006). Hence if two or more paths in the event tree(s) coincide, simple summation
of the probabilities will result in double counting in the overall probability. Typically,
this occurs when single consequences are caused by several initiating or hazardous
events (Gowland, 2006). The former is more easily avoidable within the scenario ap-
proach to risk analysis, as each end state is explicitly determined by a corresponding
initiating event. Each pair is thus in principle a disjoint path in the event tree. The
approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001) is presumably more prone to double counting,
as the various end states are not only grouped, but may also evolve from tangled
hazardous events. A specific consequence may furthermore appear in several rows
in Table 6.1, which urges caution if summarizing the risk over all hazardous events.
The latter point holds, however, also for the approach of Kaplan and Garrick (1981).
Although each path in a single set of scenarios (i.e., one event tree) is conceivably
disjoint, may different sets of scenarios overlap. Not only can different sets lead to
the same consequences, the single scenarios are in fact based on categories of ini-
tiating events that call for similar responses (Garrick, 2008). A likely result is that
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nondisjointness is left hidden under a range of assumptions.
It should finally be remarked that although disjointness is a desirable feature,
Kaplan et al. (2001) acknowledge that a modest amount of nondisjointness can be
tolerated as its primary impact is conservativeness in the results.
6.4.6 Presentation of results and central risk contributors
The answers to the triplet definition of risk may according to Kaplan and Garrick
(1981) be given in the format of Table 2.1. For pictorial representation, the risk
curves of Figure 2.4 are recommended on the grounds that single numbers are insuf-
ficient for communicating the concept of risk. The curves (labeled complementary-
cumulative-distribution-functions) are constructed by ordering the scenarios of in-
creasing levels of damage and cumulating the respective probabilities. In the later
work of both Kaplan (1997) and Garrick (2008), the tabular format is left unmen-
tioned to the advantage of risk curves. To fully communicate a risk story, Garrick
(2008) prescribes not only single curves or families of curves, but also different rep-
resentations of families of curves. An extensive amount of modeling and analysis
is integrated and assembled in the representation of risk curves. This is an obvious
merit but also a pitfall, as it allows assumptions and major risk contributors to be
buried in the presentation format.
It is not the intention of this author to evaluate the adequacy of risk curves in
representing the results of quantitative risk assessment. This owes to the recognition
that risk curves in principle can be employed also to the HE-based approach, and is
hence not a distinguishing feature to the concept of accident scenario. If anything,
this begs us to twist the argument and ask whether the approach of NORSOK Z-013
(2001) offers any distinct representational advantages.
Defining risk relative to hazardous events provides a unique means for identify-
ing those hazards that contribute most to the overall risk picture. By summing the
risk of each hazardous event as suggested in Equation 6.3, the relative contributions
of, for example, process leaks and blowouts may be explicitly shown. Particularly
advantageous is this for decision making on allocation of risk reduction measures,
which lies at the core of risk management (Kjellén, 2000). The same does not hold
for the approach of Kaplan and Garrick (1981), as each hazardous event may enter
into a variety of scenarios without systematic consideration of its contribution to
the overall risk. A possible variant is to compare the relative contribution of each
initiating event. Yet, with reference to the above discussion and the framework of
Wagenaar et al. (1990), this appears both cumbersome and counter-productive.
Garrick (2008) admits that risk curves in many cases obscure the relative effect
of risk contributors. This is not, however, considered a major deficiency since most
risk assessment software packages contain algorithms for ranking various contrib-
utors. It is still in the opinion of this author that the approach of NORSOK Z-013
(2001) has an advantage in the structured consideration of each hazardous event.
Offered is not only a better basis for evaluating local risk, but also a well-arranged
representation of the total picture. Both considerations are essential in decisions on
risk acceptability (HSE, 2001).
6.4.7 Conceptual soundness and practical superfluity
Contrasting the scenario approach to risk assessment has indicated some few de-
ficiencies of the concept of accident scenario. These are principally of pragmatic
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character, such as the lacking of a systematic means for structuring results and dis-
playing major risk contributors. A conceptual weakness is pinpointed in the initia-
tion of a scenario at the level of triggering event. This not only implies that the event
tree analysis becomes unnecessarily large, but also casts doubt upon our ability to
achieve reasonable completion of the list of scenarios. On the positive side, the sce-
nario approach gains in simple calculability. The probability of each scenario is easy
to calculate and the corresponding end state simple to track. Disjointness is consid-
ered a more attainable quality following this approach, albeit caution is advised for
summarizing the results of both approaches. Especially important is this when the
sets of scenarios become numerous, which also makes the task of summarization
almost insurmountable.
Summarizing these pros and cons yields no clear answer to whether accident
scenario is a sound concept. The refinements to the triplet definition of risk sug-
gest that the implicit requirement of the set of accident scenarios to be complete,
finite and disjoint is conceptually challenging. Principally, this requirement should
hold also for the approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001), although the latter quality is
somewhat difficult to conceive. Compared to this approach, it is in the opinion of
this author that the concept of accident scenario gains in comprehensibility. It is
perfectly suitable for communicating a critical course of events, like the possible
developments following the recent blowout at an oil drilling platform in the Gulf of
Mexico. This is, however, not to say that accident scenario is by default a communi-
cable concept to decision makers. The longer the list of scenarios grow, the less do
the numbers speak for themselves and the greater becomes the need for structural
representation to provide meaningful input to decision makers.
The principal flaw of the concept of accident scenario remains in the diffuse
definitions of initiating event and end state. When the analytical bounding is that
vague, inconsistency across analyses is likely to follow. A promising refinement is to
displace the start of each scenario to the point of hazardous event, as is inspired by
the approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001). Still, little inspiration is offered on where to
stop the event tree.
Is the concept of accident scenario satisfactory and necessary for answering the
triplet definition of risk? It is in the opinion of this author that the answer to this
query is no. Also the approach of NORSOK Z-013 (2001) fits the definition of Kaplan
and Garrick (1981) well, principally without ever having to employ the ambiguous
notation of accident. It is, however, not the intention of this study to dismiss the
scenario approach to risk assessment as extensively employed by disciples of Kaplan
and Garrick (1981). Rather, it endeavors to call for awareness and discourse on the
conceptual and practical implications of the concept of accident scenario.
6.5 A refined definition of accident scenario
As an initiative to further reflection, a refined definition of accident scenario is here-
with suggested:
Accident scenario: A sequence of events from the hazardous event to a
uniquely determined end state of relevance.
The definition of IMO (2002) is adapted to include a less ambiguous description of
scenario extent. Firstly, the vague term initiating event is replaced with the more
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conceptually clear notion of hazardous event. Scenario termination is then speci-
fied by compressing themost general advice of Section 6.3. It signals that the ending
of a scenario is determined by the purpose of analysis, but should never be defined
beyond the point of discrete ramifications. The latter makes a clarifying but dis-
quieting specification, as it not only dismisses the concept of accident scenario for
continuous or ambiguously defined event sequences, but also shakes the analytical
bedrock of this study- the bowtie diagram.
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Chapter 7
Epilogue
Numerous years of risk talk at cross purposes have led Stan Kaplan to formulate two
theorems on communication (Kaplan, 1997, p.408):
• Theorem 1: 50 % of the problems in the world result from people using the
same word with different meanings.
• Theorem 2: The other 50% come from people using different words with the
same meaning.
When Kaplan finds himself in times of trouble, the theorems provide an effective
means for focusing and draining out the emotions of any scientific dispute. The
present study indicates that all risk scholars should follow the example of Kaplan
and post the theorems on their office walls. An obvious case of the first theorem is
the numerous conceptions of risk, while the second is demonstrated in the plethora
of names referring to what this author denotes hazardous event. Researchers, prac-
titioners and regulators use the words of risk assessment differently and inconsis-
tently. Not only does this preclude communication internally and across analysis
teams, it may also lead to erroneous applications ofmethods and inexpedient use of
results. By shedding light on the following concepts and challenges, this study has
demonstrated the importance of striving for a clear and consistent terminology on
the foundations of risk assessment:
• Risk: A vast number of theorists and standards seek to describe and define
risk. Someare contradictory, while others separated bywordily nuances. Defin-
ing risk urges contemplation on fundamental questions of ontology and epis-
temology, which in turn directs the understanding of results from risk assess-
ment. Although the quantitative definition of Kaplan and Garrick (1981) is
commonly accepted, it is very capacious and in need for interpretation. Each
analyst’s interpretation of the three questions conducts the risk assessment
process in significant matters.
• Counterconcepts to risk: An alternative means to conceiving risk is to ex-
plore its related concepts of uncertainty, safety, security, vulnerability and re-
silience. Some are complementary or to some degree antonymous, while oth-
ers are considered a constituent part of risk. Whether one considers, for exam-
ple, uncertainty and vulnerability as embedded in the triplet definition of risk,
influences the presentation of results and the modeling of scenario extent.
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• Risk-informed decision making: The purpose of risk assessment is to provide
decision support. Both the application and results of risk assessment shall
be tailored to this purpose, through stakeholder involvement and manage-
rial review. This presupposes good communication and that stakeholders and
decision makers understand the principles and results of risk assessment. A
diffuse nomenclature precludes deliberation and ultimately, the provision of
relevant risk insights.
• Hazards and events of release and causation: A set of terminological knobs is
essential for guiding the identification of hazards and the potential modes of
release. The redundancy of terms describing the midst of the bowtie-diagram
represent a clear case of Theorem 2. This is confusing to the analyst and hin-
ders comparison across analyses. The choice of words in causal analysis re-
flects the aetiology of accidents and has significant implications both on the
calculability and controllability of risk.
• Accident scenario: It is a true paradox that the perhaps most central term to
Kaplan and Garrick (1981) is also the less elaborated. Both the concept itself
and the terms that serve to bound it are somewhat circularly defined. The
modeling of scenario extent is thus pragmatically conditioned in both direc-
tions. While analytical freedom is not necessarily a bad thing, it seems like
nothing but vagueness is lost by confining the scenario by hazardous event
and the point of no further ramifications.
A general search in ScienceDirect yields 1,504,020 replies to risk. These are not all
of relevance to our quest, but they do reflect the central role the concept has come
to earn in the scientific literature. Although this study has shown that risk is an ut-
terly contested concept, it is all the same amature topic. This is precisely due to the
many definitional disputes and philosophical contributions of an eminent band of
researchers. The same holds for the second question of Kaplan and Garrick (1981),
which has been subject to intense academic debate regarding the proper interpreta-
tion of probability in risk assessment. Albeit contentious issues still remain, a broad
understanding has accumulated on the characteristics and fallacies of these funda-
mental concepts. It is in the opinion of this author that we have come to a point
where other issues urge the attentional capture of the scientific community.
The present study reveals that the common counterconcepts to risk are relatively
well explored, as are also the concepts of hazard and triggering event in the frame-
work of Tripod. This is not the case for the concept of accident scenario. Although
many practitioners and researchers embrace the scenario approach to risk assess-
ment, few have contemplated this foundational concept in a focused and construc-
tive manner. The discussions indicate that the analyst’s conception of accident sce-
nario is utterly decisive to risk assessment. This should serve as a motivation and
starting point for further scientific exploration. Especially trenchant is the need for
theoretical maturing on the issue of scenario extent. Scenario extent is in this study
discussed in light of the linear bowtie-model of accident risk. An interesting topic
for further research is the relevancy and extent of accident scenario within recent
paradigms of dynamic systems. Most imminent is, however, the need for reconciling
the call for clear specification with the recognition that scenario extent is ultimately
given by the purpose of analysis. At the heart of this enigma lies the challenge of
balancing stakeholder concerns with the analyst’s need for pragmatic procedures
and the decision maker’s call for consistent and communicable results. This is both
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a normative and methodological issue. Arguably, it calls for contextual and ethical
awareness on behalf of every risk analyst. Yet most important, it urges procedu-
ral improvements and further academic discourse on how analysis and deliberation
best can be integrated in practice.
A harmonized terminology will facilitate in resolving the above challenges. De-
veloping an agreeable conception of accident scenario necessitates clarification of
central concepts of initiation, hazardous release and termination. In the sameman-
ner does focused deliberation presuppose shared understanding of central words
and concepts. Sadly, if one overall finding stands out from the present study, it is
that this is certainly not the case today. It must be admitted that striving for a uni-
fying nomenclature seems overly ambitious at this moment. Although this author
believes that semantic pragmatism is a nuisance that should be fought, the com-
munication theorems of Kaplan (1997) are particularly important until we reach
that point. Awareness to the fact that people associate similar words with differ-
ent meanings provides a simple buffer to communication problems in deliberation
and analysis of risk. Guarding definitional distinctions becomes a premise, but also
a challenge as the decision maker is left with the task of final interpretation. The
paralyzing risk of volcano ash clouds signifies that resolving these issues becomes
increasingly important in a future of ever more complex decisions about risk.
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Appendix A
Abbreviations and acronyms
AE Accidental event
AFD Anticipatory failure determination
AS Accident scenario
ALARP As low as reasonably practicable
BE Basic event
CDF Core damage frequency
CE Critical event
DSB Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (NOR)
EPA Emergency and preparedness analysis
ES End state
ETA Event tree analysis
FMEA Failure mode and effects analysis
FSA Formal safety assessment
FTA Fault tree analysis
GFT General failure type
HAZOP Hazard and operability analysis
HE Hazardous event
HSE Health and safety executive(UK)
HRA Human reliability analysis
IE Initiating event
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO International Maritime Organization
IPCC International Panel on Climate Change
IPL independent protection layers
LOPA Layer of protection analysis
MCAS Maximum credible accident scenario
LC Latent conditions
PHA preliminary hazard analysis
PRA Probabilistic risk assessment
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority(NOR)
QRA Quantitative risk assessment
RAC Risk acceptance criteria
RIF Risk influencing factor
SAM System-action-management
SU Safety issue
TSS Theory of scenario structuring
TE Triggering event
UE Undesired event
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FOUNDATIONS OF RISK ASSESSMENT
(Grunnla get for risi kovurdering)
If you ask ten persons what they mean by the word "risk", you will, most likely, get ten different
answers. To a slightly less degree, this also applies to professionals who are working with risk
assessments. Quantitative risk assessments have now been applied for more than forty years, but still
the terminology is ambiguous and confusing. This leads to erroneous application of methods,
problems in communicating risk, and so on.
A commonly accepted definition of (accident) risk is that it is the answer of the three questions:
l. Which accident scenarios can happen (that may cause harm to some assets)?
2. How likely is each of these scenarios?
3. Ifa scenario does happen, what are the consequences?
The interpretation of this definition influences the choice of analytical methods, how the results from
these methods are understood, and so on. The scientific community is still discussing how we should
interpret the definition of risk, for example (i) what is an accident scenario, where does it start and
where does it stop, what is the "initiator" of the scenario, (ii) what arethe delimitations of accident
scenarios, does it comprise only acute effbcts or also long-term effects, (iii) what do we mean by the
terrn "likely", is it a properly of the scenario or only a social construct, (iv) what do we mean by
"consequences". when do we stop the accident scenario to "measure" the consequences, how can we
include long-term effects and parlial damage.
The objective of this master thesis is to shed light on the foundations of risk assessment, discuss the
basic concepts and how the interpretation of these concepts influences the risk analysis process and
the understandins of the results from the risk assessment.
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A.s part of this master thesis the candidate shall:
1 . Perform a literature survey and describe and discuss the main definitions (or interpretations)
of the lerm risk - and also discuss how the term risk is related to concepts like safety,
security, r.ulnerability, etc.
Discuss the concept of accident scenario. Suggest a "suitable" definition and especially
discuss the extent of a scenario, what is the initiating event of the scenario and where should
the development of the scenario be terminated?
Discuss the concepts of hazard and threat - and triggering events. Do we need to distinguish
between these concepts? The aviation organization ICAO has suggested to focus on so-called
sa.fbty issttes. What are the benefits and limitations of this approach?
How can we measure and compare consequences to various types of assets? - and how can
we obtain a single measure for different degrees of harm to one type of asset (e.g., fatalities,
inj uries, permanent vs. non-permanent dis abilit ies)?
Discuss risk assessment as basis for decision-making. What are the pros and cons related to
risk-based decision-makins related to risk-informed decision-makine?
Following agreement with the supervisor, the tasks may be given different weights - and additional
tasks may also be included.
Within tree weeks after the date of the task handout, a pre-study report shall be prepared. The reporl
shall  cover the fol lowins:
o An analysis of the work task's content with specific emphasis of the areas where new
knowledge has to be gained.
r A description of the work packages that shall be performed. This description shall lead to a
clear definition of the scope and extent of the total task to be performed.
o A time schedule for the project. The plan shall comprise a Gantt diagram with specification
of the individual work packages, their scheduled start and end dates and a specification of
project milestones.
The pre-study report is a parl of the total task reporting. It shall be included in the final report.
Progress reports made during the project period shall also be included in the final report.
The report should be edited as a research report with a summary, table of contents, conclusion, list of
reference, list of literature etc. The text should be clear and concise, and include the necessary
references to figures, tables, and diagrams. It is also important that exact references are given to any
extemal source used in the text.
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Equiprnent and software developed uring the project is a part of the fulfilment of the task. unressoutside parties have exclusive propertv rig"{s 9irrr" rr*nment is physically non-moveabre, it shourdi,""1####::?#tllnffi,?t""1 il;;lirlventation ioitn" 
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The student must cover travel expenses, telecommunication, and copying unless otherwise agreed.
If the candidate encounters unforeseen difficulties in trre work, and if these difficurties warrant areformation of the task, these problems should i""*Jr;;ry be acldressed to the Deparlment.
Deadline: June I 4.t 2010.
Two bound copies of the finar report and one electronic (cD) version are required.
Responsible professor/supervisor: professor Marvin Rausand
Telephone: 73 59 25 42
E_mail: marvin. rausnad@ntnu.no
Supervisor: plary Ann Lundteigen
Telephone: 73 59 7l 0I
E_rnail: mary.a. lundteigen@ntnu.no
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